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The motivation for computer forensics research includes the increase in crimes 
that involve the use of computers, the increasing capacity of digital storage media, a 
shortage of trained computer forensics technicians, and a lack of computer forensics 
standard practices. The hypothesis of this dissertation is that domain modeling of the 
computer forensics case environment can serve as a methodology for selecting keyword 
search terms and planning forensics examinations. This methodology can increase the quality 
of forensics examinations without significantly increasing the combined effort of planning 
and executing keyword searches. The contributions of this dissertation include: 
• A computer forensics examination planning method that utilizes the 
analytical strengths and knowledge sharing abilities of domain modeling 
in artificial intelligence and software engineering,  
• A computer forensics examination planning method that provides 
investigators and analysts with a tool for deriving keyword search terms 
from a case domain model, and 
  
• The design and execution of experiments that illustrate the utility of the 
case domain modeling method. 
Three experiment trials were conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of case 
domain modeling, and each experiment trial used a distinct computer forensics case 
scenario: an identity theft case, a burglary and money laundering case, and a threatening 
email case. Analysis of the experiments supports the hypothesis that case domain 
modeling results in more evidence found during an examination with more effective 
keyword searching. Additionally, experimental data indicates that case domain modeling 
is most useful when the evidence disk has a relatively high occurrence of text-based 
documents and when vivid case background details are available. 
A pilot study and a case study were also performed to evaluate the utility of case 
domain modeling for typical law enforcement investigators. In these studies the subjects 
used case domain models in a computer forensics service solicitation activity. The results 
of these studies indicate that typical law enforcement officers have a moderate 
comprehension of the case domain modeling method and that they recognize a moderate 
amount of utility in the method. Case study subjects also indicated that the method would 
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Computer forensics is a discipline that has been practiced for many years by 
computer administrators, law enforcement officers, and other practitioners. A computer 
forensics investigation typically involves the generic activities of incident identification, 
media collection, media examination, evidence analysis, and evidence presentation. The 
topic has more recently emerged as a popular subject of computer security and 
information assurance research. The motivation for computer forensics research includes 
the increase in crimes that involve the use of computers, the increasing capacity of digital 
storage media, a shortage of trained computer forensics investigators and technicians, and 
a lack of computer forensics standard practices.  
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that domain modeling of the computer forensics 
case environment (known as case domain modeling) can serve as a methodology for selecting 
keyword search terms and planning forensics examinations. This methodology can increase 
the quality of forensics examinations without significantly increasing the combined effort of 
planning and executing keyword searches. The hypothesis is discussed in more detail in 
Section 1.4. 
Case domain modeling supports computer forensics examination planning by 
providing a structured approach to analyzing, filtering, and specifying the case 
information that will be required for conducting an examination. The case domain model 
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is an organized representation of information about the case domain that will be required 
for a computer forensics examination. This document describes a methodology for 
planning a computer forensics examination and deriving appropriate keyword search 
terms using domain modeling.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Sections 1.1 and 1.2 
summarize the scope of computer forensics research and practice, Section 1.3 discusses 
the motivations for this dissertation, Section 1.4 presents the hypothesis of this 
dissertation, Section 1.5 highlights the contributions of this dissertation, Section 1.6 
discusses practical applications of this dissertation research, and Section 1.7 provides an 
overview of the remainder of this document.  
1.1 Digital Forensics Defined 
Digital forensic science is an emerging scientific discipline defined by the First 
Annual Digital Forensics Research Workshop in 2001 as: 
The use of scientifically derived and proven methods toward the preservation, 
collection, validation, identification, analysis, interpretation, documentation, and 
presentation of digital evidence derived from digital sources for the purposes of 
facilitating or furthering the reconstruction of events found to be criminal, or 
helping to anticipate unauthorized actions shown to be disruptive to planned 
operations [52].  
 
Digital forensic science is not yet a mature scientific discipline because it has not 
yet exhibited the required characteristics of a scientific discipline: theory, abstractions 
and models, elements of practice, corpus of literature and professional practice, and 
confidence/trust in results [52]. 
Digital forensics can be further divided into three major areas: 
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• Computer forensics: Collecting, analyzing, and preserving evidence from 
digital storage media, 
• Network forensics: Collecting, analyzing, and preserving evidence that is 
spread throughout a network of computers, and 
• Software forensics: Determining the identity of the original author of a piece 
of software, malware, virus, malicious code, etc. 
This dissertation focuses exclusively on computer forensics, with a primary 
emphasis on the examination activity in a generic computer forensics process. Support is 
also provided for the preservation, analysis, and presentation activities that occur in a 
generic computer forensics process.  
1.2 The General Computer Forensics Process 
Although there is no widely adopted standard process model for computer 
forensics [49, 57, 74], a variety of process models have been proposed [4, 6, 19, 22, 31, 
48, 52, 57, 64, 66, 70]. These process models generally include the abstract phases of 
identification, collection, examination, analysis, and presentation. This dissertation 
adopts the Digital Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) model of the investigative 
process [52] illustrated in Figure 1.1 (an adaptation of the original figure) as a framework 
for the specific model of the examination activity. This model of the complete process 
was chosen because it was developed by a group of workshop members from academia, 
law enforcement, and private industry. Sections 1.2.1–1.2.6 describe each phase of the 












The preservation phase can be regarded as an umbrella activity because it is not 
really a stand-alone phase. The preservation “phase” is actually a set of activities that are 
continually practiced during the identification, collection, examination, analysis, and 
presentation phases. Hence, the rounded rectangle in Figure 1.1 that is labeled 
“preservation” encloses all other process activities (illustrated with a dotted rectangle). 
Preservation activities are concerned with ensuring that the evidence is handled properly 
to guarantee validity in a court of law. For example, the chain of custody must be 
documented and maintained throughout the entire investigation. In cases that do not involve 









may not involve legal proceedings include data recovery, time-critical combat zone 
military intelligence gathering, and network security incident root cause analysis.  
1.2.2 Identification  
In the identification phase, a crime or incident is detected or reported to the 
relevant authorities, who may be law enforcement officers, chief information officers, 
security officers, corporate managers, or incident response centers. The crime may fall 
into one or more of the following categories: a crime committed against a computer 
system, a crime where a computer or other digital device is an instrument, or a non-
computer-related crime where the suspect is assumed to have information of evidentiary 
value stored on computers, disks, or other digital devices [42]. At the end of the 
identification phase, the relevant authorities determine whether or not it is appropriate to 
proceed with a computer forensics investigation.  
1.2.3 Collection  
The activities of the collection phase are twofold: 1) physically seizing the 
involved computers or digital devices, and 2) digitally copying (imaging) the data from 
the seized computers or digital devices. “Computers or digital devices” may include but 
are not limited to: digital cameras, digital video recorders, personal digital assistant 
devices (e.g. Palm Pilots), hard drives, floppy disks, cell phones, answering machines, 
laptop computers, desktop computers, large computers (e.g. servers), memory cards, and 
pagers [70]. Investigators generally prefer not to confiscate entire computing 
configurations unless they contain contraband materials (e.g. child pornography and 
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pirated software) or will enable the suspect to continue conducting malicious activities 
(e.g. phishing scams). Instead, they prefer to seize only the storage media contained in the 
devices, and in minimal threat situations, investigators may image the media onsite 
without confiscating any computing devices or media. 
The investigators may be required to obtain a search warrant or an official consent 
to search in order to legally seize digital evidence. Assuming that the proper legal 
procedures have been followed, handling electronic evidence at the crime scene typically 
involves: 
• Recognition and identification of the evidence, 
• Documentation of the crime scene, 
• Collection and preservation of the evidence, and 
• Packaging and transportation of the evidence [1, 6, 19, 22, 31, 42, 48, 70]. 
One of the most important rules in criminal computer forensics cases is that 
analysis or examinations are not performed on the original media [25, 31, 42, 52]. 
Instead, technicians perform examination on bit-stream images of the original evidence. 
In most cases, two images of the original evidence are obtained: one image is for working 
with tools and software that do not necessarily preserve the disk’s integrity, and the other 
image is maintained as an unaltered copy and is for previewing using only tools that 
preserve the disk’s integrity [42].  
A bit-stream image not only contains all of the files on the digital media or hard 
drive, but also contains data that is hidden in free space and slack space. This topic is 
discussed in more detail in Section 1.2.4. In criminal cases, once bit-stream images are 
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obtained, the original evidence is securely stored and is only digitally accessed in very 
special circumstances (e.g. if the images are lost or destroyed).  
1.2.4 Examination  
The examination phase typically accounts for the greatest amount of effort in a 
digital investigation. Likewise, examination is the primary focus of this dissertation. 
During the examination phase, forensic technicians explore bit-stream images and 
sometimes original source storage devices in order to find interesting or relevant digital 
evidence. The Alameda County District Attorney’s Office in California claims that it can 
take approximately four hours to exhaustively examine a single 1.4-MB (megabyte) 
removable disk, and it can take about three days to exhaustively examine an 8-GB 
(gigabyte) hard drive [1]. At the present time, a computer forensics technician will likely 
be required to examine a suspect’s personal computer that often contains over 100 GB of 
storage capacity.  
Most digital evidence is recovered by examining and searching files that are 
“stored in plain sight”; that is, they are accessible via a logical directory structure and are 
not obscured by advanced data-hiding methods. The type of investigation will determine 
what files may be most useful: text files, video files, image files, audio files, etc. Because 
it is very time consuming to manually examine all files on a hard disk, keyword searches 
and other data filters are applied to efficiently locate evidence [1, 5, 16, 26, 48, 49]. Files 
may contain interesting keywords, or they may have interesting or suspicious names.  
If the suspect is clever, then he/she may have attempted to hide evidence in “plain 
sight” using a variety of methods:  
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• Steganography: This technique allows the user to hide data (e.g. text messages 
or other graphics) inside a graphics file. Special software must be used to 
detect the presence of steganography and extract the hidden data. Such 
detection is exceptionally difficult with current technology.  
• Encryption: Encrypted files are password protected, and the original contents 
are obscured by the encryption algorithm. The password must be recovered or 
cracked in order to decrypt and view the hidden data.  
• Changes in the file extension: An incorrect file extension will render the file 
unreadable. For example, if a suspect is attempting to hide a .pdf file plan.pdf, 
he/she may change the file extension so that the file is named plan.exe. To 
view the original file, a user must be change the file name back to plan.pdf.  
• Use of non-suspect file names: It is unlikely that a clever suspect will use 
obvious filenames such as terroristplan.txt or HowIMurderedMyWife.pdf. 
Instead the clever suspect may use seemingly innocent file names such as 
cakeRecipe.txt, MobyDick.pdf, or MyCar.jpg.  
Examination activities are not only directed towards visible files but may also be 
directed towards free space and slack space. Free space consists of areas, known as 
clusters, on storage media where new data may be recorded. The size of a cluster is a 
fixed characteristic of the media and the file system. A file occupies one or more clusters, 
and the number of clusters is determined by the file size divided by the cluster size. Since 
only whole clusters may be used, the number of required clusters must be rounded up if 
the file size is not evenly divisible by the cluster size. For example, if the cluster size is 
set to 64 kilobytes and the file size is 363 kilobytes, then the file will occupy 6 clusters 
(363/64 = 5.671875, rounded up to 6). When a file is “deleted,” it remains in one or more 
clusters until portions of other files are written to the same clusters. The unused portion 
of the final cluster is usually not overwritten and is known as slack space. Commercial 
computer forensics tools allow investigators to easily view data left in free space and 
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slack space. Useful data is usually more difficult to recover from slack space because 
only a portion of one cluster of the file is recovered.  
1.2.5 Analysis  
Once evidence is identified, it must be analyzed in order to establish the chain of 
events, relationships between physical and digital evidence, and criminal intent. A 
collaborative team consisting of lawyers, investigators, and forensics technicians may 
analyze the evidence. In some cases information extracted from the analysis phase may 
cause the investigator to revisit previous phases of the investigation process to obtain 
more evidence. Establishing a chain of events may be challenging if the evidence was 
obtained from a variety of sources. The systems that originally contained the evidence 
may be from different time zones, they may have unsynchronized system times, and the 
suspect may have intentionally tampered with the system time to create misleading file 
creation times.  
1.2.6 Presentation  
At the end of the computer forensics process the investigators review and revise 
their notes and, if necessary, write reports describing their investigative efforts. In legal 
cases the digital forensics investigator will likely testify as an expert witness. To serve as 
effective expert witnesses, computer forensic technicians document their work. A legal 
proceeding may take place a year or several years after the forensic examination, and in 
such cases detailed documentation is invaluable to expert witnesses and to the legal case 
[3]. Computer forensics documentation must not only provide a complete and consistent 
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representation of the computer forensics process, but it must also support a presentation 
that is clear and comprehensible to a layperson. To some extent the procedures that 
investigators follow and document must also be comprehensible to a layperson. 
1.3 Motivation 
While violent crimes such as armed robbery are decreasing in the U.S., computer 
crime1 is becoming more prevalent worldwide [4, 36, 49, 75]. The growth of the Internet 
has contributed to an increase in cyber-crimes such as child pornography, gambling, 
money laundering, financial scams, extortion, and sabotage [8, 40, 75]. From teenage 
network hackers and corporate executives to child pornographers and terrorists, the 
computer has attracted a potpourri of offenders with various skills, motives, experiences, 
and nationalities [29, 33, 56].  
Besides using a computer in the commission of a crime, computer criminals share 
another similarity: the chances of being detected, reported, caught, and/or prosecuted are 
relatively small [36]. In an extreme case of misfortune, a sheriff’s department investigator 
working exclusively on computer crimes full-time for five years only made five arrests, 
none of which led to convictions [69]. Though the FBI has attempted to encourage 
reports of computer crimes against business infrastructures, law enforcement sometimes 
seems to respond apathetically towards small-business victims [29, 60]. These small-
business victims may be ignored because of a heavy backlog of computer forensics cases. 
Additionally, large-business victims may be reluctant to report computer crimes for fear 
                                                 
1 Computer crime is generally defined as either a crime involving the use of a computer 
to commit the crime or a crime in which a computer is the victim of the crime.  
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that it would result in a lack of confidence among stockholders. Many businesses are 
more interested in getting their systems running again than in prosecuting the criminals 
responsible for the incident [45].  
While computer crime is increasing, computer forensics technicians are scarce 
[40]. This shortage of certified personnel is an obvious cause of computer forensics case 
backlogs. Civilian computer forensics firms are only beginning to emerge as profitable 
solutions to the need for more personnel. There are also secondary contributing factors: 
the constant growth of digital storage media capacity and the lack of standard technical 
methodologies for computer forensics [1, 5, 18, 52, 62]. When searching for textual 
evidence on an aggregation of media that may exceed a terabyte (1000 GB), it may be 
insufficient to rely on ad hoc examination planning techniques and best-guess keyword 
search techniques for finding evidence [5]. In cases that involve corporate or 
organizational scandals, the aggregation of digital media may easily exceed several 
terabytes of data. In a panel presentation at the 2006 National Colloquium on Information 
Systems Security Education, an FBI agent working on the Enron case claimed that there 
was in excess of 3 terabytes of digital media that had to be examined. Documented 
policies and procedures for digital investigation emphasize the importance of planning a 
forensic examination (including keyword searches) but do not offer detailed guidelines 
for producing this plan using a structured process or methodology. Instead, organizations 
adopt “home-grown” techniques for planning their examinations. Such non-
standardization has gained the attention of researchers and practitioners of computer 
forensics [52].  
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The inexperience of local law enforcement agencies (with respect to computer 
forensics), the lack of standard computer forensics methodologies, the constantly 
increasing digital storage capacity, the growing prevalence of digital devices, and the 
“hidden”2 nature of computer crimes all contribute to the need for advancements in 
computer forensics research and practice. As a first step in addressing these problems, a 
group of researchers and practitioners of digital forensics attending the first Digital 
Forensics Research Workshop (DFRWS) in 2001 outlined a roadmap for digital forensic 
research [52]. DFRWS developed several research goals, including developing standard 
methodologies and techniques, creating tools that are aligned with the DFRWS computer 
forensics process definition, and building computer forensics expertise.  
1.4 Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this dissertation is that domain modeling of the computer forensics 
case environment (known as case domain modeling) can serve as a methodology for selecting 
keyword search terms and planning forensics examinations. This methodology can increase 
the quality of forensics examinations without significantly increasing the combined effort of 
planning and executing keyword searches.  
Case domain models represent the information domain of the computer forensics 
case, and the goal of developing the case domain model is to define the scope of case 
information that will be required during a computer forensics examination. Case domain 
models are generalized ontology/domain models that may be reused in similar cases. 
                                                 
2 Computer crime is hidden because a law enforcement officer is less likely to intercept a 
computer crime in progress, unlike more visible crimes such as traffic violations, 
robbery, and assault.  
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These generalized ontology models are instantiated when they are “filled-in” with 
information from a specific case. For example, a case domain model may include a 
generalized Suspect concept that has the name and birthday descriptive attributes. These 
name and birthday attributes of the generalized Suspect concept may be instantiated with 
values such as John Doe and January 1, 1970.  
A methodology for selecting keyword search terms describes how a 
comprehensive list of keyword search terms may be derived from selected elements of 
the case domain model. The case domain modeling approach to planning is an 
improvement over current, established approaches to keyword search planning and 
examination planning. Those established approaches to examination planning and 
forensics keyword search planning are discussed in Chapter II of this document. 
Evaluation of the hypothesis is based on the research questions in the following three 
paragraphs. 
Does the case domain modeling methodology result in an increased amount of 
evidence found in an examination? Generally speaking, the amount of evidence found in 
an investigation determines the quality of the case. Evidence is the foundation upon 
which legal cases are built, and the amount of evidence can determine the strength of the 
prosecution or defense. In computer forensics, an item of evidence is typically a single 
file that the examiner has tagged because of its relevance to the underlying facts and 
circumstances of the case. Experiments were performed to measure the amount of 
evidence found in the established approach and the case domain modeling methodology 
for planning forensics keyword searches. Students from the fall 2005 Introduction to 
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Cybercrime and Computer Forensics (CSE 4273/6273) class and the summer 2006 Special 
Topics in Computer Forensics (CSE 8990) class were recruited for these experiments. 
Does the case domain modeling methodology require a significant amount of 
additional effort when compared to a typical approach? It is assumed that the 
methodology may require investigators and forensics technicians to spend more time 
planning the keyword search examination than is required by established planning 
approaches. Ideally, the methodology will not require a significant amount of additional 
effort in order to improve keyword search results. It may also be the case that the 
increased time investment during the planning stages may decrease the typical amount of 
time spent executing keyword searches; the time taken to conduct an ad hoc, trial-and-error 
keyword search may exceed the amount of time that could have been spent building a 
structured keyword search plan. Analysis of the experiments compares the amount of 
effort spent planning and conducting keyword searches using an ad hoc approach and 
using the case domain modeling methodology.  
Is the case domain modeling method useful for typical law enforcement 
investigators who participate in cases involving computer forensics? Traditionally, 
computer forensics practitioners have come from careers in criminal justice and law 
enforcement with limited previous computer or information technology experience. The 
increase in the occurrence of cyber-crimes and the growing demand for digital forensics 
technicians is extending recruitment to persons who originate from careers in computer 
science, software engineering, and information technology with limited previous criminal 
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justice or law enforcement experience. It is expected that practitioners with the latter, 
more computer-science-intensive background would have fewer difficulties 
understanding the ontology modeling foundations of the case domain modeling 
methodology than those practitioners with the former, more law-enforcement-intensive 
background. However, it is important to determine whether or not typical investigators 
and practitioners from a non-technical background can effectively understand and apply 
the fundamental ontology modeling concepts in the methodology. Though typical 
practitioners may be unfamiliar with the theoretical foundations of the methodology, it is 
likely that they could understand its purpose and populate an abstract case domain model. 
Two law enforcement practitioner case studies were performed to address this research 
question. In these studies the case domain model supported the investigators in a digital 
forensics service solicitation activity. After the activity the subjects were surveyed 
regarding their experience and opinion of case domain modeling. These subjects were 
recruited from the law enforcement computer forensics training courses offered at the 
Mississippi State University Department of Computer Science and Engineering 
Computer Forensics and Cybercrime Training Center. 
1.5 Contributions 
This dissertation provides evidence that case domain modeling is a useful 
framework for planning and executing computer forensics examinations. The general 
contributions provided by this dissertation are listed below. 
• A method for applying ontology modeling to computer forensic examinations. 
Thus far, the potential utility of ontology modeling has been largely 
unrealized in the domain of computer forensics. This dissertation applies 
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ontology and domain modeling to computer forensics examination planning. 
In this dissertation, a case domain modeling approach is applied to the task of 
keyword search selection and other examination planning tasks. As ontology 
or domain modeling is shown to be useful for extracting useful keyword 
search terms, other related computer forensics applications of 
ontology/domain modeling may be explored. Case domain models can also be 
useful for learning how general forensics case types are distinct from one 
another. Finally, the structured characteristics of the case domain modeling 
framework can also enable the establishment of a knowledge base for semi-
automated tools. 
• A methodology for deriving computer examination keyword search terms from 
a case ontology. Though many tools exist for executing and logging the 
results of keyword searches, such tools are not supported by a structured 
methodology for selecting keyword search terms. The methodology for 
keyword search term selection offers an improvement over the typical, ad hoc 
method for planning forensics keyword searches. Experimental results 
evaluate the claims that this methodology can improve the quality of keyword 
searches.  
• Experimental evidence that indicates utility for modeling language 
methodologies in computer forensics. Existing and current research in 
computer forensics modeling has not yet offered substantial experimental data 
indicating a utility for the prescribed approach. This dissertation describes a 
case domain modeling methodology that support examination planning and 
offers conclusions based on experiments using quantitative and qualitative 
measures. This dissertation’s experimental design may be replicated and 
reused by other computer forensics modeling and tool researchers. Finally, 
positive experimental results produced by this dissertation may provide the 
motivation for the refinement and ultimately the establishment of related 
ready-to-use computer forensics modeling approaches.  
Thus far, the evolution of this research topic has been chronicled in one journal 
article and three conference papers authored by Bogen and Dampier [9-12]. Two of those 
conference papers were exclusive to the digital forensics community: the Digital 
Forensics Research Workshop (online proceedings) and the First International Workshop 
on Systematic Approaches to Digital Forensic Engineering (IEEE sponsored with 
published conference proceedings) [9, 10]. Results of this research work will be 
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submitted to computer forensics journals such as Digital Investigation and the 
International Journal of Digital Evidence. Conferences in the domain modeling and 
ontology modeling communities may also be suitable targets for additional publications.  
1.6 Practical Applications 
A computer forensics modeling process may be beneficial to both law 
enforcement and civilian computer forensics firms. In a law enforcement organization a 
cyber-crime investigator handles the case before a computer forensics technician extracts 
the digital evidence. The investigator is a law enforcement officer who assumes the role 
of an information expert of case details, while the computer forensics technician is a 
technology expert who offers an independent examination and analysis of digital media. 
In such situations the responsibilities of the cyber-crime investigator include obtaining 
subpoenas and warrants, executing arrest and search warrants, interviewing suspects and 
victims, documenting the underlying facts and circumstances of a case, collaborating 
with other law enforcement officers, and providing the computer forensics technician 
with necessary case details. The forensics technician schedules an examination of the 
digital media based on current case backlog and case priority. The amount of digital 
evidence recovered is highly dependent on the investigator’s ability to analyze the case 
and offer the most relevant details to the forensics technician. 
A cyber-crime investigator could use a computer forensics case domain modeling 
methodology to assist in analyzing the case, forming hypotheses, defining the scope of 
the investigation, identifying evidence sources, and deriving keyword search terms. The 
modeling artifacts may provide the forensics technician with sufficient information to 
18 
 
perform the media examination. Once a case model is constructed, it may be generalized 
and reused on similar cases. Reuse of modeled case knowledge can improve the 
productivity of the investigator and provide the forensics examiner with a standardized 
representation of case facts. This generalized format can help facilitate information 
sharing between agencies and provide protection against leaking confidential or sensitive 
case-specific data; agencies may share generalized search strategies and forensics 
knowledge with partner organizations without providing the confidential details of a case. 
The case domain modeling methodology can also contribute to the training of novice or 
beginner investigators who are adapting their analytical skills to cyber-crime cases. A 
case domain modeling methodology can provide a structured approach to case analysis 
and provide investigative tips. Expert investigators may also benefit from using this 
structured approach when they encounter unfamiliar crimes or unusually complex cases 
that involve an abundance of digital media and a network of suspects. The modeling 
methodology is designed such that an investigator with intermediate computer skills and 
little or no background in engineering can model his/her investigative knowledge.  
Like law enforcement agencies, private or civilian agencies can reap similar 
benefits from the application of a modeling methodology. The characteristics of civilian 
computer forensics firms that distinguish them from law enforcement agencies include 
the absence of personnel exclusively allocated to investigative work, the necessity for 
marketing strategies and profit delivery, an increased diversity of cases that may or may 
not involve legal proceedings, and the increased likelihood that personnel will not 
originate from a legal or law enforcement background. It is likely that many computer 
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science, software engineering, and information technology practitioners will attempt to 
establish computer forensics firms to profit from the demand for computer forensics 
services. Such individuals will likely serve dual roles as investigator and computer 
forensics technician. An examination planning methodology has the potential to be highly 
beneficial to these technology-oriented personnel who have little experience conducting 
any criminal or private investigations; the methodology provides a familiar, structured 
framework that serves as an analytical investigative tool. Computer scientists and software 
engineers should have little difficulty using a computer forensics modeling methodology 
if they are already familiar with software modeling methodologies.  
The emergence of the computer forensics discipline has created a new demand for 
intelligent computer forensics software tools. Like other software developers, computer 
forensics tool vendors must understand the application domain in order to deliver quality 
software. Case models created by computer forensics investigators can be useful sources 
of domain knowledge for developers of computer forensics tools. Such domain models 
can be formalized as components of data-mining applications, knowledge-based 
applications, and other intelligent software applications.  
1.7 Organization 
The remainder of this document provides the background and details of this 
dissertation research work. Chapter II provides a review of related work in the areas of 
computer forensics, artificial intelligence, and software engineering. Chapter III describes 
the case domain modeling method. Chapter IV presents the results of the first two 
experimental trials of case domain modeling for examination planning and execution. An 
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additional case domain modeling experiment was planned based on the analysis of the 
first two experiments. Chapter V presents the results of this third and final trial of case 
domain modeling applied to examination planning and execution. Chapter VI presents the 
results of two case studies that evaluate the utility of case domain modeling to forensics 
service solicitation by law enforcement investigators. Finally, Chapter VII presents 












This chapter presents a survey of literature and research work related to this 
dissertation. The following topics are explored in this chapter: computer forensics 
modeling, computer forensics standard practices, ontology modeling in artificial 
intelligence, and domain analysis and modeling in software engineering.  
2.1 Modeling Approaches in Computer Forensics 
Modeling languages present opportunities for improving computer forensics 
practices, but practitioners are not using them. Most computer forensics investigators 
appear to rely on home-built methods using commercial software packages such as 
Encase3 or Forensics Toolkit4. Furthermore, only a limited amount of research on the use 
of modeling approaches in computer forensics has been published. This section of the 
literature review documents the existing and current work of researchers and practitioners 
who have contributed to modeling languages and modeling concepts in computer 
forensics.  
                                                 
3 Encase is a registered trademark of Guidance Software, Inc. 
4 Forensics Toolkit is a registered trademark of Access Data, Inc. 
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2.1.1 Process Modeling Approaches 
A number of process modeling approaches for computer forensics have been 
developed. The term “process” may refer to a process of events that occur in a network 
incident, or it may refer to a prescribed general investigative process.  
2.1.1.1 The Digital Investigation Process Language 
Peter Stephenson’s proposal for a Digital Investigation Process Language (DIPL) 
offers the first research in the application of a modeling language to computer forensics 
process modeling. DIPL is a component of Stephenson’s larger concept for an End-to-
End Digital Investigation (EEDI) Process [63, 66]. Practitioners may specify the chain of 
events that occur in an incident that requires digital forensics using DIPL. DIPL was 
adapted from the LISP (LISt Processor) language, and it can be used to specify template 
investigative processes and document the process followed in an investigation [67]. 
Stephenson has illustrated how DIPL may be applied to conducting digital incident 
postmortems on network systems. DIPL and EEDI focus primarily on network forensics 
investigations [65].  
Figure 2.1 provides a simple example of DIPL applied to a digital incident 
postmortem investigation. A postmortem investigation attempts to discover the cause of a 
network or computer system failure. The example provides a specification of the process 
followed for identifying a network incident. DIPL provides a more formal specification 










  (Time [19:23:00 GMT 04 05 2004]) 
 ) 
  (Observer 
   (RealName ‘John Smith’) 
 ) 
 (Change State 
  (OldState ‘Normal network operation’ 
   (ArchitectureName ‘CSE Network’) 
  ) 
  (CurrentState ‘Web server crashed – network overloaded’ 
   (ArchitectureName ‘CSENetwork’) 
  ) 
  (When 
   (Time [10:30:00 GMT 02 05 2004]) 




  (AttackSpecifics 
   (AttackNickName ‘Unknown Denial of Service Attack’) 
    (Comment ‘Probably Zombie Attack’) 
    (BeginTime [10:20:35 02 05 2004]) 
    (EndTime [10:24:28 02 05 2004]) 
   (Target 
    (Host Name ‘WEBServer-1’) 
    (UDPPort 1444) 
   ) 
  ) 
 ) 
 )  
) 
Corresponding Natural Language Description 
A web server on the CSE network crashed at 10:30 GMT on May 2, 2004. This incident 
was observed at 19:23 GMT on May 4, 2004 by John Smith. The attack is assumed to be 
caused by a zombie-style denial of service attack that occurred at the web server on 
UDP port 1444 between 10:20 and 10:24 GMT on May 2, 2004.  
 
Figure 2.1   DIPL Example 
 
 
2.1.1.2 Investigative Process Models 
Investigative process models (sometimes simply referred to as process models) 
define a sequence of generic activities or phases that characterize general approaches to 
computer forensics investigations. A variety of computer forensics process models have 
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been proposed in the literature, and the topic remains popular in current computer 
forensics research literature [4, 6, 19, 22, 31, 48, 52, 57, 64, 66, 70].  
This dissertation assumes that investigators follow a process model similar to the 
DFRWS investigative model [52]. This process model was described in Section 1.2 of 
this document. The DFRWS process model has been selected because members of the 
academic, law enforcement, and software development communities collaborated to 
develop it. Other process models provide enhancements to the relatively simple DFRWS 
process model. Reith et al. proposed a DFRWS abstract process model that enhances the 
DFRWS model by inserting two phases between the identification and preservation 
phases of the DFRWS model: preparation and approach strategy [57]. Carrier and 
Spafford proposed a more radical enhancement to the DFRWS model by integrating 
physical crime scene investigation activities into the model [19]. Carrier and Spafford’s 
process model contains 17 phases that are grouped into 5 categories: readiness phases, 
deployment phases, physical crime scene investigation phases, digital crime scene 
investigation phases, and review phases. This model also allows investigators to revisit 
some of the physical and digital crime scene investigation phases. Baryamureeba and 
Tushabe enhanced Carrier and Spafford’s model by allowing the investigators to revisit 
any of the five categories5 of process phases [7]. Revisiting phases may be necessary if 
new evidence is found or if investigators determine that an alternative investigative 
strategy must be developed and implemented. 
                                                 
5 Baryamureeba and Tushabe also reorganized Carrier and Spafford’s phase categories by 
replacing the digital and physical crime scene investigation phases with the trace back 
and dynamite phases.  However, Baryamureeba and Tushabe’s model places physical and 
digital crime scene activities in all five of their phase categories.  
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A more detailed comparison of computer forensics process models is omitted 
from this literature review because this dissertation presents a modeling approach that is 
not highly dependent upon the chosen process model. The methodology described in this 
dissertation may occur in any computer forensics process model that includes activities 
similar to the examination phase of the DFRWS model.  
2.1.2 Hypothesis Modeling Approaches 
Hypothesis modeling approaches to computer forensics provide expressive tools 
for representing a general hypothesis of an incident and decomposing this hypothesis into 
a collection of supporting hypotheses. The goals of hypothesis modeling approaches 
include understanding adversary tactics, identifying the state of an attack, classifying 
adversarial resources, or representing and reusing investigative knowledge.  
2.1.2.1 Attack Trees 
In 1999 Schneier introduced the concept of attack trees for modeling threats 
against computer systems [59]. Schneier claimed that “if we can understand all the 
different ways in which a system can be attacked, we can likely design countermeasures 
to thwart those attacks” (page 21). Though Schneier did not mention the term “forensics” 
in his work, his attack trees are applicable to digital forensics.  
In an attack tree structure, the root node represents the goal of the attack, and the 
leaf nodes represent various ways to achieve the goal. Figure 2.2 presents an example 
attack tree for gaining unauthorized access via a password. The leaf nodes in the example 





(Key: I = Impossible, P = Possible) 
 
Figure 2.2   Attack Tree Example 
 
 
action. The leaf nodes may be labeled using other schemes, such as monetary cost, 
amount of time, and amount of special equipment required. 
Attack trees may be especially helpful when conducting network forensics 
postmortems. In postmortem investigations it is important for the investigator to consider 
all attack options and form a hypothesis that specifies the most likely attack. Attack trees 
offer a structured method for considering attack options and may result in a more 
complete analysis of possible attacks. Attack trees also document an investigator’s 
analysis using a relatively easy-to-comprehend illustration. The investigator may quickly 
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refer to an attack tree to maintain focus during a tiresome investigation that involves 
examining hundreds of network log entries.  
Attack trees may also be applied to computer forensics media analysis (Figure 
2.3) if the investigator wishes to form hypotheses regarding how a clever suspect may 






(Key: P = Possible) 
 
Figure 2.3   Computer Forensics Attack Tree Example 
 
 
literature. However, computer forensics hypothesis modeling approaches such as 




2.1.2.2 Adversary Modeling 
Lowry et al. indicated the need for an adversary modeling technique for 
developing forensic observables that indicate the state of a malicious network attack [44]. 
The goal of adversary modeling is to “hypothesize potential adversaries or malicious acts, 
identify threats and adversary missions, identify the means that would have to be used or 
have a high probability of being used, and develop observables for those means” [22, 44]. 
Their adversary modeling approach is similar to the attack tree method, but adversary 
modeling is more specialized. Lowry et al. identified the need for a modeling approach 
that attempts to classify potential network system adversaries and identify their skills, 
resources, motivations, and attack processes. Table 2.1 presents a classification of 
potential adversary actors as presented by Lowry et al. [44]. Actors in Classes III and IV 
typically possess more resources and more devastating goals than actors in Class I. 
Furthermore, “an adversary will not use his most valuable or sophisticated techniques or 
methods unless there is sufficient payoff” [44].  
Lowry et al. claimed that existing computer forensics tools and methods have 
been insufficient for delivering “observables” related to Class III and Class IV 
adversaries. Lowry et al. assumed that all attackers follow a generic attack process that 
includes the following phases: intelligence gathering, system discovery, detailed 
preparations, testing/practice, and attack execution. Assuming that a known adversary is 
conducting or planning an attack, the defenders of a system may identify forensic 
observables such as the current state of the attack and transitions between states in an 
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attack. Lowry et al. suggested that an attack graph representation similar to the attack tree 
may be used to represent the states and transitions of an attack. 
 
 
Table 2.1   Adversary Classes 
 
Class Named Actors 
IV First-world and certain second-world countries, including military and 
intelligence agencies. Future terrorist organizations. Future organized 
criminal groups. Some types of insiders. 
III Almost every country not in the Class IV category. Some terrorist 
organizations. Some organized criminal groups. Some types of insider. 
Some types of radical organizations. 
II Very few countries. Many terrorist organizations. Many organized criminal 
groups. Many types of insiders. Many types of radical groups. Very expert 
hackers and hacker coalitions. 
I Some terrorist organizations. Some organized criminal groups. Many types 
of insiders. Many types of radical groups. Beginner to journeyman hackers.
 
 
The nodes of an attack graph represent states (pre- and post-conditions), and the 
edges represent attack activities that cause state transitions. This approach complements 
attack trees because adversary modeling focuses on if a goal state has been achieved, 
while attack trees focus on how an adversary may achieve a goal or certain state. 
Lowry et al. emphasized that adversaries spend the majority of their time 
gathering intelligence, making detailed preparations, and testing and practicing. Class III 
and Class IV adversaries typically execute more sophisticated attacks and hence spend 
more time planning and gathering intelligence. Defenders must find evidence left behind 
from an attacker’s intelligence gathering and preparation activities in order to observe the 
current state or a state transition of the attack. Lowry et al. concluded that future forensic 
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methods and tools must be based on an understanding of adversary characteristics, 
behavior, goals, and techniques. Analyzing evidence without the context offered by 
adversary modeling may fail to produce the forensic “observables” described by Lowry et 
al.  
2.1.2.3 Forensic Graphs 
Bruschi and Monga proposed a methodology for “archiving, retrieving, and 
reasoning about computer forensics knowledge.” Bruschi and Monga’s work is based on 
the assumption that common patterns exist in crimes that can be exploited to ease the 
work of investigators [17]. They proposed a hypothesis framework that accompanies the 
following investigative process followed by detectives: “formulate a hypothesis on the 
state of the world that caused the case, collect evidence on the basis of these hypotheses, 
correlate actual evidence with hypotheses, and adjust hypotheses, and repeat the process 
until the consistency state of the knowledge about the case is sensibly high” [17] .  
Bruschi and Monga formalized their modeling approach by defining a forensic 
graph. The forensic graph, FG, is a tuple that is defined as follows: 
 
FG = < H, E, Fh, Fe, w > 
 
where H is the set of hypotheses, E is the set of evidence-collecting tests, Fh is a 
decomposition relation )( HHFh ×⊆ , w is the weight of evidence, { }−+∈ ,?,w , and Fe is 
an association relation )( wEHFe ××⊆ .  
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The weight of evidence indicates if the evidence has been analyzed (w = ? when 
not analyzed), if the evidence corroborates the hypothesis (+), or if the evidence 
contradicts the hypothesis (–). Figure 2.4 illustrates a graphical and textual specification 
of a forensic graph that decomposes this hypotheses: Suspect I on date D possessed a 











H1 I on date D, possessed a copy of the file F. 
H1,1 I’s system contained a file that corresponds exactly to the incriminated one (both metadata and 
content match). 
E1 F is found on I’s system(both metadata and content match). 
E2 F was on I’s system but it has been deleted (metadata matches, the recovered content 
corresponds to the original). 
H1,2 I’s system contained a file that corresponds only in part to the F (only metadata matches). 
E3 F is found on I’s system (metadata matches but content does not). 
E4 F was on I’s system but it has been deleted (metadata matches, the recovered content does 
not correspond to the original). 
H1,3 I’s system contained only reference to F. 
E5 references to F are found in user’s history. 
E6 references to F are found in user’s documents. 




Bruschi and Monga’s graph structure is beneficial for knowledge reuse because 
subgraphs can be selected from several forensic graph instances and combined into new 
forensic graphs. Thus, the knowledge from several past investigations may be aggregated 
on a new investigation. Providing clear arguments and objectives using the forensic graph 
is also beneficial to prosecutors who need to form legal arguments based on the evidence; 
the forensic graph illustrates how evidence relates to investigative hypotheses. Bruschi 
and Monga expressed interest in formalizing their hypothesis formulation approach 
because of difficulty in reusing natural language hypotheses in investigations with 
varying degrees of scope and circumstances.  
2.2 Adopted Planning Procedures in Computer Forensics Examination 
Before suggesting improvements to computer forensics investigations, it is 
necessary to discuss the existing planning practices and procedures of computer forensics 
examinations. This section of the literature review is intended to outline planning 
procedures that have been adopted by investigators. These procedures are typically 
documented by the law enforcement community and in some instances are confidential. 
This section focuses on adopted planning procedures that are relevant to planning and 
executing an examination. The remainder of this section is organized as follows: Section 
2.2.1 discusses the typical structure of an organization that conducts computer forensics 
investigations, Section 2.2.2 discusses how investigators identify relevant case 
information, Section 2.2.3 discusses planning keyword searches, Section 2.2.4 discusses 
documenting the examination, and 2.2.5 provides an analysis of adopted procedures for 
computer forensics investigations. 
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2.2.1 Organizational Structure 
In legal organizations the case investigator and the computer forensics examiner 
are roles that are typically played by two separate parties. According to the United States 
Department of Justice, “in most computer searches, the case agent organizes and directs 
the search, learns as much as possible about the computers to be searched, and writes the 
affidavit establishing probable cause. The technical specialist explains the technical 
limitations that govern the search to the case agent and prosecutor, creates the plan for 
executing the search, and in many cases takes the lead role in executing the search 
itself…. Of course, each member of the team should collaborate with the others to help 
ensure an effective search” [70]. 
In private or commercial data recovery and computer forensics firms, such role 
distinctions are less likely to occur, as one person may have both investigative and 
forensic responsibilities. Regardless of who plays the roles, the investigative and forensic 
tasks must be performed to recover evidence; the investigation activities uncover 
information about the circumstances or case, while the forensic activities extract evidence 
using technological methods based on investigative information. The methodology 
presented in this document recognizes this distinction between investigative activities and 
forensic activities and provides support for both roles.  
2.2.2 Defining the Scope of an Examination 
Before passing a case to a forensics examiner, the investigator must narrow the 
scope of the forensics examination by identifying information that is relevant to the case. 
The United States Department of Justice (USDOJ) suggested that an investigator should 
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at least provide the forensics examiner with the following information: “case summary, 
IP addresses, keyword lists, nicknames, passwords, points of contact, supporting 
documents, and type of crime” [70]. Preparing this background information and 
additional required information requires the investigator to act as an information filter 
who supplies the forensics technician with data useful in an examination. Experienced 
investigators instinctively identify the relevant information when dealing with familiar 
case types, while less experienced investigators require guidance. In this same USDOJ 
computer forensics manual, the authors provided brief outlines of information that is 
relevant to specific case types [70]. Table 2.2 lists two case types and relevant 
information items as they appear in the computer forensics manual.  
 
 
Table 2.2   Case Types and Relevant Information 
 
Case Type Relevant Information Items 
Email Threats / 
Harassment / Stalking 
Address books, diaries, e-mail/notes/letters, Internet activity 
logs, legal documents, telephone records, financial/asset 
records, victim background research, images 
Extortion Date and time stamps, e-mail/notes/letters, history log, Internet 




Such checklists may provide valuable introductory information to beginner 
investigators but may be too general for novice or advanced investigators. For example, 
Table 2.2 lists diaries as an item of interest but does not provide additional information 
about the attributes of a diary in the context of an email threat case. Identifying attributes 
of a diary entity is an activity that investigators may perform instinctively or through an 
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analytical process; the investigators must perform this activity to narrow the scope of the 
examination and present the forensics technician with a search plan to find the relevant 
artifacts contained in a diary. The USDOJ indicates that such case domain information 
must be collected and organized by the investigator before a successful forensics 
examination occurs. As indicated in Section 2.1, there is no previous computer forensics 
research that addresses the need for modeling these case domain concepts. Section 2.4 
will describe software engineering technologies that may be applicable for modeling 
relevant information attributes in a case domain. 
2.2.3 Keyword Search Planning 
Keyword searches are a common technique for locating data during examinations, 
and sources suggest that keyword searches should be carefully planned [1, 5, 48, 49, 70, 
71]. As discussed previously, the investigator and the forensics examiner are likely not 
the same person. In such situations it is essential that the investigator provide the 
forensics examiner with a list of keyword search terms; the investigator is the information 
expert regarding the case details, and the forensics examiner is a technology expert who 
requires case information in order to deliver forensics evidence. Only two brief sources 
provide further guidance for developing a list of effective keyword search terms for a 
computer forensics case [16, 26]. Depending on the complexity of the case the 
investigator may require a more structured approach to preparing a list of keyword search 
terms.  
Brown claimed that “keyword searching in computer forensics can make or break 
an investigation [16]. Choosing the wrong search terms may cause you to miss vital 
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evidence, or may return so many hits that you spend hours looking for a needle in a 
haystack to find any real evidence.” Brown claimed that too often computer forensics 
practitioners take GREP6 (or other tools) training courses, which may cause them to 
become too tool-centric. Instead, the investigators should keep their primary focus on 
what they are looking for and where they need to look. Brown did not discount the use of 
GREP or other tools; rather he expressed the need for a search effort that is driven by 
fundamental investigation concepts where tools provide support instead of motivation. 
Brown later offered some elementary tips that include the use of search phrases, case 
sensitive searches, unique misspellings, Boolean logic, and nested searches. He cited a 
case where a bank robber gave tellers demand notes that contained misspelled words. The 
investigators found an electronic copy of the ransom note by including the misspelled 
words in a keyword search. Brown claimed that a computer forensics examiner can 
usually find what he/she is looking for by selecting appropriate keywords and applying 
only a few simple Boolean logic operators. Brown’s search tips are less significant than 
his general statement: effective computer forensics data searching is achieved by 
maintaining focus on what the examiner is looking for and where he/she thinks it is, not 
by becoming an expert in forming complex keyword expressions.  
Feldman, like Brown, specified the need to focus on maintaining a fundamental 
strategy and plan [16]. Feldman, of Computer Forensics Inc. (CFI), offered these brief 
tips for planning computer forensics data searches:  
                                                 
6 GREP (global regular expression print) is a highly expressive search utility that 
originated in the UNIX operating system. GREP provides the power to search for regular 
expressions in one or more files. 
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1. Identify the type of data you want. 
2. Determine whether or not you want information regarding system events such 
as the date and time files where opened, accessed, and/or deleted. 
3. Specify relevant time periods. 
4. Obtain a list of users, their log-on names, and other network aliases. 
5. Use good search terms; avoid “noise” words that bloat search results. 
6. Group search terms together; prioritize your search. 
7. Be flexible [26]. 
Once again, the search tips are rather simple, but they reinforce the previous point 
regarding the importance of planning a data search. 
In criminal cases it is even more important to maintain a focus on the legal 
constraints of the search. For example, the United States Department of Justice identified 
several federal laws that are relevant to computer forensics cases. State and local 
governments may place further legal constraints on electronic search and seizure [71]. A 
major concern during examination is to remain consistent with the scope of the search 
warrant. The search warrant identifies a set of electronic devices to be seized, along with 
the nature of the evidence that will be sought. The examiner may violate the terms of the 
search warrant if he/she excessively searches for evidence of crimes not specified in the 
search warrant. During legal proceedings the forensics examiner may be challenged 
regarding the scope of his/her search and the motivation behind that search.  
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2.2.4 Documenting the Examination 
Among other legal-oriented suggestions, computer forensics manuals in law 
enforcement instruct the forensics examiner to maintain detailed documentation in 
anticipation of legal proceedings [70, 71]. However, these manuals do not provide 
guidelines for producing this documentation, and it is assumed that such guidelines are 
defined within investigative organizations/branches. It is also likely that examination 
notes are produced by forensics technicians who adopt their own documentation styles, 
which are not officially defined. Private companies, such as New Technologies 
Incorporated (NTI), offer training courses in case documentation and how to use this 
documentation in expert witness testimony [3].  
2.3 Ontology Modeling in Artificial Intelligence 
Domain analysis and modeling, as adopted in this dissertation, originated from 
ontology and knowledge representation research in the artificial intelligence community. 
The terms “domain model” and “ontology” are often used interchangeably and involve 
the same fundamental principles. In this chapter the term “ontology” will be used in the 
context of artificial intelligence and knowledge representation, while domain analysis and 
modeling will be limited to the context of software engineering research and practice. 
This subsection presents an overview of ontology methodologies and representation 
languages as identified by sources in the artificial intelligence and knowledge 
representation domains. The goals of this ontology literature review are to establish the 
background of ontology modeling in computer science and to contribute to a survey of 
39 
 
candidate methods and representations for computer forensics domain modeling and 
analysis.  
2.3.1 Ontology Definition and Background 
Ontology theory originated from Plato and Aristotle’s classical philosophical 
frameworks, and it emerged as a popular artificial intelligence, knowledge representation 
research topic in the 1990s [21, 34]. Artificial intelligence theories may be categorized as 
content theories or mechanism theories, and ontology research fits into the former 
category. Chandrasekaran et al. distinguished between content and mechanism theories 
and offered general commentary on the alternating popularity of them in AI research: 
“…Sometimes, the AI community gets excited by some mechanism such as rule systems, 
frame languages, neural nets, fuzzy logic, constraint propagation, or unification. The 
mechanisms are proposed as the secret of making intelligent machines. At other times, 
we realize that, however wonderful the mechanism, it cannot do much without a good 
content theory of the domain on which it is to work. Moreover, we often recognize that 
once a good content theory is available, many different mechanisms might be used 
equally well to implement effective systems, all using essentially the same content” [21]. 
Chandrasekaran also provided an interesting discussion of the alternation of content and 
mechanism theories in an article in the final issue of IEEE Expert in 19947 [20].  
McCarthy is acknowledged as the first to use ontology as a term to refer to “the 
things that exist” in a common-sense knowledge base of logical facts [46]. According to 
                                                 
7 Chandrasekaran was the Editor in Chief of IEEE Expert during its last five years. As a 
reflection of AI’s movement away from the expert systems trend, in January 1995 IEEE 
Expert was renamed to IEEE Intelligent Systems and their Applications. 
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Welty, in 1986, Alexander et al. were the first to bring ontology from its classical 
philosophical meaning into a new computer science meaning [2, 73]. Alexander et al. 
explained their use of ontologies as follows: “To philosophers, ontology is the branch of 
metaphysics concerned with the nature of existence, and the cataloging of existent 
entities…We use the term to emphasize that a knowledge-based system is best designed 
by careful attention to the step-by-step composition of knowledge structures. An ontology 
is a collection of abstract objects, relationships and transformations that represent the 
physical and cognitive entities necessary for accomplishing some task” [2].  
Currently, there are two dominant, conflicting definitions for ontology in the 
context of artificial intelligence and knowledge representation: 
a. According to Gruber, “an ontology is an explicit specification of a 
conceptualization. The term is borrowed from philosophy, where an Ontology is a 
systematic account of Existence” [34]. Welty indicated that this definition is 
probably the most commonly cited definition of ontology in artificial intelligence 
and that researchers commonly make incorrect claims that Gruber’s article was 
the start of ontology research in computer science [73].  
b. According to Uschold and Gruninger, an ontology is “a shared understanding in 
a given subject area” [72].  
The distinction between the previous definitions is subtle and somewhat elusive. 
Chandrasekran et al. elaborated further on the distinction between the two major uses of 
the term ontology in artificial intelligence: “…the term ontology has largely come to 
mean one of two related things. First of all [definition a], ontology is a representation 
vocabulary, often specialized to some domain or subject matter. More precisely, it is not 
the vocabulary as such that qualifies as an ontology, but the conceptualizations that the 
terms in the vocabulary are intended to capture…. In its second sense [definition b], the 
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term ontology is sometimes used to refer to a body of knowledge describing some 
domain, typically a commonsense knowledge domain, using a representation 
vocabulary…. In other words, the representation vocabulary provides a set of terms with 
which to describe the facts in some domain, while the body of knowledge using that 
vocabulary is a collection of facts about a domain…. The distinction is that the former 
emphasizes the use of ontology as a set of terms for representing specific facts in an 
instance of the domain, while the latter emphasizes the view of ontology as a general set 
of facts to be shared” [21].  
Noy and McGuiness also recognized the inconsistent use of the term ontology and 
proposed yet another definition: “…the Artificial-Intelligence literature contains many 
definitions of an ontology; many of these contradict one another…[for the purposes of 
their paper] an ontology is a formal explicit description of concepts in a domain of 
discourse (classes (sometimes called concepts)), properties of each concept describing 
various features and attributes of the concept (slots (sometimes called roles or 
properties)), and restrictions on slots (facets (sometimes called role restrictions)). An 
ontology together with a set of individual instances of classes constitutes a knowledge 
base. In reality, there is a fine line where the ontology ends and the knowledge base 
begins” [50]. Also, in 2003 Welty indicated in a guest editorial that the meaning of 
ontology “…is often argued back and forth by well-meaning people to clarify confusion, 
but often, the argument causes more confusion than it eliminates. Like many things, one 
must actually do ontology to understand what it is” [73]. Finally, in 2004, Musen added 
this commentary on the meaning of ontology: “although no simple predicate tells us 
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unambiguously whether a particular specification is an ontology, we can still agree on 
certain things. We can agree that ontologies enumerate the salient concepts in an 
application area” [15]. 
2.3.2 Methods and Principles for Ontology Design 
Researchers and practitioners recognized that the successful deployment of large-
scale shared ontologies and ontology libraries would be highly dependent on the 
establishment of quality-centric methods and principles for designing ontology products. 
This subsection presents an overview of influential literature on ontology design methods 
and principles. 
In 1986, Alexander et al. proposed an ontological analysis methodology for 
developing artificial intelligence knowledge bases [2]. They suggested that ontology 
development follows a three-phase process that produces a new type of knowledge at 
each stage: static knowledge, dynamic operations, and epistemic knowledge. Static 
knowledge describes physical objects that exist in the world, and dynamic operations can 
alter the state of the physical objects. Epistemic knowledge provides guidance for when 
to apply dynamic operations based on the state of the static objects. They also proposed 
the following principles to guide users of the methodology:  
1) Begin with physical entities, proceed to their properties and relationships from 
there…2) The static, dynamic, and epistemic ontologies are not strict boundaries, 
use them loosely…3) Clearly establish the distinction between objects and what 
they are intended to represent…4) Understand and separate intensional and 
extensional entities…5) Build relevant abstractions through the use of 
generalization and aggregation…6) Encode rules as simple associations, and 





In 1993, Gruber presented design criteria for reusable ontologies [34]. He 
proposed that disciplined engineering methods akin to software engineering methods 
were required in order to achieve the long-term goal of establishing a shared library of 
reusable knowledge components or ontologies. Additionally, ontology design criteria are 
important because all intelligent software agents commit to the ontology if their actions 
are to be consistent with the ontology, and “a common ontology defines the vocabulary 
with which queries and assertions are exchanged among agents” [34]. With these usages 
of ontologies in mind, Gruber proposed five design criteria for ontologies: clarity, 
coherence, extensibility, minimal encoding bias, and minimal ontological commitment. 
Because of their significance in the body of ontology design research, Gruber’s 
descriptions of these design criteria are presented in Table 2.3 as they appeared in his 
paper [34]. Readers should consult Gruber’s paper for detailed illustrations of and case 
studies involving the five ontology design criteria. 
Gomez-Perez contributed guidelines for the evaluation of ontologies, and he 
suggested the following steps in an ontology definition evaluation:  
1. “Check the structure or architecture of the ontology,” 2. “check the syntax of 
the definitions,” and 3. “check the content in the definitions” [32]. In step one, the 
structure of the ontology is evaluated according to the selected design criteria (e.g. 
Gruber’s five design criteria). In step two, syntactically incorrect structures and 
definitions are defined independent of their semantics. Finally, in step three, the 





Table 2.3   Gruber’s Ontology Design Criteria (directly quoted from [34]) 
 
Design Criteria Description 
Clarity An ontology should effectively communicate the intended meaning of 
defined terms. Definitions should be objective. While the motivation for 
defining concept might arise from social situations or computational 
requirements, the definition should be independent of social or 
computational context. Formalism is a means to this end. When a definition 
can be stated in logical axioms, it should be. Where possible, a complete 
definition (a predicate defined by necessary and sufficient conditions) is 
preferred over a partial definition (defined by only necessary or sufficient 
conditions). All definitions should be documented with natural language. 
Coherence An ontology should be coherent: that is, it should sanction inferences that 
are consistent with the definitions. At the least, the defining axioms should 
be logically consistent. Coherence should also apply to the concepts that 
are defined informally, such as those described in natural language 
documentation and examples. If a sentence that can be inferred from the 
axioms contradicts a definition or example given informally, then the 
ontology is incoherent. 
Extensibility An ontology should be designed to anticipate the uses of the shared 
vocabulary. It should offer a conceptual foundation for a range of 
anticipated tasks, and the representation should be crafted so that one can 
extend and specialize the ontology monotonically. In other words, one 
should be able to define new terms for special uses based on the existing 




The conceptualization should be specified at the knowledge level without 
depending on a particular symbol-level encoding. An encoding bias results 
when representation choices are made purely for the convenience of 
notation or implementation. Encoding bias should be minimized, because 
knowledge-sharing agents may be implemented in different representation 




An ontology should require the minimal ontological commitment sufficient 
to support the intended knowledge sharing activities. An ontology should 
make as few claims as possible about the world being modeled, allowing 
the parties committed to the ontology freedom to specialize and instantiate 
the ontology as needed. Since ontological commitment is based on 
consistent use of vocabulary, ontological commitment can be minimized by 
specifying the weakest theory (allowing the most models) and defining 
only those terms that are essential to the communication of knowledge 






Uschold and Gruninger are also primary contributors of preliminary principles 
and methods for ontology design [72]. They recognized a lack of standard methodologies 
and research literature for producing quality ontology designs and products. They 
proposed a methodology for building ontologies that are developed for communication, 
interoperability, and systems engineering (specification, reliability, and reusability). In 
the context of communication, an ontology “reduces conceptual and terminological 
confusion by providing a unifying framework within an organization” [72]. In the 
context of interoperability, ontologies address the problem “in which we have different 
users that need to exchange data or who are using different software tools. A major theme 
for the use of ontologies in domains such as enterprise modeling and multiagent 
architectures is the creation of an integrating environment for different software tools” 
[72]. Finally, in the systems engineering context, ontologies serve as specification and 
design products of the software system.  
Uschold and Gruninger’s methodology includes the following items: 
identification of the purpose and scope, building of the ontology, evaluation, 
documentation, and development of guidelines for each phase. This methodology is a 
refinement of Gruninger and Fox’s previous methodology for the design and evaluation 
of ontologies that included the following components: identification of the motivating 
scenario, mapping of informal competency questions to the scenario, specification using 
first-order logic, and evaluation of the first-order logic according to formal competency 
questions (axioms and completeness theorems) [35]. Further discussion of Gruninger and 
Fox’s methodology is omitted because Uschold and Gruninger’s model contains the same 
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ideas, and it is not specific to first-order logic specifications. Table 2.4 presents a 
description for each component of Uschold and Gruninger’s ontology design 
methodology. 
Uschold and Gruninger’s ontology development methodology serves as the basis 
for contemporary literature on ontology development. For example, in 2001 Noy and 
McGuiness, from Stanford University’s Knowledge Systems Laboratory, published a 
technical report entitled, “Ontology Development 101: A Guide to Creating Your First 
Ontology” [50]. Noy and McGuiness presented an ontology development process that is 
very similar to Uschold and Gruninger’s methodology. Noy and McGuiness’s 
methodology includes the following steps: 1. Determine the domain scope of the ontology, 
2. Consider reusing existing ontologies, 3. Enumerate important terms in the ontology, 4. 
Define classes and the class hierarchy, 5. Define the properties of classes, 6. Define the 
facets of the slots (cardinalities, attribute types, etc.), and 7. Create instances. They also 
offered three general guidelines within the context of Uschold and Gruninger’s 
methodology: “There is no one correct way to model a domain—there are always viable 
alternatives. The best solution almost always depends on the application that you have in 
mind and the extensions that you anticipate…. Ontology development is necessarily an 
iterative process…. Concepts in the ontology should be close to objects (physical or 
logical) and relationships in your domain of interest. These are most likely to be nouns 
(objects) or verbs (relationships) in sentences that describe your domain” [50].  
Based on this review of ontology development methodologies and principles, 
there seems to be a general agreement in the artificial intelligence community that 
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Table 2.4   Uschold and Gruninger’s [72] Ontology Design Methodology 
 
Methodology Component Description 
Identify Purpose and Scope Define the usage scenarios and application domain 
of the ontology  
Building the Ontology Consists of three activities: ontology capture, 
ontology coding, and integration of existing 
ontologies 
Ontology Capture Identify the concepts and relationships, produce 
precise unambiguous textual descriptions of them, 
and identify terms for referring to concepts and 
relationships 
Ontology Coding Choose the meta-ontology or terms used to specify 
the ontology (classes, entities, relations, slots, 
attributes, etc.), select a representation language 
that supports the meta-ontology, code the ontology 
in the representation language 
Integrating Existing Ontologies During the capture and coding phases, evaluate the 
potential for reuse of existing ontologies. 
Evaluation Apply ontology design evaluation criteria such as 
those proposed by Gruninger and Fox [35] and 
Gomez-Perez [32] 
Documentation Clearly define the assumptions and important 
decisions that were made with regards to the 
ontology design and representation 
Guidelines for Each Phase Include guidelines for each of the above phases as 
well as indication of relationships between the 
phases. Gruber [34] provides preliminary 




developing quality ontology knowledge bases demands a systematic, engineering 
approach. Also, there seems to be a consensus that methodologies for ontology 
development should include a process framework for ontology development, principles 
for following the process, and criteria for evaluating the resulting product. Choosing a 
methodology may be dependent on the project characteristics and the chosen ontology 
representation language.  
2.3.3 Ontology Representations 
To conclude this survey of work on ontology modeling in artificial intelligence, 
this subsection presents an overview of four general categories of ontology 
representations as identified by Russell and Norvig: logic programming languages, 
production systems, description logic systems, and frame systems and semantic networks 
[58]. Logic programming languages and production systems will be described together 
because they both represent the ontology in terms of first-order logic.  
2.3.3.1 Logic Programming Languages and Production Systems 
Logic programming languages represent ontologies as a consistent collection of 
first-order logic implications and predicates. For example, parenthood may be 
represented by two functions, Mother and Father, where one’s mother is one’s female 
parent, and one’s father is one’s male parent. Female and Male may be represented as 










According to Russell and Norvig, “logic programming views the program and 
inputs as logical statements about the world, and the process of making consequences 
explicit as a process of inference” [58]. An inference engine is an essential part of a logic 
programming language, and it may be used to respond to queries via backward-chaining. 
For example, based on the following positive literals and the definitions of Mother and 
Father, backward-chaining may be applied to determine the mother and father of Chris: 
Male(Al), Female(Charlotte), Parent(Charlotte, Chris), Parent(Al, Chris). Based on the 
ontology, it may be inferred that Charlotte is the mother of Chris and Al is the father of 
Chris. Details of the backward-chaining algorithm are beyond the scope of this chapter, 
and readers are advised to consult Russell and Norvig for further details [58]. PROLOG, 
the most popular logic programming language, has been used as a tool for building 
compilers, parsing natural language, and building expert systems. All inference 
calculations in PROLOG are performed using a backwards-chaining, depth-first search 
algorithm.  
Like logic programming languages, production systems represent the ontology in 
first-order logic terms. However, the application of logic programming languages and 
production systems differ: logic programming languages evaluate queries using 
backward-chaining, and production systems use forward-chaining to infer new 
information about the world. However, in production systems the consequence of the 
implications (rule memory) is an action to add or delete information from the collection 
of positive literals (working memory). CLIPS is an example of a production system.  
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Some of the most heavily debated issues in logical knowledge representation have 
revolved around what is known as the frame problem [58, 61]. The frame problem, 
described by McCarthy and Hayes in 1969, details a significant disadvantage of 
declarative logical knowledge representation: “Using mathematical logic, how is it 
possible to write formulae that describe the effects of actions without having to write a 
large number of accompanying formulae that describe the mundane, obvious non-effects 
of those actions” [61]? The frame problem is commonly illustrated in terms of an 
example that involves a specification on the effects of moving an object and painting an 
object: “1. Colour(x, c) holds after Paint(x,c), 2. Position(x, p) holds after Move(x,p)” 
[61]. For example, an object is green after it is painted green, and an object is in the yard 
after it is moved into the yard. Though it is intuitive to assume that the color of an object 
does not change after it is moved, the former two rules do not allow one to draw this 
rather commonsense conclusion. To address this problem, a knowledge-based system 
must contain frame axioms that state how the ontology is unchanged by each action. The 
challenge of the frame problem is in representing these commonsense rules in a clear and 
concise manner while avoiding the burden of explicitly specifying M × N frame axioms, 
where M is the number of single-property-modifying actions and N is the number of 
properties. The issue has been, for the most part, resolved by solutions such as 
circumscription, situation calculus, and successor-state axioms [58, 61]. Further 
discussion of the frame problem, its variants, and solution approaches are beyond the 
scope of this chapter.  
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2.3.3.2 Description Logic Systems 
According to Russell and Norvig, “the syntax of first-order logic is designed to 
make it easy to say things about objects. Description logics are designed to focus on 
categories and their definitions” [58]. In general, the description logic representation is 
more straightforward and concise than first-order logic. For example, in CLASSIC, a 
description logic system, )()()(, xHasChildxFemalexMotherx ∧⇔∀  may be 
represented as Mother = And(Female, HasChild). Description logics such as CLASSIC 
and KL-ONE also improve on the tractability of inference by guaranteeing a polynomial 
response time to all inference queries. Because of inference tractability and more user-
friendly, concise syntax, practitioners adopted CLASSIC and other description logic 
systems for applications such as financial management, database interfaces, and software 
information systems [58]. However, due to restrictions on the description logic syntax, 
namely the lack of disjunction and negation, it is difficult and sometimes impossible to 
represent complex problems and queries.  
2.3.3.3 Frame Systems  
Frame systems offer a significant syntactical departure from logic programming 
languages, production systems, and description logic systems. Frame-based systems 
represent ontologies as collections of objects that are related by subset and membership 
relations. Objects also have slots with allowable values, and subset objects may inherit 
these slots from superset objects. Figure 2.5 illustrates a frame-based knowledge base. A 
rectangle represents an object, and it contains the object name and the slots of the object. 
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Arrows drawn between objects represent subset or membership relationships. Though the 
syntax is more user-friendly than first-order logic, the frame-based or semantic network 
may be translated into first-order logic. For example, the Stringed Instruments and 






















































Figure 2.5   Frame-Based Knowledge Base Example 
 
 
Given a large knowledge base with many objects, the frame-based ontology 
illustration (as illustrated in Figure 2.5) is not scalable. Typically, frame-based ontology 
languages provide syntax for graphical representation and for textual representation; in 
large knowledge bases the graphical representation may be applied to a subset of the most 
widely used object hierarchies. The frame-based approach is significantly less expressive 
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than logic programming languages, production systems, and description logics; frame-
based knowledge bases do not allow negation, disjunction, or quantification. However, 
according to Russell and Norvig, the frame-based approach offers the following 
advantages: “they are able to capture inheritance information in a modular way, and their 
simplicity makes them easy to understand” [58].  
Currently, frame-based ontology representations are very popular in literature 
regarding the Semantic Web. The Semantic Web is an initiative led by the World Wide 
Web Consortium (W3C) to enhance the metadata standards for Web documents and 
services. Currently, access to documents on the World Wide Web is highly dependent on 
ambiguous keyword matches and website rankings, and there is little machine-
interpretable data present in World Wide Web documents. XML (Extensible Markup 
Language), RDF (Resource Description Framework), and OWL (Web Ontology 
Language) are the standard languages of the Semantic Web. OWL is a frame-based 
language that is used for publishing ontologies on the World Wide Web, and its standard 
is specified by the W3C [76]. In the Semantic Web, ontologies will be published, shared, 
and referenced in Web content and Web services; the ontologies will provide a machine-
readable, shared understanding of concepts present in documents. Table 2.5 provides an 
OWL representation for the class of Solidbody Electric Guitars as specified in the frame-
based knowledge base illustrated in Figure 2.5. 
Several tools are available for supporting frame-based ontology development in 




Table 2.5   OWL Ontology Example  
 
  <owl:Class rdf:ID="Solidbody_Electric_Guitars"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty> 
          <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:ID="Strings"/> 
        </owl:onProperty> 
        <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#int" 
        >6</owl:hasValue> 
      </owl:Restriction> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty> 
          <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="#SteelStrings"/> 
        </owl:onProperty> 
        <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean" 
        >true</owl:hasValue> 
      </owl:Restriction> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf> 
      <owl:Restriction> 
        <owl:onProperty> 
          <owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="#Hollow"/> 
        </owl:onProperty> 
        <owl:hasValue rdf:datatype="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#boolean" 
        >false</owl:hasValue> 
      </owl:Restriction> 
    </rdfs:subClassOf> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="#Guitars"/> 





project, published a comprehensive evaluation of tools for ontology development, 
ontology merge and integration, ontology evaluation, ontology storage and querying, and 
ontology-based annotation [51]. Their evaluation criteria included factors such as 
software architecture, interoperability, underlying knowledge representation language, 
available inference services, and usability. All of the evaluated tools were relevant to 
Semantic Web development, and many of the ontology development tools, such as 
Apollo, Link Factory, OntoEdit, Ontolingua, Protégé, WebODE, and WebOnto, support 
frame-based ontology development. 
2.4 Domain Modeling in Software Engineering 
In the 1980s and 1990s, while artificial intelligence researchers were busy 
exploiting the reasoning capabilities of ontologies, software engineers began placing an 
increasing amount of emphasis on developing reusable components and providing 
support for requirements engineering tasks. During this period, software engineering 
researchers began applying methods and principles similar to ontology design methods to 
the problem of analyzing and modeling the application domain for which a software 
product is built; in the context of this chapter, this will be known as domain analysis and 
modeling. This section defines domain modeling in the context of software engineering, 
describes methods and principles of domain modeling, and presents an overview of 
prevalent domain modeling representations. This topic is discussed in sufficient detail 
such that candidate methods and representations for computer forensics domain modeling 
may be identified and evaluated later in this document.  
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2.4.1 Domain Modeling Definition and Background 
The term “domain analysis” was first defined by Neighbors in 1980 as “the 
activity of identifying objects and operations of a class of similar systems in a particular 
problem domain” [47]. Neighbors proposed that domain analysis was essential for 
developing reusable software components, and he stated that “the key to reusable 
software is to reuse analysis and design; not code” [47]. Neighbors’s early domain 
analysis research was part of a trend of application-domain focus in software engineering, 
where, “by application domain, we mean a collection of problems that have something in 
common, usually (but not always) the nature of the problem” [30]. The trend began 
because researchers recognized a shortfall in general, weak problem-solving methods to 
system development; analyzing and modeling the application domain provided a focused, 
strong problem-solving method for systems development. In the context of problem-
solving methods, “strong methods are those designed to address a specific type of 
problem, while weak methods are those general approaches that may be applied to many 
types of problems” [30]. Though Neighbors originally proposed domain analysis in the 
context of reusable components, the operational goals of domain analysis and modeling 
were later expanded to include: 
• “Requirements & Specifications: Eliciting, verifying, and formalizing 
software requirements and specifications. 
• Automated Program Generation: Generating code from a system specification. 
• Reverse Engineering: Identifying the semantics of existing code. 
• Explanation & Communication: Capturing and communicating system content 
as with an executive information system. 
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• Decision Modeling: Understanding and resolving design decisions and 
rationales. 
• Education & Training: Training analysts and end users. 
• Testing: Automating the testing procedure” [37, 38].  
The result of domain analysis activities is a model that represents entities, 
attributes, and operations native to the application domain. During design and coding, 
developers make decisions about which elements of the domain model will be 
transformed into software components. In some circumstances, the model’s validity is 
based on the agreement and common understanding between all system stakeholders; 
stakeholder feedback and negotiation is an essential approach to requirements verification 
and validation [41, 53]. In this sense, domain models are consistent with Uschold and 
Gruninger’s definition that an ontology is a “a shared understanding in a given subject 
area” [72].  
2.4.2 Domain Modeling Methods and Principles 
When Neighbors proposed domain analysis, he did not specify a method or 
process for constructing a domain model; rather, he focused on the more encompassing 
method for transforming a domain model into reusable software components. Neighbors 
called this the “Draco Approach,” and it included the following activities: “the analysis of 
a complete problem area or domain (domain analysis), the formulation of a model of the 
domain into a special-purpose, high level language (domain language), the use of 
software components to implement the domain languages, and the use of source-to-
source program transformations to specialize the components for their use in a specific 
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system” [47]. However, as the trend toward application domain methods began, specific 
methods for domain analysis followed. 
Prieto-Diaz described the domain analysis process in the following narrative: 
“Information is collected from existing systems in the form of source code, 
documentation, designs, user manuals, and test plans, together with domain knowledge 
and requirements for current and future systems. Domain experts and domain analysts 
extract relevant information and knowledge. They analyze and abstract it. With the 
support of a domain engineer, knowledge and abstractions are organized and 
encapsulated in the form of domain models, standards, and collections of reusable 
components. The process is guided by domain analysis methods and techniques as well as 
management procedures” [54]. Table 2.6 summarizes the inputs, roles, support 
mechanisms, and output of Prieto-Diaz’s domain analysis process. 
 
 
Table 2.6   Domain Analysis Process Inputs, Roles, Support, and Output 
 
Inputs/Sources of Domain 
Knowledge 
Technical literature, existing implementations, customer 
surveys, expert advice, and current and future requirements
Roles Problem domain expert, domain analyst, and domain 
engineer 
Supporting Mechanisms Domain analysis methods, management procedures 




The object-oriented development methodology has become the standard solution 
for software reuse and, to a large extent, domain modeling in software engineering. The 
object-oriented paradigm views the application domain as a collection of related entities 
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that encapsulate attributes and operations [43, 53]. This domain representation is similar 
to the frame-based ontologies in artificial intelligence. The object-oriented development 
methodology begins with object-oriented analysis. The goal of object-oriented analysis is 
to identify the classes relevant to the problem domain and to identify the relationships, 
attributes, and behavior of these classes. A typical object-oriented analysis process 
includes the following sequence of tasks:  
1. “Basic user requirements must be communicated between the customer and 
the software engineer. 
2. Classes must be identified. 
3. A class hierarchy is defined. 
4. Object-to-object relationships should be represented. 
5. Object behavior must be modeled. 
6. Tasks 1 through 5 are reapplied iteratively until the model is complete” [53]. 
Alternatively, if few requirements have been developed, the first representation of 
an object-oriented domain model may exclude the behavior and operations of classes and 
focus only on class hierarchies, class attributes, and class relationships (information 
domain). This is sometimes known as the Shalaer-Mellor method of object-oriented 
analysis, and it is also present in the Unified Modeling Language (UML) approach to 
object-oriented analysis [41, 43]. As the requirements are refined and design activities are 
performed, domain concepts are transformed into system classes with delegated 
responsibilities and operations. Larman specified the following sequence of tasks for this 
approach to object-oriented domain modeling: 1. identify domain concepts, 2. identify 
relationships between domain concepts, and 3. identify the attributes or properties of the 
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domain concepts [43]. The following three paragraphs discuss this approach to object-
oriented domain analysis in more detail. 
Domain concepts may be any ideas, things, or objects that are relevant to the 
development project. Concept category lists and noun extraction are common tools and 
techniques for identifying candidate concepts in a problem domain [43, 53]. Table 2.7 
provides an example concept category list with example concepts. In noun extraction, text 
passages relevant to the project are grammatically parsed, and all nouns are listed as 
candidate concepts. However, noun extraction may provide an overwhelming list of 
candidate concepts that contains redundant and irrelevant entries. 
Coad and Yourden8 suggested six selection characteristics that a class or concept 
should exhibit to be included in the domain model: 
1. Retained information: The potential class will be useful during analysis only if 
information about it must be remembered so that the system can function. 
2. Needed services: The potential class must have a set of identifiable operations 
that can change the value of its attributes in some way. 
3. Multiple attributes: During requirements analysis, the focus should be on 
‘major’ information; a class with a single attribute may, in fact, be useful 
during design, but is probably better represented as an attribute of another 
class during the analysis activity. 
4. Common attributes: A set of attributes can be defined for the potential class, 
and these attributes apply to all instances of the class. 
5. Common operations: A set of operations can be defined for the potential class, 
and these operations apply to all instances of the class. 
6. Essential requirements: External entities that appear in the problem space and 
produce or consume information essential to the operation of any solution for the 
system will almost always be defined as classes in the requirements model [53]. 
                                                 
8 The original source of the six criteria is P. Coad and E. Yourden, Object-Oriented 
Analysis, 2nd ed., Prentice-Hall, 1991. 
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Table 2.7   Concept Category List 
 
Concept Category Examples 
Physical or tangible objects Cell phone, hard drive, CDR disk 
Descriptions of things Marketing report, Technical Report 
Places Home, street 
Transactions Payment, sale, money deposit, email transmission 
Roles of people User, Systems Administrator 
Containers of things Databases, hard drives 
Things in a container Files, transactions 
Computer or electro-
mechanical systems 
Internet store, credit card authorization system 
Organizations Sales Department, Savings and Loan Department 
Events Sale, Class Registration 
Rules and policies Tax Laws, Security Policies 
Records of finance, work, 
contracts, legal matters 
Bank Account Log, Work Contract 
Services Internet service provider, telephone service, cell phone 
service 






Relationships between objects identify some meaningful or interesting 
association. As was the case in identifying concepts, relationships may also be identified 
by using a relationship category list such as the one in Table 2.8. The goal of identifying 
these relationships is to enhance the understanding of the application domain, but the 
concepts themselves are more important than the relationships between the concepts [43]. 
Larman provided the following guidelines for selection relationships (he referred to them 
as associations):  
• “Focus on those associations for which knowledge of the relationship needs to 
be preserved for some duration (“need-to-know” associations). 
• It is more important to identify concepts than to identify associations. 
• Too many associations tend to confuse a conceptual [domain] model rather 
than illuminate it. Their discovery can be time-consuming, with marginal 
benefit. 
• Avoid showing [selecting] redundant or derivable associations” [43]. 
Finally, a set of attributes is selected that enumerate the important information 
held by a concept. Example attributes include descriptive data such as phone number, zip 
code, date, name, social security number, etc. When selecting attributes, Pressman [53] 
advised the developer to answer the following question for each concept: “What data 
items (composite and/or elementary) fully define this class [concept] in the context of the 
problem at hand?” This process of selecting concepts, relationships, and attributes may be 
performed iteratively such that previous phases are revisited when required; for example, 
during the attribute identification phase, it may be necessary to introduce new concepts or 




Table 2.8   Concept Relationship Categories 
 
Category Examples 
A is a physical part of B DVD drive – Workstation 
A is a logical part of B Network mapping – Network intrusion 
A is physically contained in/on B Used CDR media – CD case 
A is a description for B Readme file – Executable program 
A owns B Employee – Car 
A is a member of B Employee – Company 
A is an organizational subunit of B Information technology division – Company  
A uses or manages B Systems administrator – Company network 
A is a specialized version of the 
generalized B 
Systems administrator – Company employee 
A communicates with B Tech Support - Users 
A is known/logged/recorded/reported 
in B 
Email registration – Network logs 
 
 
Domain models and ontologies are similar (this will be discussed further in 
Section 2.4.3), and in some instances, researchers directly prescribe ontology 
development methods for requirements domain analysis [14, 55]. Prieto-Diaz adapted 
Uschold and Gruninger’s ontology development method, and Breitman and Leite devised 
their own method based on previous ontology methods and on application language 
methods [14, 55, 72]. As ontology is a contemporary “buzzword” in computer science 
literature, more ontology-based requirements modeling and software engineering 
methods are likely to follow.  
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2.4.3 Domain Modeling Representations 
Domain models are generally more focused and less formal than the ontology and 
knowledge models used in artificial intelligence applications. Table 2.9 provides a 
comparison of ontology knowledge models and domain models as presented by Prieto-
Diaz [55]. Typically, reasoning and inference algorithms are not applied to domain 
models, so formality is not required. However, domain models may be extended to include 
the formal features and notation of ontologies [23, 28]. Additionally, some requirements 
domain modeling languages do provide the formality provided by knowledge-based 
ontology languages. This formality may be required in order to support automated 




Table 2.9   Comparison of Domain Model and Ontology 
 
Feature Domain Model Ontology 
Controlled vocabulary Yes Yes 
Taxonomy Yes Yes 
Thesaurus Yes Yes 
Abstract concept definitions Informal Formal 
Semantic relationships Yes Yes 
Multiple viewpoint models Yes Yes 
Axioms Yes Yes 
Cross-domain association Implicit (via thesaurus) Explicit 







The remainder of this section presents three example representations of 
requirements domain models: the Unified Modeling Language, the Entity Relationship 
Diagram, and Formal Specification Languages. 
2.4.3.1 Conceptual Diagrams in the Unified Modeling Language 
UML conceptual diagrams are typically constructed during the early requirements 
phase of software projects in order to help the developers understand the application 
domain of the project [43]. The foundational element of the UML conceptual diagram is 
the concept. A concept represents a “real-world” entity that may contain zero or more 
attributes that describe the concept. The conceptual diagram serves as a reference during 
requirements engineering design and as the basis for later UML models such as system 
contracts and class diagrams.  
The UML conceptual model notation is relatively simple, as the model is intended 
to be reviewed by a layperson. Figure 2.6 provides an example of a UML conceptual 
model applied to the domain of a retail point-of-sale system [43]. Concepts are 
represented by boxes, with the concept name appearing in the top of the box. If attributes 
exist, they are listed in the field below the concept name. Lines drawn between concepts 
indicate a named relationship with a specified cardinality. For example, one Product 


































































As the UML representation is very popular, researchers have developed 
extensions to UML such as UMLSEC for security applications, and methods for 
translating a UML conceptual diagram into a formal ontology [23, 28, 39]. These 
extensions to UML illustrate the popularity and flexibility of UML and the dominance of 
the object-oriented development methodology.  
2.4.3.2 Entity Relationship Diagrams 
Entity relationship diagrams are primarily used for designing relational database 
schemas, but they may also be used for representing the information domain of a non-
database application. The entity relationship diagram was proposed by Chen in 1976 and 
is known as a semantic data model [41]. There are three fundamental components of the 
entity relationship diagram: entities, attributes, and relationships. The meanings of these 
terms are synonymous to the concepts, attributes, and relationship elements of the UML 
conceptual diagram, and in fact, the entity relationship diagram is a precursor to object-
oriented models [41].  
Figure 2.7 illustrates an entity relationship diagram for an Internet shopping 
system.9 Rectangles represent entities, ovals represent entity attributes, and diamonds 
represent relationships. A line drawn between an entity and a relationship indicates the 
entity’s participation in the relationship. There are two additional components to the 
entity relationship diagram notation: cardinality and modality. Cardinality indicates the 
number of entities participating in a relationship, and modality indicates whether or not 
                                                 
9 Figure 2.7 is a reproduction of an entity relationship diagram that was provided with an 
evaluation version of Smart Draw software by Hemera Technologies Incorporated.  
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the relationship is required or optional. A “crow’s foot” indicates a multiple cardinality, 
and a vertical line indicates a singular cardinality. For example, in Figure 2.7, one Order 
entity Contains many Item entities. Modality is indicated by a vertical line (mandatory 
relationship) or a circle (optional relationship), and modality is only specified when the 
cardinality is also specified. When modality is specified, its indicators occur beside the 
cardinality indicator and nearest to the relationship diamond. For example, in Figure 2.7, 
a Customer entity is an optional element of an Orders relationship, but an Item entity is a 
required element of an Orders relationship. If cardinality and modality are not specified, 







Figure 2.7   Entity Relationship Diagram for Internet Shopping System 
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2.4.3.3 Formal Requirements Specification 
Formal software specification languages such as Z (pronounced Zed) and the 
requirements modeling language allow users to represent system requirements using rigid 
mathematical terms. The mathematical representation of system requirements eliminates 
problems with ambiguity and allows software engineers to mathematically prove that the 
coded system behaves according to the formal specifications. The use of formal methods 
requires skills in Boolean algebra and set theory, requiring users to attend extensive 
training. Figure 2.8 provides an example Z specification for an order invoices data 
schema [27]. Z also allows states and operations to be defined. This type of domain 
model specification contains the same level of formality present in knowledge-based 









The schema in Figure 2.8 specifies that “…orders and orderStatus are partial 
functions from the set OrderID. The functions are partial (i.e., their domains do not 
necessarily cover the whole of the OrderID set in this case) since only valid orders are 
mapped in this way. All orders have a status associated with them. This type of general 
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information that must apply at all times (whatever the specific state of the system at any 
given time) is presented as a stat invariant predicate in most Z specifications (e.g., dom 
orders = dom orderStatus, constraining the domains of both functions to always be the 
same)” [27]. 
The practicality of formal methods in software engineering has been an ongoing 
debate for the past two decades. Critics claim that formal methods have not gained 
widespread acceptance in software engineering practice because the learning curve is too 
steep, it takes too much time to write formal specifications for a large system, and formal 
methods are only appropriate for safety critical systems. Researchers have responded to 
the critics by proposing the use of lightweight approaches to formal methods. This 
lightweight formalism has characteristics such as:  
• Placing more emphasis on creating an abstract representation than on formal 
notational details. 
• Employing formal methods as an analysis tool, and not using formal methods 
for theorem proving on the mapping of specifications to design/code. 
• Using theorem proving on a small subset of the system (optional). 
• Using formal specifications on a selected subset of confusing or risky system 
requirements. 
• Using formal methods in response to problems encountered during 
requirements analysis (e.g. misunderstood requirements, volatile 
requirements). 
• Improving the quality of natural language baselined requirements [13, 24]. 
2.5 Summary 
This chapter has provided a survey of work related to this dissertation. With 
respect to each of the topic areas, this chapter has: 
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• Established the current state of the art in computer forensics modeling 
approaches. 
• Established the current state of practice in computer forensics investigations. 
• Described common methods and representations of knowledge-based 
ontologies. 
• Described common methods and representations for software engineering 
domain analysis and modeling. 
Chapter 3 will synthesize the research presented in this chapter by introducing a 
method for planning a forensics examination that includes domain modeling. The case 
domain modeling approach utilizes the fundamental theories of domain and ontology 
modeling discussed in this chapter. The case domain modeling method described in 











CASE DOMAIN MODELING KEYWORD SEARCH 
PLANNING METHODOLOGY 
 
This chapter describes the case domain modeling and keyword search derivation 
methodologies. These topics are discussed in sufficient detail to characterize how the 
methodology may be applied in practical circumstances. However, these methodologies 
were customized to suit the needs of each experiment or case study.  
3.1 Analysis of Related Work  
Current best practices for computer forensics examination imply that the 
information domain of a case is defined by keyword lists, checklists, and other 
documents [6, 70, 71]. Ad hoc methods for scoping the information domain of an 
examination may be insufficient when investigators and technicians encounter large-scale 
cases, unusually complex cases, or unfamiliar case types. Existing modeling approaches 
in computer forensics each provide a different view of the investigation: DIPL provides a 
chain-of-events view, attack trees and adversary models offer adversary (or suspect) 
strategy views, and forensic graphs offer a hypothesis test view [17, 44, 59, 67, 68]. No 
previous forensic modeling approaches provide a method for exclusively analyzing and 
modeling the information domain of the forensics case. This dissertation research 
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addresses this shortcoming of existing modeling approaches by offering a more 
structured domain modeling approach for defining the information domain of a forensics 
examination.  
Established ontology and domain modeling methods and representations in 
artificial intelligence and software engineering provide a suitable framework for 
establishing a forensic case domain modeling methodology and representation. Both 
communities have produced an abundance of information on the topic of information 
domain modeling. In general, the software engineering methods for domain analysis and 
model representation seem to be more appropriate for case domain modeling adaptation 
than the knowledge-based ontology methods and representations. 
First-order-logic-based ontology representations (logic programming languages, 
description logics, and production systems) provide more expressive power than is 
necessary for defining the information domain of a forensics examination. Additionally, 
these languages are likely to be too technical for users who do not have extensive 
background in philosophy, computer science, or computer engineering. The frame-based 
ontology representation is the least expressive and the most user friendly. Though the 
frame-based ontology representation is based on first-order logic and set theory, it does 
not contain formal notations and syntax; entities are defined by boxes, lists, and link-lines 
instead of first-order logic sentences. 
Software engineering domain model representations are derivatives of the frame-
based ontology representations. Though they are restricted to software engineering 
applications, this restriction does not discount their utility for computer forensics 
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applications. The products of software engineering and computer forensics differ 
significantly. The former delivers a practical software configuration that consists of 
documentation, computer-executable code, and data structures, while the latter delivers 
digital evidence and documentation that indicates the occurrence of a digital event [53]. 
However, there are significant similarities between the approaches and underlying 
philosophies of software engineering and computer forensics: a focus on delivering a 
quality product, the importance of structured and scientific methods, the application of 
repeatable processes, the application of computer science concepts, the reuse of 
knowledge and components, and the application of software tools for supporting methods 
and processes. Furthermore, non-formal software engineering domain modeling methods 
are suitable for modeling computer forensics case domains because:  
• Representations such as UML and entity relationship diagrams are designed 
such that a layperson customer or software system stakeholder can review and 
validate the model. It is likely that computer forensics case stakeholders 
(investigators, lawyers, juries, etc.) will also be capable of reviewing and 
validating the model.  
• The UML and entity relationship diagram representations provide sufficient 
power to model the information domain of a computer forensics case. 
Computer forensics case domains are populated with related concepts that can 
be described by attributes.  
• The purpose of domain modeling in software engineering is aligned with the 
purpose of case domain modeling. In both instances, the information domain 
is defined in order to define the scope of development or investigative 
activities. 
3.2 Characteristics of Target Users  
The target users of the methodology described in Section 3.3 are teams of 
forensics analysts, intelligence analysts, forensics technicians, investigators, and 
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attorneys who routinely conduct large-scale computer forensics examinations. Complex 
and large-scale computer forensics examinations are mostly conducted by federal law 
enforcement, regulatory, and defense organizations such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA). These agencies have the abundant personnel and financial resources 
required to conduct large-scale computer forensics examinations. The computer forensics 
examination team members are more likely to have college degrees in accounting or 
criminal justice than in computer science, and they are trained in computer forensics by 
their employers.  
In such large-scale computer forensics examinations, there may be an abundance 
of diverse case information often related to an unfamiliar case domain. Consequently, 
there is a high degree of uncertainty regarding the goals of a large-scale examination. For 
example, a computer forensics team may be tasked with imaging and examining more 
than 30 workstations and a few servers if they conduct white collar crime investigations 
of corporations or large organizations. In such circumstances it can be difficult to 
characterize the evidence of a crime and clearly outline the scope and goals of the 
forensics examination. This methodology for examination planning manages case 
complexity by providing a structured approach for analyzing the case information, 
developing planning products, and identifying evidence. 
3.3 Case Domain Modeling Examination Planning Method  
Table 3.1 defines the four activities of the methodology and specifies the products 
of each activity. Figure 3.1 illustrates the relationship between the products of the 
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methodology. Starting with the case domain model, each subsequent product is built upon 
its predecessor. Thus all products can be traced back to elements in the case domain 




Table 3.1   Examination Methodology Activities and Products 
 
Activity Products 
1. Model the information domain of the case Case domain model 
2. Define search goals Statement of search goals 
3. Specify search methods for each goal Keyword search lists and statements of 
search strategies 
4. Conduct the examination Evidence bookmarks and traceability 
matrices  
Revisit activities and products when necessary:  
Domain modeling is an iterative process, and when new information is discovered, the 
model must be changed to reflect the new information. Also, new goals may be 




Figure 3.1   The Traceable Relationship of the 
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3.3.1 Case Domain Modeling 
The goals of case domain modeling are to analyze and organize the information 
domain of the forensics case. This case domain represents the known and unknown 
information that is relevant to the forensics examination. The case domain modeling 
method is derived from the UML conceptual modeling method presented by Larman 
[43]. This method consists of four phases, and each phase may be repeated during the 
modeling activity (it is a non-linear process):  
1. Identify concepts,  
2. Identify relationships,  
3. Identify attributes, and  
4. Instantiate the model.  
The fundamentals of domain modeling are adapted from software development to 
computer forensics. However, specific heuristics and methods are required for domain 
modeling in the context of computer forensics examination. The remainder of this section 
describes how each of the generic domain modeling steps should be executed in the 
examination planning methodology.  
3.3.1.1 Identifying Concepts 
The concept is the foundational element of the case domain model. Concepts are 
entities that are relevant to the computer forensics portion of the investigation. A concept 
is described by zero or more attributes and is related to at least one other concept. These 
concepts should include information required to conduct the examination and information 
that will be sought by the examination. It is important to begin with an extensive list of 
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concepts and gradually eliminate concepts that are irrelevant. Reusability is another 
important factor to consider when selecting concepts; reusing concepts can save time 
when developing future case domain models. A concept name that is more abstract is 
easier to reuse than a concept name that is more specific. For example, Suspect is more 
general than John Smith and thus is easier to reuse in a later case. An attribute such as 
Name may be included in the Suspect concept in order to distinguish between actual 
instances of the concept. Some of the eliminated concepts can be modeled as attributes 
instead of concepts, so it is useful to preserve the candidate list of concepts for later use.   
Identifying concepts in a case domain is a brainstorming activity that is supported 
by concept category checklists and noun–verb extraction. The USDOJ’s Electronic 
Crime Scene Investigation: A Guide for First Responders provides checklists (pp. 42-44) 
of common evidence entities that should be sought in certain types of investigations [70]. 
Tables 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 provide a complete reproduction of the USDOJ checklist as it 
appeared in their guide [70]. The evidence entities in these checklists can be directly 




  79 
 
Table 3.2   USDOJ Evidence Targets by Case Type (Part 1) 
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A more general concept category checklist should also be used to enumerate the 
common types of concepts with examples relevant to the computer forensics domain. 
Table 3.5 provides a concept category table that is tailored to the computer forensics 
application domain. The modeler must brainstorm on each concept category and 
determine if there are relevant case concepts that fit the category.  
 
 
Table 3.5   General Concept Category Checklist 
 
Concept Category Examples 
Physical or tangible objects Cell phone, Hard Drive, CDR disk 
Descriptions of things Marketing Report, Incident Report 
Places Home, Street 
Transactions Payment, Sale, Money Deposit, Email 
Transmission 
Roles of people Victim, Suspect, Witness 
Containers of things  Databases, Hard Drives 
Things in a container Files, Transactions 
Computer or Electro- 
mechanical systems 
Internet Store, Credit Card Authorization 
System 
Abstract noun concepts Motive, Alibi, Insanity, Poverty  
Organizations Mafia, Corporate Department, 
Government Organization 
Events Robbery, Meeting, Phone Call, File 
Access 
Rules and policies Laws, Procedures 
Records of finance, work, 
 contracts, legal matters 
Employment Contract, Lease, Receipt, 
Subpoena 
Services Internet Service Provider, Telephone 
Service, Cell Phone Service 
Manuals, Books Flight Manual, Explosives Manual 
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Finally, if the concept checklists do not provide a sufficient list of concepts, then a 
list of candidate concepts is identified by extracting nouns and verbs (known as noun–
verb extraction) from case documents such as underlying facts and circumstances, 
warrants, subpoenas, arrest reports, incident reports, etc. [43].  
3.3.1.2  Identifying Relationships 
For the purposes of planning a forensics investigation, the concept names and 
attributes are the most important items of information; concepts and attributes are the 
relevant pieces of information that the technician will use to seed the examination plan. 
However, relating the concepts adds an additional layer of information that can help an 
outsider understand the background and circumstances of a case. Larman’s relationship 
category table (see Table 2.8) can be adapted to identify typical relationships that may 
occur between case domain concepts [43]. Table 3.6 provides a concept relationship 
category table with some examples common to computer forensics examinations. 
When too many relationships are selected, then the complexity of the case domain 
model becomes unmanageable. Larman states that “…it is undesirable to overwhelm the 
conceptual [domain] model with associations [relationships] that are not strongly required 
and which do not illuminate our understanding. Too many un-compelling associations 
obscure rather than clarify” [43]. Thus, redundant and derivable relationships should be 
avoided in favor of essential relationships that foster an understanding of the case 
domain. Multiplicity (also called cardinality) constraints may be added to the 
relationships to specify how many items are involved in the relationship: A Suspect owns 
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0 or more Vehicles. Such constraints may enhance case domain understanding, but they 
are not essential for deriving and identifying important case information.  
 
 
Table 3.6   Case Domain Modeling Relationship Category Table 
 
Relationship Category Examples 
A is a physical part of B DVD Drive – Workstation 
A is a logical part of B Network Mapping – Network 
Intrusion 
A is physically contained in/on B Used CDR Media – CD Case 
A is a description for B Readme file – Executable Program
A owns B Suspect – Vehicle 
A is a member of B Suspect – Gang 
A is an organizational subunit of B Information Technology Division 
– Company  
A uses or manages B Systems Administrator – Company 
Network 
A is a specialized version of the 
generalized B 
Systems Administrator – Company 
Employee 
A communicates with B Suspect – Associates 
A is known, logged, recorded, or 
reported in B 





3.3.1.3  Identifying Attributes 
Attributes are the defining characteristics of a concept, and they represent the 
information that is essential to the computer forensics examination. These attributes may 
be referred to when constructing keyword searches, examining text documents, 
examining network logs, etc. For example, when looking for documents that refer to the 
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suspect, the name attribute of concept Suspect can be elaborated to form a short keyword 
list that includes initials, nicknames, first name, last name, middle name, etc.  
Concepts and relationships are very similar, and it is up to the modeler to 
determine if something should be modeled as an attribute or a concept. Because of this 
inherent similarity, the concept category tables are also used as brainstorming tools to 
identify attributes. As a minimum, the list of attributes should be exhaustive enough to 
uniquely distinguish between instances of a concept. For example, the name attribute is 
insufficient for distinguishing between unique instances of a Suspect concept. Appending 
this attribute list with social security number is sufficient information to distinguish 
between two distinct instances of Suspect. As was the case with other phases of the 
methodology, it is important to maintain a moderate approach between providing a 
comprehensive attribute list and providing a minimal attribute list.  
3.3.1.4  Instantiate the Model 
To instantiate the model, the attributes must be assigned actual values. The 
attributes for each concept should be categorized as known or unknown. Known values 
are assigned values, and attributes with unknown values should be flagged as “unknown.” 
When appropriate, the forensic examination activities will attempt to find the values of 
the unknown attributes, and the known attribute values will be developed into keyword 
search lists. Alternatively the occurrence of too many unknown attribute values may 
indicate to the modeler that additional case information must be collected before 
proceeding with the examination. It is also important to flag any attribute values that are 
misspelled words in documents written or referenced by the suspects, witnesses, or 
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victims involved in the case. Because people commonly misspell the same words, known 
misspellings are powerful keyword searches that can help find documents authored by an 
individual. 
3.3.1.5  Representing the Model 
The UML conceptual diagram is used as the graphical syntax for case domain 
models. Figure 3.2 provides an illustration of a case domain model for an email death 
threat case at a university. Tools such as Microsoft Visio and ArgoUML can be used to 
create a graphical case domain model. Attributes with unknown values are flagged with 
boldface and underlined font. Known attribute values must be excluded from the diagram 
to conserve page space. Instead of including them in the diagram, known concept 
attribute values should be included in a separate table.  
Alternatively, the case domain model can be represented without using graphical 
notations. A case concept can be described in a text form that has blanks for concept 
name, attribute names, attribute values, and related concepts. In the tabular 
representation, the emphasis is placed on the case concepts and attributes instead of the 
relationships. A graphical representation of a case domain model is most useful when the 
investigation involves a large team of analysts and investigators, the expected 
investigation time is relatively long, and the investigators are accustomed to the use of 
visual aids as analytical tools. The tabular representation is more appropriate when there 
is a small team (possibly even one person) involved in the forensics investigation and the 
expected investigation time is short.  




Figure 3.2   University Death Threat Email Case Domain Model Diagram  
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3.3.2 Developing Search Goals 
Search goals identify a concise search requirement for the examination and 
reference the relevant items in the case domain model. Search goals may be represented 
in a table that includes the following items of information: an ID tag that is unique to the 
case, a concise goal statement that references one or more concepts in the domain model, 
the purpose for the search goal, a list of all relevant concepts and attributes, a list of 
known attribute values, and a list of unknown attribute values that should be sought. 




Table 3.7   Example Search Goal Table 
 
Goal ID: 1 
Goal Statement: Find file items that reference the victim 
Purpose: Attempt to find evidence that the suspect(s) conducted 
background research on the victim 
Involved Concepts 
and Attributes: 
Faculty Member {Office Number, Office Hours, Class Names, 
Full Name, SSN, DOB, Phone Numbers, Email Addresses, 
Physical Addresses, Nicknames} 
Known Attribute 
Values: 
Office Number = 101 
Office Hours = 1-3pm M W F 
Class Names = English Composition 101, Creative Writing 102 
Full Name = Henry Silver Doe 
SSN = 123 – 45 – 6789 
DOB = 1/1/1965 
Phone Numbers = 555-555-1234 (home) 555-555-5432 (office) 
Email Addresses = hdoe@university.edu  
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3.3.3 Developing Keyword Lists and Search Strategies 
Keyword lists are often an important artifact for defining the scope of a search 
warrant and an examination. A keyword list should be developed for each known 
attribute value referenced in a search goal table. The keyword list should reference one or 
more goal IDs, identify the concept and attribute, specify a location(s) for the search, and 
uniquely identify each element in the keyword search list. Table 3.8 provides an example 
keyword list for the home phone number attribute referenced by the search goal in Table 
3.7. The example enumerates common string representations of a phone number. 
Attribute values can be elaborated into keyword lists by identifying synonyms, 
abbreviations, and other alternative representations. For example, a keyword list for the 
date value of October 31, 2005 may contain the following items: 10/31/2005, 10/31, 
10/31/05, Halloween 2005, 10-31-2005, 31 October, October 31st, etc. As was the case 
with identifying case domain concepts and relationships, it is important to maintain a 
balance between providing a comprehensive list and providing a concise list. Apply 
logical operators to combine and/or exclude terms. Depending on the search tool used, 
various logical operators can be added to a search string (e.g. OR, AND, NOT, 
CONTAINS, NEAR). These logical operators can be used to represent the relationships 
that exist between concepts in the case domain model. For example, to find documents 
that establish a relationship between John Smith (suspect) and Jane Doe (victim), the 
search string can specify a logical-AND combination of the two persons’ last names: 
Smith AND Doe. 
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Table 3.8   Keyword Search List Example 
 
Goal ID: 1 
Concept Attributes: Faculty Member {Phone Number = 555-555-1234 (home} 
Search Locations: All files and folders on all evidence disks 







Keyword search terms should be prioritized in each list according to their 
likelihood of finding the search target. Best practices for keyword searching in computer 
forensics cases can provide additional support for the keyword search term selection 
methodology [16, 26]. 
Finally, general search strategies must be developed to support the search goals. 
These search strategies are techniques that may be used to supplement or as an alternative 
to keyword searching. Each search strategy statement should reference a goal ID, be 
uniquely identified, describe the prescribed strategy or heuristic, and reference relevant 
concepts in the case domain model. Table 3.9 presents an example collection of search 
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ID Description Relevant Concepts
1 S-1.1 Browse directory structure for filenames that seem 
to relate to the victim before conducting the 
keyword searches. 
Faculty Member 
1 S-1.2 Sort all of the files by date, filter the files that have 
modification or creation dates within the time 
frame of the email threats. If there are less than 








3.3.4 Conducting the Examination 
Examinations are conducted using forensics software that allows users to 
bookmark file items that are of interest to the technician. Most commonly these 
bookmarks indicate an item that will be entered into evidence in the final report. 
Computer forensics tools such as Forensics Toolkit allow the user to enter metadata about 
the bookmark that includes a name and a description. For this methodology, bookmark 
metadata must contain a reference to the search strategy or keyword search term ID that 
was used to locate the file item. If the file item was found using a technique other than 
one identified in the plan, then a description of this search method should also be 
indicated in the bookmark metadata. Making such a reference indicates how the file item 
was found and allows the file item to be traced back to elements of the examination plan. 
After the examination is finished, a report should be generated that indicates which 
activities were conducted and which ones produced bookmarked results. Reviewing this 
report provides a way to check the completeness of the results with respect to the plan. If 
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it is determined that some critical elements of the plan were not executed, then the 
examination may be revisited. Table 3.10 presents an example of such a report. 
 
 
Table 3.10   Example Examination Results Table 
 
Keyword ID Performed? (Y/N) Evidence Bookmark Names 
K-1.1.1 Y Victim Digdirt Report 
K-1.1.2 Y None 
K-1.1.3 Y None 
Strategy ID Performed? (Y/N) Evidence Bookmark Names 
S-1.1 N None 
S-1.2 Y Victim’s photograph, Directions 
to Victim’s Home 
Other Activities Performed? (Y/N) Evidence Bookmark Names 
Keyword Search String 
“Doeman” 
Y None 
Keyword Search String on 
misspelled word “exert” 




Analysis of the results will likely reveal new information about the case domain 
than was unknown during the planning activities, and analysis of the results may also 
necessitate further planning and examining. In such circumstances it is necessary to 
revise the domain model and revisit previous phases of the planning methodology.  
3.4 Summary 
This chapter described the examination planning method that was used in the 
experiments described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The purpose of case domain modeling 
is to provide a rigorous analytical method for analyzing case details, filtering important 
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forensic-relevant case information, and providing the foundation for an organized and 
focused forensics examination plan. Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 evaluate this case domain 
modeling method by presenting the results of three experiment trials. These experiments 












CASE DOMAIN MODELING APPLICATIONS FOR FORENSICS PRACTITIONERS: 
PLANNING AND EXECUTING FORENSICS EXAMINATIONS: PART I 
 
 
This chapter describes how the case domain modeling planning method in Chapter 
III was evaluated using two experiment trials. These experiment trials required a control 
group and an experimental group to plan and execute a computer forensics examination. 
The experimental groups used the case domain modeling method and the control groups 
used an ad hoc planning approach. The performance of these groups is compared with 
respect to the amount of evidence found and the amount of time spent in the examination. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follow: Section 4.1 describes the experiment 
design, Section 4.2 includes the raw data that was collected in the experiment trials, Section 
4.3 presents a statistical analysis of the experiment data items, and Section 4.4 concludes 
this chapter by providing discussion of the results. 
4.1 Experiment Design 
The experiment population consists of an experimental group, which used the 
case domain modeling and keyword search derivation methodology, and a control group, 
which did not use the case domain modeling approach. Each group used their respective 
methods to plan an examination, conduct keyword searches, and record the results. Table 
4.1 provides the design details of the experiment. 
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Table 4.1   Experiment 1 Design 
 




1. Does the case domain modeling methodology result in an increased 
amount of evidence found in an examination? 
2. Does the case domain modeling methodology require a significant 
amount of additional effort when compared to a typical approach? 
Hypotheses • The experimental group will identify more evidence than the 
control group.  
• The experimental group will spend more time planning their 
keyword searches than the control group. 
• The experimental group will spend less time executing their 
keyword searches than the control group. 
• Overall, the experimental group will spend more time in the 
experiment than the control group.  
Experimental 
Group 
Subjects who were provided training in how to use the case domain 
modeling approach to forensics keyword search planning.  
Control 
Group 
Subjects who were provided training in how to use a typical approach 
to forensics keyword search planning.  
Independent 
Variable 
Presence or absence of the case domain modeling approach in the task 
of computer forensics keyword search planning and execution. 
Dependent 
Variables 
• The amount of evidence recovered from the provided media  
• The amount of effort required for planning keyword searches 
• The amount of time spent executing keyword searches 
Confounding 
Variables 
• The variability of subjects’ forensics skills 
o This was controlled by asking subjects to voluntarily tell the 





• MSU CSE students who were enrolled in CSE 4273/6273 
(Introduction to Cyber Crime and Computer Forensics) during the 






Mississippi State Department of Computer Science and Engineering  
Incentives None 
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• Subjects volunteered for the experiment and signed a consent form.
• Subjects committed to participate on a specific time, date, and 
place. 
• Prior to the experiment, the control group and the experimental 
group were given a separate 60-minute lectures on how to plan and 
execute a keyword search. The control group was given 
instructions that are characteristic of a typical approach to keyword 
search planning/execution, and the experimental group was given 
instructions on how to plan/execute a keyword search using the 
case domain modeling method. 
• When the experiment was conducted, the control group and the 
experimental group were placed in separate rooms. They were 
given the following materials: a case file, one evidence hard drive, 
experiment instructions, pens, and paper. 
• The participants were instructed (via the experiment instruction 
hand-out) to use their respective methods to analyze the case file 
and to find evidence on the hard drives.  
o Each group was given a four-hour time limit to complete this 
task, but they were allowed to quit when they felt they had 
found all of the evidence.  
o The groups were instructed to take detailed notes on their 
keyword search plan, the results of their search, and the time 
that planning/execution events occurred. Details on how this 
documentation was to be recorded were provided in the 
experiment instructions. When appropriate, forms were 
provided as documentation tools. 
• At the conclusion of the experiment, each group submitted their 
notes and results to the principal investigator or the faculty advisor 
(Dr. Dampier). They also completed an exit survey that evaluated 
the qualitative factors of their keyword searching method.  
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• A case scenario, a case file, and evidence hard drives were 
developed prior to the experiment. 
o As a class project, student teams in the fall 2005 CSE 
4273/6273 course prepared these materials. The class was 
divided into four teams, and each team developed a unique case 
scenario and case file and hid evidence on a hard drive. For the 
final class project, each team attempted to find the evidence 
hidden by another team. 
o When recruiting subjects, the principal investigator ensured that 
participants from the fall 2005 CSE 4273/6273 course were not 
given an evidence disk that they have seen before; they did not 
have developed the hard drive or examined it prior to the 
experiment.  
• Instructional materials were developed for keyword search 
planning with case domain modeling and with the typical approach. 
The participants were given the training lecture Power Point slides 
for use in their search planning and execution. 
• Instructional materials were developed for directing the 
experimental and control groups’ participation in the experiment, 
including instructions on how to complete the experiments. 
• A domain modeling software, Visio, was installed on the 
experimental group computers. 
• A qualitative exit survey was drafted.  
• In accordance with the Institutional Review Board for the 
Protection of Humans in Research (IRB), the appropriate subject 
consent forms were drafted and approved. 
• The forensics lab and required resources were reserved by 
contacting Dr. Dampier and Keri Chisolm (Systems Administrator). 
Required 
Resources 
• 24 hard drives (20–80 GB) 
• 24 Forensics Workstations with Forensics Toolkit software  
• 12 Forensics Workstations with the case domain modeling tool, 
Microsoft Visio. 
• Hard copies of all written materials: a case file, instructional 
materials, and an exit survey 
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4.1.1 The Control Group Preparation Method 
Chapter III outlined the case domain modeling method that is prescribed for the 
experimental groups in Experiment 1. This sub-section outlines the preparation method 
prescribed for the control groups in Experiment 1. The control group preparation method 
is a sequence of four activities: 
1. Summarize the case facts and information relevant to forensics activities, 
2. Classify the case type and relevant evidence sources, 
3. Develop a keyword search list, and 
4. State plans for other forensics activities. 
The goal of the control group method is generally the same as for the experimental 
group method: identify the relevant facts, develop a keyword search list, and plan non-
keyword searching activities. However, the control group method is ad hoc in the sense 
that there is no rigorous analytical process to follow for each of these activities. Instead, 
the purpose of each activity is briefly described and the subjects are instructed to 
complete the activities by writing lists and notes.  
4.1.2 Organization of Subject Population 
As identified in Table 4.1, the experiments’ case scenarios, case information, and 
evidence files were prepared by Mississippi State University (MSU) students enrolled in 
the fall 2005 Introduction to Cybercrime and Computer Forensics CSE 4273/6273 course. 
There were forty-nine students attending the course at MSU. Additionally there were 
twenty distance learning students at Jackson State University (JSU), and two distance 
learning students at the United States Army Corps of Engineers Engineering Research 
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and Development Center (USACE-ERDC) in Vicksburg, MS. The distance learning 
students did not participate in the experiments. As a class assignment, Dr. Dampier 
required all MSU students (this excludes the JSU and USACE-ERDC students) to 
participate in a group that must prepare a case scenario, a case file, and an evidence hard 
drive. Later in the semester, each group exchanged their work with another group and 
attempted to find the hidden evidence. There were four groups with eleven or twelve 
students in each group. Figure 4.1 illustrates the organization of groups with respect to 
evidence files according to the CSE 4273/6273 course assignment. Dr. Dampier also 
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from other groups or other individuals outside of the course. Assuming that this 
confidentiality was maintained and that the group assignments were successfully 
completed, then there are exactly two cases unfamiliar to each group. Figure 4.2 





Figure 4.2   CSE 4273/6273 Groups Linked to Their 




Additional constraints were placed on the organization of the experimental and 
control group subjects in Experiment 1. These constraints were imposed in an attempt to 
make the population uniform and balanced with respect to forensics expertise. First, in 
both experiments the experimental and control groups were balanced according to skill 
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4273/6273 grade average rankings. To the highest extent possible, equal numbers of 
subjects from each skill group were placed in the experimental and control groups. 
Furthermore, in Experiment 1, the experimental groups and control groups were balanced 
according to which evidence materials they had been exposed. Figure 4.3 illustrates the 
final organization of the experimental groups and control groups for Experiment 1. This 
approach to evidence preparation included the following disadvantages:  
• Planning and coordination effort was required in order to ensure that fall 2005 
CSE 4273/6273 students did not work on cases that they have developed or 
examined prior to the experiment.  
• Additional time was spent configuring hardware resources to accommodate 
two different sets of evidence. 
• The subject population was distributed across two pairs of experimental and 
control groups. This made it more difficult to draw statistical conclusions 
regarding the difference of means in the data. 
However, the benefits of using the student-prepared evidence outweighed the 
disadvantages. The benefits of the adopted evidence preparation approach included: 
• The principal investigator focused his initial experiment efforts on preparing 
instructional materials for the experiment instead of preparing case scenarios, 
case files, and evidence hard drives.  
• The principal investigator was restricted from consciously or subconsciously 
producing a case scenario and evidence that is biased in favor of the case 
domain modeling methodology. 
• The case domain methodology was evaluated on two case types that were 
prepared by two independent groups. This provides additional insight 












4.1.3 The Prepared Evidence Drives and Scenarios 
As described in Section 4.1.2, the subject population was divided into four major 
groups: A, D, B, and C. Groups A and D were combined, separated into an experimental 
group and a control group, and assigned to work on the evidence and scenario known as 
Case 3. Likewise Groups B and C were combined and partitioned into experimental and a 
control groups, and they worked on the evidence and scenario known as Case 1.  
Case 3, known as Alpha Delta, was an identity theft and hacking scenario. The 
scenario stated that twelve bank statements of allegedly stolen identities were found in a 
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twelve bank statements were prepared as background information to distribute to the 
examiners. The Alpha Delta evidence drive has an advertised capacity of 40 gigabytes 
(GB), and its allocated space was divided among three logical partitions: an 18.4-GB 
partition, a 17.6-GB partition, a 1.02-GB partition (the remaining space is unallocated). A 
total of 2,981 file items were present on the disk, including 99 evidence files. Figure 4.4 

























































































Figure 4.4   Distribution of File Item Types on the Alpha Delta Evidence Disk 
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The ratio of evidence files to non-evidence files was 3.32%. The 99 evidence files 
were distributed as follows:  
• 43 files contained mass lists of stolen identity information such as social 
security numbers and credit card numbers,  
• 44 files contained instructional materials for hacking and other illicit 
activities,  
• 1 file contained an archive of pictures that were modified using 
steganography to contain stolen identity information,  
• 1 file contained a text passage where the suspects indicated their use of 
steganography to hide information, and 
• 10 files were executables or archive files that contained what may be 
considered as hacker software tools. 
Case 1, known as Bravo Charlie, was a bank robbery, burglary, and money 
laundering scenario. Figure 4.5 illustrates the distribution of file types on the Bravo 



























































































No scenario statement was prepared, but the hard copies of 12 bank statements, 
3 Dallas, TX, news headlines (describing robberies), and 3 map images of a bank were 
prepared as artifacts that were found near the suspect computer. The Bravo Charlie 
evidence hard drive also had a 40-GB advertised capacity, and it contained two logical 
partitions: an 18-GB partition and a 19.2-GB partition (the remaining space was 
unallocated). A total of 58,459 files were present on the Case 1 disk, including 29 
evidence files. The ratio of evidence to non-evidence files was 0.0496%. The 29 evidence 
files were distributed as follows: 
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• 9 files containing email messages written to and by the suspects; these 
messages contained references to their illegal activities, 
• 11 image files that illustrated things such as the architectural layout of the 
robbed bank and various Dallas, TX, landmarks, and  
• 9 html files that provided tourist information about the Dallas, TX, area of 
the robbed bank and the jewelry store. 
4.1.4 Experiment Logistics 
All of the facilities, software, and hardware used in this experiment were owned 
and maintained by the MSU Department of Computer Science and Engineering. The 
following resources were used in the experiments: 
• Three classrooms, 
• 20 PC workstations with the Forensic Toolkit software package, and 
• 20 40-GB hard drives. 
4.2 Data items Collected 
The same data items were collected for both the Alpha Delta and the Bravo 
Charlie experiment populations. These data items may be categorized as time, 
performance, and survey data. The time data items represent the amount of time the 
subjects spent preparing and executing their examination. A cell phone clock was used as 
the official time, and the starting and finishing times for each subject were recorded by 
the principal investigator and his assistants. The performance data items represent how 
much of the scenario evidence the subjects located and bookmarked in their examination. 
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The subjects’ Forensic Toolkit case files were reviewed against a “solution” file that 
indicated where the scenario evidence was located on the evidence drive. The survey data 
was collected from a post-experiment evaluation survey that included multiple choice and 
short answer questions. The data items collected from the multiple choice portions of the 
surveys provide insight into the practicality and effectiveness of the subjects’ preparation 
and examination methods. The following subsections present the data items that were 
collected in the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie experiment trials. 
4.2.1 Data items Collected: Alpha Delta Trial 
Table 4.2 presents the time data items collected on the Alpha Delta group during 
the planning session and the examination session. Time is expressed in minutes. The 
upper half of the table provides time data items for the control group (ad hoc planning 
approach), while the bottom half of the table provides time data items for the 
experimental group (case domain modeling planning approach). This scheme is also used 
in the other tables in this section. 
Table 4.3 provides a summary of the amount of evidence located by the Alpha 
Delta groups. The amount of evidence is expressed in percentages. The evidence is also 
categorized into four groups: Stolen Identity (ID) files, Hacker References, 
Steganography (Steg) Evidence, and Hacking Tools. The overall or total percent of 
evidence found is also provided in the right-most column.  
Table 4.4 presents data regarding the amount of evidence found using specific 
search methods. Values are expressed in terms of the percentage of overall evidence that 
was successfully located using the specified search method. 
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AD1-1 92 160 252 
AD1-2 92 141 233 
AD1-3 92 161 253 
AD1-4 92 154 246 
AD1-5 103 135 238 
AD1-6 116 120 236 
MEAN  97.83 145.17 243 
Experimental Group 
Subjects 
   
AD2-1 137 129 266 
AD2-2 137 146 283 
AD2-3 169 194 363 
AD2-4 174 185 359 
AD2-5 171 184 355 
AD2-6 189 164 353 
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AD1-1 100 56.82 50 80 77.78 
AD1-2 2.26 29.55 0 20 16.16 
AD1-3 100 36.36 50 20 62.63 
AD1-4 11.63 43.18 50 20 27.27 
AD1-5 6.98 13.64 50 50 15.15 
AD1-6 100 70.46 0 10 75.76 
MEAN  53.48 41.67 33.33 33.33 45.79 
Experimental 
Group 










AD2-1 100 59.09 0 20 71.72 
AD2-2 97.67 84.09 50 50 85.86 
AD2-3 97.67 45.46 100 60 70.71 
AD2-4 97.67 11.36 0 10 48.48 
AD2-5 2.33 15.91 0 0 8.1 
AD2-6 4.65 18.18 0 10 11.11 
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AD1-1 40.40 2.02 42.42 71.71 
AD1-2 40.40 0 40.40 12.12 
AD1-3 10.10 17.17 27.27 35.35 
AD1-4 23.23 0 23.23 4.04 
AD1-5 13.13 1.01 14.14 1.01 
AD1-6 45.45 10.10 55.55 20.20 
AVERAGE 28.79 5.05 33.84 24.07 
Experimental 
Group 
    
AD2-1 1.01 47.47 48.48 23.23 
AD2-2 2.02 44.44 46.46 39.39 
AD2-3 3.03 5.05 8.08 62.62 
AD2-4 46.46 2.02 48.48 0 
AD2-5 8.08 0 8.08 0 
AD2-6 2.02 6.06 8.08 3.03 




Searching methods are categorized as planned keyword searches, unplanned 
keyword searches, all keyword searches, and non-keyword searches. Planned keyword 
searches were identified during the planning session, while unplanned keyword searches 
were specified during the examination session; these two categories are aggregated to 
represent all keyword searches. Non-keyword searches include any method other than 
keyword searching that the subjects used to find evidence. 
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Table 4.5 presents the post-experiment multiple choice survey questions. Table 
4.6 presents the multiple responses of the Alpha Delta group. The alphabetic multiple 
choice identifiers (a-e) were replaced with numerical identifiers (1-5). Questions Q1, Q2, 
and Q3 have a range of 1–5, while questions Q4 and Q5 have a range of 1–4. A listing of 
the responses from the two survey discussion questions is omitted, but insightful survey 
responses will be cited when appropriate. 
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Table 4.5   Alpha Delta Multiple Choice Post-Experiment Survey Questions 
 
Q1 Was the time you spent preparing appropriate for the examination task? 
a. My preparation time was extremely short considering the difficulty of the examination: I 
should have spent at least 2 additional hours preparing 
b. My preparation time was somewhat short considering the difficulty of the examination: I 
should have spent an additional 30 minutes – 1 hour preparing. 
c. I spent just the right amount of time preparing for the examination task 
d. I spent a little too much time preparing: I over-prepared by approximately 30 minutes – 1 
hour  
e. I spent way too much time preparing: I over-prepared by at least 2 hours 
Q2 Did your preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding of the case? 
a. The preparation effort contributed to confusion regarding case concepts and case facts 
b. The preparation effort was not helpful for understanding or identifying important case 
concepts 
c. The preparation effort was somewhat helpful for understanding or identifying important 
case concepts. 
d. The preparation effort was helpful in understanding and identifying important case 
concepts 
e. The preparation effort was very helpful in understanding and identifying important case 
concepts. 
Q3 Estimate your level of confidence in the results of your examination? 
a. I found less than 20% of the evidence 
b. I found between 20-40% of the evidence 
c. I found between 41-60% of the evidence 
d. I found between 61-80% of the evidence 
e. I found between 81-100% of the evidence 
Q4 Were you given a sufficient amount of time to execute the examination? 
a. I needed a significant amount of additional time to execute the examination (> 2 hours) 
b. I needed additional time to execute the examination (1-2 hours) 
c. I needed a little bit of additional time to execute the examination (30 minutes – 1 hour) 
d. I executed all planned activities and was given a sufficient amount of time to execute the 
examination. 
Q5 Did you spend additional time developing or brainstorming keyword searches after the preparation 
sessions/during the examination? 
a. I developed several keyword searches during the examination session (> 20) 
b. I developed some keyword searches during the examination session (10-20) 
c. I developed very few keyword searches during the examination session (1-10) 
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Table 4.6   Alpha Delta Multiple Choice Survey 
Data Items 
 
Control Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
AD1-1 3 4 4 4 1 
AD1-2 3 3 2 4 3 
AD1-3 4 2 4 4 3 
AD1-4 3 4 3 4 3 
AD1-5 3 4 2 4 3 
AD1-6 3 4 4 4 3 
MEDIAN 3 4 3.5 4 3 
Experimental Group      
AD2-1 4 4 4 4 3 
AD2-2 1 3 3 4 2 
AD2-3 3 3 2 4 1 
AD2-4 2 4 5 4 3 
AD2-5 3 3 2 4 3 
AD2-6 3 4 1 4 2 




4.2.2 Data Items Collected: Bravo Charlie Trial 
Table 4.7 presents the time data items collected on the Bravo Charlie group 
during the planning session and the examination session. Time is expressed in minutes. 
The upper half of the table provides time data items for the Bravo Charlie control group, 
while the bottom half of the table provides time data items for the Bravo Charlie 
experimental group. This scheme is also used in the other tables in this section. 
Table 4.8 provides a summary of the amount of evidence located by the Bravo 
Charlie groups. The amount of evidence is expressed in percentages. The evidence is also  
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BC1-1 85 120 205 
BC1-2 89 119 208 
BC1-3 104 74 178 
BC1-4 62 99 161 
BC1-5 114 79 193 
BC1-6 99 122 221 
BC1-7 72 114 186 
AVERAGE 89.29 103.86 193.14 
Experimental 
Group 
   
BC2-1 124 141 265 
BC2-2 142 108 250 
BC2-3 98 131 229 
BC2-4 130 131 261 
BC2-5 217 174 391 
BC2-6 161 142 303 
BC2-7 67 137 204 
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categorized into three groups: Emails, Images/Photos, and Dallas, TX area information. 
The overall or total percent of evidence found is also provided in the right-most column.  
Table 4.9 presents data regarding the effectiveness of keyword searching in the 
Bravo Charlie group. Values are expressed in terms of the percentage of overall evidence 
that was successfully located using the specified searching method. Searching methods 
are categorized as planned keyword searches, unplanned keyword searches, keyword 
searches, and non-keyword searches. Planned keyword searches were identified during 
the planning session, while unplanned keyword searches were specified during the 
examination session; these two categories are aggregated to represent all keyword 
searches. Non-keyword searches include any method other than keyword searching that 
the subjects used to find evidence. 
Table 4.10 presents the post-experiment multiple choice survey questions (this is 
a repeat of Table 4.5). Table 4.11 presents the multiple responses of the Bravo Charlie 
group, and the alphabetic multiple choice identifiers (a–e) were replaced with numerical 
identifiers (1–5). Questions Q1, Q2, and Q3 have a range of 1–5, while questions Q4 and 
Q5 have a range of 1–4. A listing of the responses from the two survey discussion 
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Table 4.8   Bravo Charlie Amount of Evidence Found Data Items  
 
Control Group % Emails
% 
Images/Photos 
% Dallas, TX Area 
Information Overall % 
BC1-1 11.1 45.45 88.89 48.28 
BC1-2 100 36.36 22.22 51.72 
BC1-3 0 0 0 0 
BC1-4 0 63.64 55.56 41.38 
BC1-5 0 9.09 22.22 10.34 
BC1-6 0 45.45 11.11 20.69 
BC1-7 11.11 45.45 0 20.69 





% Dallas, TX Area 
Information Overall % 
BC2-1 0 27.27 11.11 13.79 
BC2-2 77.78 18.18 22.22 37.93 
BC2-3 0 18.18 0 6.90 
BC2-4 100 27.27 11.11 44.83 
BC2-5 100 45.45 22.22 55.17 
BC2-6 100 45.45 22.22 55.17 
BC2-7 11.11 72.73 11.11 34.48 
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BC1-1 0 0 0 48.28 
BC1-2 6.90 13.79 20.69 13.79 
BC1-3 0 0 0 0 
BC1-4 0 0 0 41.38 
BC1-5 3.45 3.45 6.9 34.48 
BC1-6 0 0 0 20.69 
BC1-7 0 10.34 10.35 10.35 
AVERAGE 1.48 3.94 5.42 24.139 
Experimental 
Group     
BC2-1 10.35 0 10.35 3.45 
BC2-2 0 20.69 20.69 3.45 
BC2-3 3.45 0 3.45 3.45 
BC2-4 0 20.69 20.69 6.90 
BC2-5 0 13.79 13.79 24.14 
BC2-6 0 10.35 10.35 27.59 
BC2-7 10.35 24.14 34.48 0 
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Table 4.10   Multiple Choice Survey Questions 
 
Q1 Was the time you spent preparing appropriate for the examination task? 
a. My preparation time was extremely short considering the difficulty of the examination: I 
should have spent at least 2 additional hours preparing 
b. My preparation time was somewhat short considering the difficulty of the examination: I 
should have spent an additional 30 minutes – 1 hour preparing. 
c. I spent just the right amount of time preparing for the examination task 
d. I spent a little too much time preparing: I over-prepared by approximately 30 minutes – 1 
hour  
e. I spent way too much time preparing: I over-prepared by at least 2 hours 
Q2 Did your preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding of the case? 
a. The preparation effort contributed to confusion regarding case concepts and case facts 
b. The preparation effort was not helpful for understanding or identifying important case 
concepts 
c. The preparation effort was somewhat helpful for understanding or identifying important 
case concepts. 
d. The preparation effort was helpful in understanding and identifying important case 
concepts 
e. The preparation effort was very helpful in understanding and identifying important case 
concepts. 
Q3 Estimate your level of confidence in the results of your examination? 
a. I found less than 20% of the evidence 
b. I found between 20-40% of the evidence 
c. I found between 41-60% of the evidence 
d. I found between 61-80% of the evidence 
e. I found between 81-100% of the evidence 
Q4 Were you given a sufficient amount of time to execute the examination? 
a. I needed a significant amount of additional time to execute the examination (> 2 hours) 
b. I needed additional time to execute the examination (1-2 hours) 
c. I needed a little bit of additional time to execute the examination (30 minutes – 1 hour) 
d. I executed all planned activities and was given a sufficient amount of time to execute the 
examination. 
Q5 Did you spend additional time developing or brainstorming keyword searches after the preparation 
sessions/during the examination? 
a. I developed several keyword searches during the examination session (> 20) 
b. I developed some keyword searches during the examination session (10-20) 
c. I developed very few keyword searches during the examination session (1-10) 
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Table 4.11   Bravo Charlie Multiple Choice Survey 
Data Items 
 
Control Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
BC1-1 3 3 2 4 3 
BC1-2 2 3 3 4 2 
BC1-3 3 3 1 4 2 
BC1-4 3 2 3 4 2 
BC1-5 2 3 1 4 3 
BC1-6 5 5 1 1 3 
BC1-7 4 4 3 4 2 
MEDIAN 3 3 2.5 4 3 
Experimental 
Group      
BC2-1 3 5 4 4 5 
BC2-2 2 4 3 4 3 
BC2-3 2 4 3 4 1 
BC2-4 3 4 4 4 3 
BC2-5 2 3 2 4 2 
BC2-6 2 4 2 4 3 
BC2-7 3 3 1 4 3 
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4.3 Statistical Analysis of Data Items 
The preferred method of statistical analysis of the data items is the paired, one-
sided Student’s paired t-test for significant differences between two independent means. 
The one-sided t-test is used to determine if the mean of one population is significantly 
greater than the mean of another population; with a 90% confidence interval there is only 
a 10% chance that the difference was caused by chance. The probability of the null 
hypothesis, p, is the probability that the difference between two means is caused by 
chance, and 1 – p is the probability of assuming the alternative hypothesis that one mean 
is greater than the other. There are four critical assumptions that must be true in order to 
use the t-test: 1) observations must be independent of one another, 2) the dependent 
variable must be measured using an interval or ratio scale, 3) the dependent variable from 
each group must be normally distributed, and 4) the distribution of the dependent variable 
for each group must have the same variance. 
The first two assumptions of the t-test—independent observations and 
interval/ratio scale measurements—are satisfied by the design of the experiment. 
Assumptions 3 and 4 must be evaluated based on the results of the data collected. When 
the assumptions for the t-test are not satisfied, an alternative Mann-Whitney test is used 
to evaluate differences between means. The Mann-Whitney test is a non-parametric test 
used for comparing two independent groups of sampled data. The Mann-Whitney test 
makes no assumptions about the distribution or the equality of variance in the sample 
data. Non-parametric tests use the ranks of data (instead of raw values) to calculate 
statistical differences. It is preferable to compare the differences between the raw data, 
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and thus the t-test is preferred when its critical assumptions are met. The Mann-Whitney 
test is a two-sided, non-directional test whose alternative hypothesis is that the two means 
are significantly different; unlike the one-sided, paired t-test, the Mann-Whitney test 
cannot test whether the mean of one population is significantly greater than the mean of 
another population. 
Sub-sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 present the results of the statistical tests for the Alpha 
Delta and Bravo Charlie experiment trials, respectively. The alternative hypotheses for 
the t-tests are based on pre-experiment research questions and hypotheses. All hypotheses 
in Sub-sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 are evaluated based on a 90% confidence interval. Thus, if 
the probability of assuming the null hypothesis is less than or equal to 10%, then the 
alternative hypothesis is accepted and a statistically significant difference is observed.  
4.3.1 Statistical Analysis of Alpha Delta Trial 
According to the sample size, five degrees of freedom are applied on all of the one-
tailed Alpha Delta t-tests. Table 4.12 presents the results of the normality and equality of 
variance tests for the Alpha Delta group. Table 4.12 also provides the final conclusion for 
whether or not the data item is eligible for statistical comparison with the t-test.  
Table 4.13 presents the results of the t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests (applied 
when appropriate) on the collected time/effort data items for the Alpha Delta groups. If 
the Mann-Whitney test was conducted, then the field for t-values is marked “N/A.” Time 
values are expressed in minutes. Based on the results of these statistical tests, the 
following statement can be made: The case domain modeling method contributed to an 
increase in time spent during the planning and execution phases.  
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Planning Time Con. Group 0.005594 No 
Planning Time Exp. Group 0.191886 Yes 
0.121 Yes No 
Execution Time Con. Group 0.470179 Yes 
Execution Time Exp. Group 0.491627 Yes 
0.341 Yes Yes 
Total Time Con. Group 0.349366 Yes 
Total Time Exp. Group 0.019637 No 
0.003 No No 
%Stolen ID Con. Group 0.009624 No 
%Stolen ID Exp. Group 0.002270 No 
0.929 Yes No 
%Hacker References Con. Group 0.994311 Yes 
%Hacker References Exp. Group 0.331678 Yes 
0.440 Yes Yes 
%Steganography Con. Group 0.001351 No 
%Steganography Exp. Group 0.006373 No 
0.313 Yes No 
%Hacking Tool Con. Group 0.069188 No 
%Hacking Tool Exp. Group 0.230158 Yes 
0.848 Yes No 
%Overall Con. Group 0.103523 Yes 
%Overall Exp. Group 0.235196 Yes 
0.813 Yes Yes 
%Found w/ Planned Keywords 
Con. Group 
0.217518 Yes 
%Found w/ Planned Keywords 
Exp. Group 
0.000533 No 
0.747 Yes No 
%Found w/ unplanned Keywords 
Con. Group 
0.041475 No 
%Found with unplanned 
Keywords Exp. Group 
0.014540 No 
0.025 No No 
%Found w/ all Keywords Con. 
Group 
0.302029 Yes 
%Found w/ all Keywords Exp. 
Group 
0.906800 Yes 
0.437 Yes Yes 
%Found w/o Keywords Con. 
Group 
0.211162 Yes 
%Found w/o Keywords Exp. 
Group 
0.188729 Yes 




  123 
 




( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) t p Outcome 
ha1 x = 97.83 y = 162.83 N/A 0.003 Accept ha1 
ha2 x = 145.17 y  = 167 t = 1.78 0.932 Reject ha2 
ha3 x  = 243 y  = 329.83 N/A 0.004 Accept ha3 
Hypothesis Legend 
ha1 = The experimental group dedicated a significantly different amount of time on the planning 
session than the control group. 
ha2 = The experimental group spent a significantly less amount of time on the execution session 
than the control group. 
ha3 = The experimental group spent a significantly different amount of total time on the 




Table 4.14 provides the results of the t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests performed 
on the percent of evidence found by the Alpha Delta experimental and control groups. 
The means are expressed in percentages. None of these statistical tests on these data 
items revealed any statistical difference between the amounts of evidence found by the 
experimental and control groups. However, the experimental group found more overall 
evidence than the control group and more evidence related to stolen identities (the second 
largest category of evidence files). 
Table 4.15 presents the results of the t-tests and Mann-Whitney tests that were 
performed on the data items related to the amount of evidence found by searching 
methods. The control group located a statistically significantly greater amount of 
evidence using planned-keyword searching than the experimental group. The 
experimental group found a greater amount (non-significant) of evidence using 
unplanned keyword searches than the control group. 
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( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) t p Outcome 
ha4 53.48 66.67 N/A 0.681 Reject ha4 
ha5 41.67 39.02 0.177 0.567 Reject ha5 
ha6 33.33 25 N/A 0.476 Reject ha6 
ha7 33.33 25 N/A 0.411 Reject ha7 
ha8 45.79 49.33 0.198 0.425 Reject ha8 
Hypothesis Legend 
ha4 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
containing victim stolen identities than the control group 
ha5 = The experimental group located a significantly greater amount of evidence files 
containing hacker reference materials than the control group 
ha6 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
related to the suspect’s use of steganography than the control group 
ha7 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
containing hacking software tools than the control group 
ha8 = The experimental group located a significantly greater overall amount of evidence 
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( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) t p Outcome 
ha9 28.79 10.44 N/A 0.054 Accept ha9 
ha10 5.05 17.51 N/A 0.294 Reject ha10 
ha11 33.84 27.94 -0.574 0.705 Reject ha11 
ha12 24.07 21.38 0.230 0.414 Reject ha12 
Hypothesis Legend 
ha9 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
using planned keyword searches than the control group 
ha10 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
using unplanned keyword searches than the control group 
ha11 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
using planned or unplanned keyword searches than the control group 
ha12 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 




Basic frequency distribution statistics are provided for the post-experiment survey 
data items. Table 4.16 presents the distribution of responses for survey question 1: Was 
the time you spent preparing appropriate for the examination task? All but one of the 
control group subjects indicated that they felt they spent the appropriate amount of 
preparation time. Only half of the experimental group subjects indicated that they spent 
an appropriate amount of time preparing, one subject indicated that they spent a little too 
much time preparing, and two subjects indicated that they felt that additional preparation 
time was required considering the difficulty of the examination. It is unexpected that 
approximately 33% of the experimental group would indicate a short preparation time, 
considering that the experimental group mean preparation time was almost twice as long  
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Table 4.16   Alpha Delta Survey Q1 Response Distributions 
 








1. My preparation time was extremely 
short considering the difficulty of the 
examination: I should have spent at least 2 
additional hours preparing 
0 / 0% 1 / 16.667% 
2. My preparation time was somewhat 
short considering the difficulty of the 
examination: I should have spent an 
additional 30 minutes – 1 hour preparing 
0 / 0% 1 / 16.667% 
3. I spent just the right amount of time 
preparing for the examination task 
5 / 83.333% 3 / 50.000% 
4. I spent a little too much time preparing: 
I over-prepared by approximately 30 
minutes – 1 hour  
1 / 16.667% 1 / 16.667% 
 
 
5. I spent way too much time preparing: I 
over-prepared by at least 2 hours 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q1 Median Response = 3 / 3 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 97.83 min. / 162.83 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 145.17 min. / 167 min. 
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as the control group. Incidentally, the control group subjects who indicated the need for 
more preparation time spent 137 and 174 minutes in the preparation session. 
Table 4.17 presents the distribution of responses to survey question 2: Did your 
preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding of the case? No 
subjects in the control or experiment group indicated that the preparation effort was 
extremely helpful in understanding the case, but at least half of each group indicated that 
the preparation effort was helpful in understanding the case concepts. The control group 
provided the only negative response (one subject) to question 2, indicating that the 
preparation effort was not helpful for understanding case concepts.  
Table 4.18 presents the response distributions for survey question 3: Estimate 
your level of confidence in the results of your examination? Though the experimental 
group found more overall evidence than the control group, the confidence in their results 
was somewhat lower than the control group.  
Table 4.19 presents the response distributions for survey question 4: Were you 
given a sufficient amount of time to execute the examination? Both subject groups 
unanimously indicated that they were given a sufficient amount of time to conduct their 
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Table 4.17   Alpha Delta Survey Q2 Response Distributions 
 
Q2: Did your preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding 








1. The preparation effort contributed to 
confusion regarding case concepts and case 
facts 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
2. The preparation effort was not helpful 
for understanding or identifying important 
case concepts 
1 / 16.667% 0 / 0% 
3. The preparation effort was somewhat 
helpful for understanding or identifying 
important case concepts 
1 / 16.667% 3 / 50.000% 
4. The preparation effort was helpful in 
understanding and identifying important 
case concepts 
4 / 66.667% 3 / 50.000% 
5. The preparation effort was very helpful 
in understanding and identifying important 
case concepts 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q2 Median Response = 4 / 4 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 97.83 min. / 162.83 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 145.17 min. / 167 min. 
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Table 4.18   Alpha Delta Survey Q3 Response Distributions 
 








1. I found less than 20% of the evidence 0 / 0%  1 / 16.667% 
2. I found 20–40% of the evidence 2 / 33.333% 2 / 33.333% 
3. I found 41–60% of the evidence 1 / 16.667% 1 / 16.667% 
4. I found 61–80% of the evidence 3 / 50.000% 1 / 16.667% 
5. I found 81–100% of the evidence 0 / 0% 1 / 16.667% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q3 Median Response = 3.5 / 2.5 




Table 4.19   Alpha Delta Survey Q4 Response Distributions 
 








1. I needed a significant amount of 
additional time to execute the examination 
(> 2 hours) 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
2. I needed additional time to execute the 
examination (1–2 hours) 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
3. I needed a little bit of additional time to 
execute the examination (30 minutes – 1 
hour) 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
4. I executed all planned activities and was 
given a sufficient amount of time to 
execute the examination 
6 / 100.000% 6 / 100.000% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q4 Median Response = 4 / 4 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 97.83 min. / 162.83 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 145.17 min. / 167 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean % Evidence Found = 45.79% / 49.333% 
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Table 4.20 presents the response distributions for survey question 5: Did you 
spend additional time developing or brainstorming keyword searches after the 
preparation sessions/during the examination? Overall, the control group indicated that 
they spent more time developing unplanned keyword searches than the experimental 
group. Though there was no significant difference in the amount of evidence found with 
unplanned keyword searches, on average, the experimental group did find more evidence 




Table 4.20   Alpha Delta Survey Q5 Response Distributions 
 
Q5: Did you spend additional time developing or brainstorming keyword searches 








1. I developed several keyword searches 
during the examination session (> 20) 
1 / 16.667% 1 / 16.667% 
2. I developed some keyword searches 
during the examination session (10–20) 
0 / 0% 2 / 33.333% 
3. I developed very few keyword searches 
during the examination session (1–10) 
5 / 83.333% 3 / 50.000% 
4. I developed no keyword searches during 
the examination session 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q5 Median Response = 3 / 3 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 97.83 min. / 162.83 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 145.17 min. / 167 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean % Evidence Found = 45.79% / 49.333% 
Control/Experimental Group Mean % Evidence Found with Unplanned Keyword 
Searches = 5.05% / 17.51%  
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4.3.2 Statistical Analysis of Bravo Charlie Trial 
Table 4.21 presents the results of the normality and equality of variance tests for 
the Bravo Charlie group. Table 4.21 also provides the final conclusion for whether or not 
the data item is eligible for statistical comparison with the t-test. According to the sample 
size of the Bravo Charlie group, six degrees of freedom were used in the statistical t-tests. 
Hypotheses are evaluated based on a 90% confidence interval.  
Table 4.22 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney tests (none of these data 
items were t-test-eligible) performed on the collected time/effort data items for the Bravo 
Charlie groups. Time values are expressed in minutes. Based on the results of these tests, 
the following statement may be made with a high degree of certainty: the case domain 
modeling method contributed to a significant increase in the amount of time spent in 
planning and executing the forensics examination.  
Table 4.23 provides the results of the t-tests performed on the data items that 
measured the amount of evidence found by the experimental and control groups. The 
means are expressed in percentages. None of the t-tests performed on these data items 
revealed any statistical difference between the amounts of evidence found by the 
experimental and control groups. However, the experimental group found more evidence 
than the control group in two out of the three evidence categories, and the experimental 
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Planning Time Con. 
Group 
0.956439 Yes 
Planning Time Exp. 
Group 
0.933707 Yes 
0.034 No No 
Execution Time Con. 
Group 
0.081085 No 
Execution Time Exp. 
Group 
0.376322 Yes 
0.947 Yes No 
Total Time Con. 
Group 
0.983399 Yes 
Total Time Exp. Group 0.298139 Yes 
0.017 No No 
%Email Con. Group 0.000084 No 
%Email Exp. Group 0.015764 Yes 
0.494 Yes No 
%Images Con. Group 0.255372 Yes 
%Images Exp. Group 0.178225 Yes 




%AreaInfo Exp. Group 0.086137 Yes 
0.004 No No 
%Overall Con. Group 0.501375 Yes 
%Overall Exp. Group 0.334944 Yes 
0.918 Yes Yes 
%Found w/ Planned 
Keywords Con. Group 
0.000931 No 
%Found w/ Planned 
Keywords Exp. Group 
0.004797 No 
0.179 Yes No 
%Found w/ unplanned 
Keywords Con. Group 
0.011132 Yes 
%Found w/ unplanned 
Keywords Exp. Group 
0.236194 Yes 
0.216 Yes Yes 
%Found w/ all 
Keywords Con. Group 
0.018772 Yes 
%Found w/ all 
Keywords Exp. Group 
0.608417 Yes 
0.572 Yes Yes 
%Found w/o 
Keywords Con. Group 
0.793916 Yes 
%Found w/o 
Keywords Exp. Group 
0.019128 No 
0.287 No No 
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( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) t p Outcome 
hb1 89.29 134.14 N/A 0.048 Accept hb1 
hb2 103.86  137.71 N/A 0.009 Accept hb2 
hb3 193.143 271.86 N/A 0.006 Accept hb3 
Hypothesis Legend 
hb1 = The experimental group dedicated a significantly different amount of time on the 
planning session than the control group. 
hb2 = The experimental group spent a significantly different amount of time on the 
execution session than the control group. 
hb3 = The experimental group spent a significantly different amount of total time on the 




Table 4.24 presents the results of the t-tests performed on the Bravo Charlie 
search method data items. Values are expressed in terms of the percentage of overall 
evidence found by using the specified search method. The results of these t-tests indicate 
that the experimental group’s unplanned and overall keyword searching activities were 
significantly more effective than the control group’s keyword searching activities. Thus, 
it is highly likely that the case domain modeling method contributed to a more thorough 
use of keyword searching methods. Though there is a significant difference in how the 
groups found data, as indicated in Table 4.23, there was no statistically significant 
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( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) t p Outcome 
hb4 17.46 55.56 N/A 0.157 Reject hb4 
hb5 35.06 36.36 0.127 0.235 Reject hb5 
hb6 28.57 14.28 N/A 0.595 Reject hb6 
hb7 27.59 35.47 0.771 0.235 Reject hb7 
Hypothesis Legend 
hb4 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
containing suspect emails than the control group 
hb5 = The experimental group located a significantly greater amount of evidence files 
containing suspect images than the control group 
hb6 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
related to the Dallas, TX area than the control group 
hb7 = The experimental group located a significantly greater amount of overall evidence 








( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) t p Outcome 
hb8 1.48 3.45 N/A 0.455 Reject hb8 
hb9 3.94 12.81 3.166 0.01 Accept hb9 
hb10 5.42 16.26 3.268 0.009 Accept hb10 
hb11 24.139 9.85 N/A 0.123 Reject hb11 
Hypothesis Legend 
hb8 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
using planned keyword searches than the control group 
hb9 = The experimental group located a significantly greater amount of evidence files 
using unplanned keyword searches than the control group 
hb10 = The experimental group located a significantly greater amount of evidence files 
using planned or unplanned keyword searches than the control group 
hb11 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
using non-keyword searches than the control group 
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Basic frequency distribution statistics are provided for the post-experiment survey 
data items. Table 4.25 presents the response distribution to survey question 1: Was the 
time you spent preparing appropriate for the examination task? Though the experimental 
group spent a greater amount of time planning than the control group, the experimental 
group had a higher occurrence of individuals who indicated the need for more planning 
time.  
Table 4.26 presents the response distributions for survey question 2: Did your 
preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding of the case? The 
experimental group had a higher occurrence of individuals who indicated that the 
preparation effort was helpful or very helpful (options 4 and 5) in understanding case 
concepts: five responses versus two responses. 
Table 4.27 presents the response distributions for survey question 3: Estimate 
your level of confidence in the results of your examination? On average, the experimental 
group was somewhat more confident in their results than the control group, with a 
median response of 3 versus 2; this is consistent with the experimental group’s somewhat 
greater mean percentage of overall evidence found. 
Table 4.28 presents the response distributions for survey question 4: Were you 
given a sufficient amount of time to execute the examination? The response to this 
question was nearly identical to the Alpha Delta trial: all but one of the experiment 
subjects indicated that they were given a sufficient amount of time to execute their 
planned activities and conduct a thorough examination.  
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Table 4.25   Bravo Charlie Survey Q1 Response Distributions 
 








1. My preparation time was extremely 
short considering the difficulty of the 
examination: I should have spent at least 2 
additional hours preparing 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
2. My preparation time was somewhat 
short considering the difficulty of the 
examination: I should have spent an 
additional 30 minutes – 1 hour preparing 
2 / 28.571% 4 / 57.143% 
3. I spent just the right amount of time 
preparing for the examination task 
3 / 42.857% 3 / 42.857% 
4. I spent a little too much time preparing: 
I over-prepared by approximately 30 
minutes – 1 hour  
1 / 14.286% 0 / 0% 
5. I spent way too much time preparing: I 
over-prepared by at least 2 hours 
1 / 14.286% 0 / 0% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q1 Median Response = 3 / 2 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 89.29 min. / 134.14 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 103.86 min. / 137.71 min. 
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Table 4.26   Bravo Charlie Survey Q2 Response Distributions 
 
Q2: Did your preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding 








1. The preparation effort contributed to 
confusion regarding case concepts and 
case facts 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
2. The preparation effort was not helpful 
for understanding or identifying important 
case concepts 
1 / 14.286 0 / 0% 
3. The preparation effort was somewhat 
helpful for understanding or identifying 
important case concepts 
4 / 57.143 2 / 28.571 
4. The preparation effort was helpful in 
understanding and identifying important 
case concepts 
1 / 14.286 4 / 57.143 
5. The preparation effort was very helpful 
in understanding and identifying important 
case concepts 
1 / 14.286 1 / 14.286 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q2 Median Response = 3 / 4 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 89.29 min. / 134.14 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 103.86 min. / 137.71 min. 
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Table 4.27   Bravo Charlie Survey Q3 Response Distributions 
 








1. I found less than 20% of the evidence 3 /42.857 1 / 14.286% 
2. I found 20–40% of the evidence 1 / 14.286 2 / 28.571% 
3. I found 41–60% of the evidence 3 / 42.857 2 / 28.571% 
4. I found 61–80% of the evidence 0 / 0% 2 / 28.571% 
5. I found 81–100% of the evidence 0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q3 Mean Response = 2 / 3 




Table 4.28   Bravo Charlie Survey Q4 Response Distributions 
 








1. I needed a significant amount of 
additional time to execute the examination 
(> 2 hours) 
1 / 14.286% 0 / 0% 
2. I needed additional time to execute the 
examination (1–2 hours) 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
3. I needed a little bit of additional time to 
execute the examination (30 minutes – 1 
hour) 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
4. I executed all planned activities and was 
given a sufficient amount of time to 
execute the examination 
6 / 85.714% 7 / 100% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q4 Median Response = 4 / 4 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 89.29 min. / 134.14 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 103.86 min. / 137.71 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean % Evidence Found = 27.59% / 35.47% 
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Table 4.29 presents the response distributions for survey question 5: Did you 
spend additional time developing or brainstorming keyword searches after the 
preparation sessions/during the examination? The survey results indicate that the 
experimental group developed more unplanned keyword searches than the control group. 
This result is consistent with the significantly greater amount of evidence that the 
experimental group found with unplanned keyword searches when compared with the 
control group. 
 
Table 4.29   Bravo Charlie Survey Q5 Response Distributions 
 
Q5: Did you spend additional time developing or brainstorming keyword searches 








1. I developed several keyword searches 
during the examination session (> 20) 
0 / 0% 1 / 14.286% 
2. I developed some keyword searches 
during the examination session (10–20) 
4 / 57.143 1 / 14.286% 
3. I developed very few keyword searches 
during the examination session (1–10) 
3 / 42.857 4 / 57.143% 
4. I developed no keyword searches during 
the examination session 
0 / 0% 1 / 14.286% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q5 Median Response = 3 / 3 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 89.29 min. / 134.14 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 103.86 min. / 137.71 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean % Evidence Found = 27.59% / 35.47% 
Control/Experimental Group Mean % Evidence Found with Unplanned Keyword 
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4.3.3 Statistical Analysis on the Aggregate of Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie 
Trials 
All time data items, the total percentage of evidence found, and all search method 
data items were aggregated from the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie groups. Table 4.30 
provides the results of the normality and variance equality tests that determine the data 
items’ eligibilities for the t-test.  
 
 
Table 4.30   Aggregate Data Items t-test Eligibility 
 








Planning Time Con. Group 0.533818 Yes 
Planning Time Exp. Group 0.971364 Yes 
0.002 No No 
Execution Time Con. Group 0.440974 Yes 
Execution Time Exp. Group 0.355692 Yes 
0.855 Yes Yes 
Total Time Con. Group 0.420793 Yes 
Total Time Exp. Group 0.338347 Yes 
0.025 No No 
%Overall Evidence Con. Group 0.338203 Yes 
%Overall Evidence Exp. Group 0.398338 Yes 
0.925 Yes Yes 
%Found w/ Planned Keywords Con. Group 0.004360 No 
%Found w/ Planned Keywords Exp. Group 0.000030 No 
0.273 Yes No 
%Found w/ unplanned Keywords Con. Group 0.002067 No 
%Found w/ unplanned Keywords Exp. Group 0.026030 No 
0.002 No No 
%Found w/ all Keywords Con. Group 0.007397 No 
%Found w/ all Keywords Exp. Group 0.012356 No 
0.836 Yes No 
%Found w/o Keywords Con. Group 0.247465 Yes 
%Found w/o Keywords Exp. Group 0.004219 No 




The time data items from the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie groups were 
combined, and t-tests were performed on this aggregate data set. Table 4.31 presents the 
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results of the t-tests and Mann-Whitney test performed on the aggregate of the time data 
items in the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie groups. All three t-tests indicate within a 99% 




Table 4.31 Aggregate of Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie Groups Mean Differences of 




( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) t p Outcome 
hab1 93.23 147.39 N/A 0.001 Accept hab1 
hab2 122.92 151.23 t = 3.262 0.003 Accept hab2 
hab3 216.15 298.62 N/A 0.001 Accept hab3 
Hypothesis Legend 
hab1 = The experimental groups dedicated a significantly different amount of time on the 
planning session than the control groups. 
hab2 = The experimental groups spent a significantly less amount of time on the 
execution session than the control groups. 
hab3 = The experimental groups spent a significantly different amount of total time on the 




Table 4.32 presents the t-test and Mann-Whitney results on the aggregate data 
items of the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie overall amount of evidence found. The t-test 
indicates that there is no significant difference between the overall amounts of evidence 
found between the aggregated control and experimental groups. 
Table 4.33 presents the Mann-Whitney tests performed on the aggregate of the 
Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie groups’ search method data items. The results of these 
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tests indicate that the experimental group found a significantly greater amount of 
evidence than the control group using unplanned keyword searches.  
 
 
Table 4.32   Aggregate of Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie Groups Mean Difference of 




( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) 
t, 
St. Dev.( st) p Outcome 
hab4 x = 35.99 y = 41.87 t = 0.620 0.273 Reject hb4 
Hypothesis Legend 
hab4 = The experimental groups located a significantly greater amount of evidence files 




Table 4.33 Aggregate of the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie Groups Mean Difference of 




( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) 
t, 
St. Dev.( st) p Outcome 
hab5 14.08 6.68 N/A 0.495 Reject hab5 
hab6 4.45 14.98 N/A 0.049 Accept hab6 
hab7 12.94 21.65 N/A 0.116 Reject hab7 
hab8 24.11 15.17 N/A 0.181 Reject hab8 
Hypothesis Legend 
hab5 = The control groups located a significantly different amount of evidence files using 
planned keyword searches than the experimental groups 
hab6 = The experimental groups located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
using unplanned keyword searches than the control groups 
hab7 = The experimental groups located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
using planned or unplanned keyword searches than the control groups 
hab8 = The control groups located a significantly different amount of evidence files using 
non-keyword searches than the experimental groups 
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Table 4.34 presents the question 1 survey response distributions of the combined 
Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials. Table 4.35 presents the question 2 survey response 
distributions of the combined Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials. 
 
Table 4.34   Experiment 1 Aggregate Q1 Survey Response Distributions 
 








1. My preparation time was extremely 
short considering the difficulty of the 
examination: I should have spent at least 2 
additional hours preparing 
0 / 0% 1 / 7.692% 
2. My preparation time was somewhat 
short considering the difficulty of the 
examination: I should have spent an 
additional 30 minutes – 1 hour preparing 
2 / 15.385% 5 / 38.462% 
3. I spent just the right amount of time 
preparing for the examination task 
8 / 61.538% 6 / 46.154% 
4. I spent a little too much time preparing: 
I over-prepared by approximately 30 
minutes – 1 hour  
2 / 15.385% 1 / 7.692% 
5. I spent way too much time preparing: I 
over-prepared by at least 2 hours 
1 / 7.692% 0 / 0% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q1 Median Response = 3 / 3 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 93.23 min. / 147.39 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 133.92 min. / 141.23 min. 
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Table 4.35   Experiment 1 Aggregate Q2 Survey Response Distributions 
 
Q2: Did your preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding 








1. The preparation effort contributed to 
confusion regarding case concepts and case 
facts 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
2. The preparation effort was not helpful 
for understanding or identifying important 
case concepts 
2 / 15.385% 0 / 0% 
3. The preparation effort was somewhat 
helpful for understanding or identifying 
important case concepts 
5 / 38.462% 5 / 38.462% 
4. The preparation effort was helpful in 
understanding and identifying important 
case concepts 
5 / 38.462% 7 / 53.846% 
5. The preparation effort was very helpful 
in understanding and identifying important 
case concepts 
1 / 7.692% 1 / 7.692% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q2 Median Response = 3 / 4 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 93.23 min. / 147.39 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 133.92 min. / 141.23 min. 
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Table 4.36 presents the question 3 survey response distributions of the combined 
Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials. Table 4.37 presents the question 4 survey response 
distributions of the combined Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials. 
Table 4.38 presents the question 5 survey response distributions of the combined 
Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials. 
 
 
Table 4.36   Experiment 1 Aggregate Q3 Survey Response Distributions 
 








1. I found less than 20% of the evidence 3 / 23.077% 2 / 15.385% 
2. I found 20–40% of the evidence 3 / 23.077% 4 / 30.769% 
3. I found 41–60% of the evidence 4 / 30.769% 3 / 23.077% 
4. I found 61–80% of the evidence 3 / 23.077% 3 / 23.077% 
5. I found 81–100% of the evidence 0 / 0% 1 / 7.692% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q3 Median Response = 3 / 3 
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Table 4.37   Experiment 1 Aggregate Q4 Survey Response Distributions 
 








1. I needed a significant amount of 
additional time to execute the examination 
(> 2 hours) 
1 / 7.692% 0 / 0% 
2. I needed additional time to execute the 
examination (1–2 hours) 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
3. I needed a little bit of additional time to 
execute the examination (30 minutes – 1 
hour) 
0 / 0% 0 / 0% 
4. I executed all planned activities and was 
given a sufficient amount of time to 
execute the examination 
12 / 92.308% 13 / 100% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q4 Median Response = 4 / 4 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 93.23 min. / 147.39 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 133.92 min. / 141.23 min. 
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Table 4.38   Experiment 1 Aggregate Q5 Survey Response Distributions 
 
Q5: Did you spend additional time developing or brainstorming keyword searches 








I developed several keyword searches 
during the examination session (> 20) 
1 / 7.692% 2 / 15.385% 
I developed some keyword searches during 
the examination session (10–20) 
4 / 30.769% 3 / 23.077% 
I developed very few keyword searches 
during the examination session (1–10) 
8 / 61.538% 7 / 53.846% 
I developed no keyword searches during 
the examination session 
0 / 0% 1 / 7.692% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q5 Median Response = 3 / 3 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 93.23 min. / 147.39 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 133.92 min. / 141.23 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean % Evidence Found = 35.99% / 41.87% 
Control/Experimental Group Mean % Evidence Found with Unplanned Keyword 




4.4 Discussion of Experiment 1 Results and Conclusions 
The statistical analysis of the Alpha Delta, Bravo Charlie, and aggregate data sets 
will be discussed with respect to two research questions:  
1. Does the case domain modeling methodology result in an increased amount of 
evidence found in an examination? 
2. Does the case domain modeling methodology require a significant amount of 
additional effort when compared to a typical approach? 
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Sections 4.4.1 and 4.4.2 discuss the experiment results with respect to research 
question 1, and Section 4.4.3 discusses the results with respect to research question 2. 
Finally, Section 4.4.4 provides conclusions and discusses implications relevant to further 
evaluation of the dissertation hypothesis. 
4.4.1  Amount of Evidence 
There were no statistically significant differences in the amount of evidence found 
by the case domain modeling subjects versus the ad hoc method subjects. However, the 
case domain modeling subjects did find a greater overall amount of evidence in each of 
the experiment trials. In the Alpha Delta trial the experimental group found an average of 
49.33% of the overall evidence, while the control group found an average of 45.79% of 
the overall evidence. In the Bravo Charlie trial the experimental group found 35.47% of 
the overall evidence, while the control group found an average of 27.59% of the overall 
evidence. These differences, though not significant, do support the claim that the case 
domain modeling method can provide an improvement in the amount of evidence found 
in an examination.  
The effectiveness of the prescribed preparation activities and methods depend on 
the level of detail in the available case information. One subject commented on their 
post-experiment survey that “…there should be more case information. It seems like 
when the complete forensics team is brought in, the case should be fairly well developed 
already.” In each trial the case materials provided subjects with a brief, one-paragraph 
description of a scenario and several printouts of bank statements or Internet news 
reports. There was very little information provided to place these materials in the context 
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of a scenario, and no victims or subjects were identified. Though the subjects were not 
provided with an abundance of background information, the experimental group’s 
performance (with respect to evidence found) suggests that case domain modeling can 
still be applicable and useful in less than ideal circumstances.  
Additionally, the Alpha Delta evidence disk had a total of 2,981 file items, while 
the Bravo Charlie evidence disk had a total of 58,459 file items. To some extent, the 
number of files on a disk can determine the complexity of the case, and if there are too 
many files, then it becomes difficult and perhaps impossible to exhaustively browse the 
files. When it is impractical to browse the files, then preparing keyword searches and 
search strategies may be more important. In the Alpha Delta trial there was a difference 
of 3.54 percentage points in the average overall amount of evidence found, while in the 
Bravo Charlie trial there was a difference of 7.88 percentage points in the average overall 
amount of evidence found (each difference was in favor of the experimental group), and 
the Bravo Charlie evidence disk contained nearly twenty times more files than the Alpha 
Delta evidence disk. These comparisons imply that the case domain modeling approach 
may be more effective for relatively large evidence disks and less effective for smaller 
evidence disks. It is expected that a more rigorous preparation method will have more 
value when it is applied to a relatively complex task. 
4.4.2 Keyword Searching 
Analysis of the Bravo Charlie and aggregate data sets revealed statistically 
significant differences in the effectiveness of keyword searching activities between the 
experimental and control groups. In the Bravo Charlie trial the experimental group found 
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a significantly greater amount of evidence files using unplanned keyword searches and in 
all overall keyword searching activities. Analysis of the aggregate data set revealed that 
the experimental group found a significantly greater amount of evidence files using 
unplanned keyword searches than did the control group. These significant differences 
support the portion of the hypothesis that claims that case domain modeling will improve 
the effectiveness of keyword searching activities. Therefore, the case domain modeling 
approach likely directed the subjects to spend more time attempting and exhausting 
keyword search efforts instead of simply browsing the hard drive for files.  
4.4.3 Time and Effort 
The most significant differences between the experimental and control groups 
occurred with respect to the amount of time spent in the experiment. This was an 
expected difference in the preparation session, as the experimental groups were directed 
to follow a more rigorous approach to preparation than the control groups. Ideally the 
case domain modeling approach would contribute to more evidence collected and less 
overall time spent. However, the experimental group spent significantly greater time in 
the examination session and in the overall experiment. Though these differences were 
significant, the total time limit of the experiment was 8 hours. Thus, the time differences 
observed are less than one regular work day. Additionally, the experimental group’s 
greater time investment yielded a greater amount of overall evidence, although the 
difference was not statistically significant.  
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4.4.4 Conclusions and Implications for a Follow-up Experiment 
On average the experimental groups found a greater percentage of overall 
evidence than the control groups. However, this difference was not statistically 
significant. It is assumed that the vagueness of the case scenario materials contributed to 
this lack of significant difference between the control and experimental groups. Based on 
the results of Experiment 1, an additional experiment was planned. Experiment 2 was 
almost identical to Experiment 1 with the following exceptions: 
• The number of document file items was increased by at least an order of 10 
in order to make it less feasible for subjects to browse through all of the text-
based files. 
• The case scenario, an email threat in a university environment, was vividly 
populated with an underlying facts and circumstances report, suspect and 
victim interviews, email subpoena results, and threatening emails. 
• To improve the experimental group’s time performance, the case domain 
modeling method was streamlined to exclude the diagramming activity. 
Chapter 5 presents the results of the follow-up experiment that was designed and 








CASE DOMAIN MODELING APPLICATIONS FOR FORENSICS PRACTITIONERS: 
PLANNING AND EXECUTING FORENSICS EXAMINATIONS: PART II 
 
 
This experiment was planned and conducted based on the analysis of the Alpha 
Delta and Bravo Charlie student-subject experiment trials. This experiment was designed 
not only to evaluate the same research questions as in Experiment 1, but also to observe 
the influence of evidence disk characteristics and case file material. Section 5.1 describes 
the experiment design, Section 5.2 describes the evidence preparation procedure, Section 
5.3 provides the raw data collected during the experiment, Section 5.4 presents the 
statistical analysis of the data, the discussion of the results, and conclusions, and Section 
5.5 discusses threats to validity applicable to the experiments.  
5.1 Experiment Design 
This experiment is known as the Phi Gamma experiment trial. The design of the 
Phi Gamma experiment is nearly identical to the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie 
experiment trials described in Chapter III. However, there are some notable differences 
between the two experiment designs: 
• The subjects were all graduate students enrolled in Dr. Dampier’s summer 
2006 Advanced Topics in Digital Forensics course. 
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• The subjects did not participate in preparing any of the evidence or 
scenario materials. The scenario materials were prepared by the principal 
investigator, and the evidence drive was prepared by Dr. Dampier’s 
research assistants and, to a limited extent, the principal investigator. 
5.1.1  The Control Group and Experimental Group Phi Gamma Preparation Methods 
The control group preparation method used in this experiment was identical to the 
control group preparation method prescribed for Experiment 1 in Section 4.1.1. A few 
modifications were made to the experimental group preparation method described in 
Chapter III. During the training session the experimental group was exposed to the UML 
class diagram representation of the case domain model. However, the preparation method 
did not require the experimental group subjects to create the case domain model diagram. 
Instead they were instructed to represent their case domain model in a tabular format as 
illustrated in Table 5.1. Identifying concept relationships was also excluded from this 
revised case domain modeling method. This change was implemented in an attempt to 
streamline the method, place more emphasis on the analytical method than the 
diagramming syntax, and reduce the amount of effort required to apply the case domain 
modeling method.  
 
Table 5.1   Case Domain Concept 
Representation for Experiment 2 
 
Concept Name:  Suspect 
Attribute Name Attribute Value 
Name Jane Doe 
Address 100 Last House Dr. 
Phone (555)-555-6667 
Birthday Unknown 
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5.1.2 Organization of Phi Gamma Subject Population 
The subject population consisted of students enrolled in Dr. Dampier’s summer 
2006 Advanced Topics in Digital Forensics graduate course. Fifteen subjects participated 
in the experiment: eight of the subjects were in the experimental group, and seven were in 
the control group. Two subjects in the experimental group and one subject in the control 
group had previously participated in the Bravo Charlie or Alpha Delta experiment trials. 
To balance the two subject populations, one of the experimental group subjects who had 
previously participated in the experiment was randomly excluded from the data items. A 
second subject was excluded from the data items because of the subject’s relatively 
extensive exposure to the case domain modeling method and the experiment design. The 
data collected for one of the control group subjects was excluded because the subject 
participated in preparing the evidence disk; this subject performed the experiment for the 
value of the experience. The data items that are presented in this chapter were collected 
from the remaining twelve subjects, with six subjects in each group. Exactly one subject 
from the control group and one from the experimental group had participated in the 
previous Bravo Charlie or Alpha Delta trials. These subjects were also placed in the same 
groups to which they had previously been assigned.  
5.1.3 The Prepared Phi Gamma Evidence Drive and Scenario 
The principal investigator prepared all of the background materials and evidence 
files used in this experiment. The scenario was an email death threat case in a university 
environment. In the scenario, the victim, Dr. Henry Doe (English professor), received 
anonymous death threats from a Microsoft Hotmail account. Prior to receiving the death 
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threats the professor had had an unpleasant conflict with a former student, Jane Bateman, 
who had cheated on an assignment. The originating IP addresses of the messages all 
came from a university library’s anonymous-login public-use computer. Also, a 
university librarian had observed the suspect and her friends behaving suspiciously in the 
library computer lab. The investigating agents seized the suspected library computer, 
subpoenaed the records of the Hotmail account, and interviewed the involved parties. The 
case file included the threatening emails, a summary of underlying facts and 
circumstances, interview transcripts, and the results of the Hotmail subpoena. The names 
of the involved parties were selected from popular horror films, and any similarities to 
persons alive or deceased are coincidental. 
The evidence files and non-evidence files were distributed on the computer by Dr. 
Dampier’s research assistants. The principal investigator also spent a limited amount of 
time distributing additional non-evidence files on the evidence disk. The evidence disk 
has an advertised capacity of 10 GB and contained one partition. Figure 5.1 illustrates the 
distribution of file item types on the evidence disk. The disk had a total of 56,894 file 
items, with thirty-three evidence files. The evidence files were categorized and 
distributed as follows: 
• Eight file items were text documents left by the primary suspect, Jane 
Bateman. These file items contained messages related to the cheating 
incident and the threatening emails. 
• Fifteen file items were documents left by Victor Linoge, the primary 
suspect’s boyfriend. These files contained victim research information and 
homework assignment files that were authored during the same time 
period that one of the threatening emails was sent. 
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• Ten file items were documents and graphics left by Frank Booth, a friend 
of the primary suspect’s boyfriend. These files contained plans for 






























































































5.1.4 Phi Gamma Experiment Logistics 
All of the facilities, software, and hardware used in this experiment were owned 
and maintained by the MSU Department of Computer Science and Engineering. 
Conducting the Phi Gamma experiment trial required the use of the following resources: 
• 2 MSU computer science and engineering classrooms, 
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• 15 laptop computers with the Forensics Toolkit software, 
• 1 10-GB hard drive, and 
• 2 of Dr. Dampier’s computer forensics research assistants. 
5.2 Phi Gamma Data Items Collected 
Table 5.2 presents the time data items collected on the Phi Gamma experiment 
trial during the planning session and the examination session. Time is expressed in 
minutes. The upper half of the table provides time data items for the control group, while 
the bottom half of the table provides time data items for the experimental group. This 
scheme is also used in the other tables in this section. 
Table 5.3 provides a summary of the amount of evidence located by the 
experimental and control groups. The amount of evidence is expressed in percentages. 
The evidence is also categorized into three groups: Jane, Victor, and Frank. The names of 
the evidence categories represent the first names of the suspects who left behind the 
evidence file items. The overall or total percentages of evidence found are also provided 
in the right-most column.  
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Session Time (min.) Total Time (min.) 
PG1-1 62 114 176 
PG1-2 68 85 153 
PG1-3 56 87 143 
PG1-4 55 84 139 
PG1-5 48 92 140 
PG1-6 62 86 148 
AVERAGE 58.50 91.33 149.83 
Experimental Group    
PG2-1 76 103 179 
PG2-2 54 60 114 
PG2-3 76 85 161 
PG2-4 85 76 161 
PG2-5 95 126 221 
PG2-6 86 85 117 
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Table 5.3   Phi Gamma Amount of Evidence Found Data Items 
 
Control Group % Jane % Victor % Frank Overall % 
PG1-1 62.5 0.0 27.3 23.5 
PG1-2 12.5 0.0 18.2 8.8 
PG1-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PG1-4 62.5 13.3 18.2 26.5 
PG1-5 62.5 0.0 0.0 14.7 
PG1-6 25.0 6.7 9.1 11.8 
AVERAGE 37.5 3.3 12.1 14.2 
Experimental Group     
PG2-1 62.5 6.7 27.3 26.5 
PG2-2 50.0 40.0 36.4 41.2 
PG2-3 25.0 0.0 9.1 8.8 
PG2-4 12.5 0.0 27.3 11.8 
PG2-5 87.5 6.7 54.5 41.2 
PG2-6 62.5 6.7 18.2 23.5 




Table 5.4 presents data regarding the amount of evidence found using specific search 
methods. Values are expressed in terms of the percentage of overall evidence that was 
located using the specified search method. Searching methods are categorized as planned 
keyword searches, unplanned keyword searches, keyword searches, and non-keyword 
searches. Planned keyword searches were identified during the planning session, while 
unplanned keyword searches were specified during the examination session. These two 
categories are aggregated to represent all keyword searches. Non-keyword searches 
include any method other than keyword searching that the subjects used to find evidence. 
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PG1-1 23.5 0.0 23.5 0.0 
PG1-2 8.8 0.0 8.8 0.0 
PG1-3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
PG1-4 14.7 11.8 26.5 0.0 
PG1-5 14.7 0.0 14.7 0.0 
PG1-6 8.8 2.9 11.8 0.0 
AVERAGE 11.8 2.5 14.2 0.0 
Experimental Group     
PG2-1 17.6 8.8 26.5 0.0 
PG2-2 41.2 0.0 41.2 0.0 
PG2-3 0.0 8.8 8.8 0.0 
PG2-4 2.9 8.8 11.8 0.0 
PG2-5 26.5 14.7 41.2 0.0 
PG2-6 17.6 5.9 23.5 0.0 




Table 5.5 presents the post-experiment multiple-choice survey questions. Table 
5.6 presents the multiple responses of the Phi Gamma groups. The alphabetic multiple 
choice identifiers (a–e) were replaced with numerical identifiers (1–5). A listing of the 
responses from the two survey discussion questions is omitted, but insightful survey 
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Table 5.5   Phi Gamma Multiple Choice Post-Experiment Survey Questions  
 
Q1 Was the time you spent preparing appropriate for the examination task? 
a. My preparation time was extremely short considering the difficulty of the examination: I 
should have spent at least 2 additional hours preparing 
b. My preparation time was somewhat short considering the difficulty of the examination: I 
should have spent an additional 30 minutes – 1 hour preparing. 
c. I spent just the right amount of time preparing for the examination task 
d. I spent a little too much time preparing: I over-prepared by approximately 30 minutes – 1 
hour  
e. I spent way too much time preparing: I over-prepared by at least 2 hours 
Q2 Did your preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding of the case? 
a. The preparation effort contributed to confusion regarding case concepts and case facts 
b. The preparation effort was not helpful for understanding or identifying important case 
concepts 
c. The preparation effort was somewhat helpful for understanding or identifying important 
case concepts. 
d. The preparation effort was helpful in understanding and identifying important case concepts
e. The preparation effort was very helpful in understanding and identifying important case 
concepts. 
Q3 Estimate your level of confidence in the results of your examination? 
a. I found less than 20% of the evidence 
b. I found between 20–40% of the evidence 
c. I found between 41–60% of the evidence 
d. I found between 61–80% of the evidence 
e. I found between 81–100% of the evidence 
Q4 Were you given a sufficient amount of time to execute the examination? 
a. I needed a significant amount of additional time to execute the examination (> 2 hours) 
b. I needed additional time to execute the examination (1–2 hours) 
c. I needed a little bit of additional time to execute the examination (30 minutes – 1 hour) 
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Table 5.6   Phi Gamma Multiple Choice Survey Data 
Items 
 
Control Group Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 
P1 3 5 5 3 
P2 1 4 2 4 
P3 2 3 5 3 
P4 2 3 4 2 
P5 3 4 3 4 
P6 2 4 2 4 
MEDIAN 2 4 3.5 3.5 
Experimental Group     
G1 3 3 2 4 
G2 2 5 5 4 
G3 1 3 2 4 
G4 3 4 5 4 
G5 Did not reply 
G6 3 4 5 4 




5.3 Statistical Analysis of Phi Gamma Data Items 
As with the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie experiment trials, the preferred 
method for observing significant differences between means is the one-sided t-test. When 
the critical assumptions of the t-test are not satisfied, then the non-parametric Mann-
Whitney test is used to observe significant differences between means. All statistical tests 
are observed with a 90% confidence interval. Table 5.7 presents the results of the 
normality and variance tests that determine t-test eligibility for each pair of data items.  
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Table 5.7   Phi Gamma Data Items t-test Eligibility 
 









Planning Time Con. Group 0.879743 Yes 
Planning Time Exp. Group 0.456501 Yes 
0.152 Yes Yes 
Execution Time Con. Group 0.695062 Yes 
Execution Time Exp. Group 0.816702 Yes 
0.156 Yes Yes 
Total Time Con. Group 0.073187 No 
Total Time Exp. Group 0.644884 Yes 
0.067 
 No No 
%Jane Con. Group 0.079391 No 
%Jane Exp. Group 0.782827 Yes 
0.932 Yes No 
%Victor Con. Group 0.006373 No 
%Victor Exp. Group 0.003066 No 
0.048 No No 
%Frank Con. Group 0.415044 Yes 
%Frank Exp. Group 0.830223 Yes 
0.458 Yes Yes 
%Overall Con. Group 0.865666 Yes 
%Overall Exp. Group 0.331360 Yes 
0.456 Yes Yes 
%Found w/ Planned Keywords 
Con. Group 
0.827072 Yes 
%Found w/ Planned Keywords 
Exp. Group 
0.691910 Yes 
0.176 Yes Yes 
%Found w/ unplanned 
Keywords Con. Group 
0.001158 No 
%Found w/ unplanned 
Keywords Exp. Group 
0.479993 Yes 
0.968 
 Yes No 
%Found w/ all Keywords Con. 
Group 
0.865666 Yes 
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Table 5.8 presents the results of the Mann-Whitney tests and t-tests performed on 
the collected time/effort data items for the experimental and control groups. The t-value 
column is marked “N/A” when a Mann-Whitney test was performed. Time values are 
expressed in minutes. Based on the results of these tests, the following statement may be 
made with a high degree of certainty: the case domain modeling method contributed to a 
significant increase in the amount of time spent in planning the examination, but there 
was no significant differences in the overall time and execution time. In contrast to the 
Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials, the experimental group’s mean execution time was 
slightly lower than the control group’s mean execution time. 
 
 




( x ) 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) t p Outcome 
hc1 58.500 78.667 2.447 0.029 Accept hc1 
hc2 91.333 89.167 0.269 0.399 Reject hc2 
hc3 149.833 167.833 N/A 0.149 Reject hc3 
Hypothesis Legend 
hc1 = The experimental group dedicated a significantly greater amount of time on the 
planning session than the control group. 
hc2 = The experimental group spent a significantly less amount of time on the execution 
session than the control group. 
hc3 = The experimental group spent a significantly different amount of total time on the 




Table 5.9 provides the results of the t-tests performed on the data items that 
measured the amount of evidence found by the experimental and control groups. The 
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means are expressed in percentages. Based on the results of these tests, the experimental 
group found a significantly greater amount of evidence left by suspect Frank, and they also 
found a significantly greater amount of overall evidence. Additionally, the experimental 
group’s mean amount of evidence found was slightly higher than the control group’s mean 
amount of evidence found in the remaining two categories: Jane and Victor. 
 
 




( x ) in % 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) in % t p Outcome 
hc4 37.5 50.0 N/A 0.505 Reject hc4 
hc5 3.3 10.0 N/A 0.337 Reject hc5 
hc6 12.1 28.8 2.101 0.045 Accept hc6 
hc7 14.2 25.5 1.635 0.081 Accept hc7 
Hypothesis Legend 
hc4 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
left by Jane Doe than the control group 
hc5 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
left by Victor Linoge than the control group 
hc6 = The experimental group located a significantly greater amount of evidence files left 
by Frank Booth than the control group 
hc7 = The experimental group located a significantly greater amount of overall evidence 




Table 5.10 presents the results of the t-tests performed on the search method data 
items. Values are expressed in terms of the percentage of overall evidence found by using 
the specified search method. The non-keyword search category was not tested because no 
subjects reported the use of any non-keyword searching methods. The results of these 
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tests indicate that the experimental group found a significantly greater amount of 
evidence using unplanned keyword searches and overall keyword searches. The 
experimental group’s mean amount of evidence found using planned keyword searches 
was also slightly higher than the control group’s mean.  
 
 




( x ) in % 
Experimental 
Mean ( y ) in % t p Outcome 
hc8 11.8 17.6 0.919 0.20 Reject hc8 
hc9 2.5 7.8 N/A 0.094 Accept hc9 
hc10 14.2 25.5 1.635 0.081 Accept hc10 
Hypothesis Legend 
hc8 = The experimental group located a significantly greater amount of evidence files 
using planned keyword searches than the control group 
hc9 = The experimental group located a significantly different amount of evidence files 
using unplanned keyword searches than the control group 
hc10 = The experimental group located a significantly greater amount of evidence files 




Basic frequency distribution statistics are provided for the post-experiment survey 
data items. Table 5.11 presents the response distribution to survey question 1: Was the 
time you spent preparing appropriate for the examination task? The experimental group 
and control group means are both below three, which indicates that the subjects likely felt 
that they should have spent more time preparing for the examination. However, the 
experimental group’s median is slightly higher, indicating that they felt slightly more 
prepared than the control group. 
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Table 5.11   Phi Gamma Survey Q1 Response Distributions 
 








My preparation time was extremely short 
considering the difficulty of the 
examination: I should have spent at least 2 
additional hours preparing 
 1 / 16.67% 1 / 20.00% 
My preparation time was somewhat short 
considering the difficulty of the 
examination: I should have spent an 
additional 30 minutes – 1 hour preparing 
3 / 50.00% 1 / 20.00% 
I spent just the right amount of time 
preparing for the examination task 
2 / 33.33% 3 / 60.00% 
I spent a little too much time preparing: I 
over-prepared by approximately 30 
minutes – 1 hour  
0 / 0.00% 0 / 0.00% 
I spent way too much time preparing: I 
over-prepared by at least 2 hours 
0 / 0.00% 0 / 0.00% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q1 Median Response = 2 / 3 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 58.500 min. / 78.667 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 91.333 min. / 89.167 min.  
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Table 5.12 presents the response distributions for survey question 2: Did your 
preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding of the case? The 
experimental group and control group medians are identical (4), and both indicate that the 
subjects felt that their respective preparation methods were helpful. 
 
 
Table 5.12   Phi Gamma Survey Q2 Response Distributions 
 
Q2: Did your preparation efforts contribute to a clear and complete understanding 








The preparation effort contributed to 
confusion regarding case concepts and 
case facts 
0 / 0.00% 0 / 0.00% 
The preparation effort was not helpful for 
understanding or identifying important 
case concepts 
0 / 0.00% 0 / 0.00% 
The preparation effort was somewhat 
helpful for understanding or identifying 
important case concepts 
2 / 33.33% 2 / 40.00% 
The preparation effort was helpful in 
understanding and identifying important 
case concepts 
3 / 50.00% 2 / 40.00% 
The preparation effort was very helpful in 
understanding and identifying important 
case concepts 
1 / 16.67% 1 / 20.00%  
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q2 Median Response = 4 / 4  
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 58.500 min. / 78.667 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 91.333 min. / 89.167 min.  
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Table 5.13 presents the response distributions for survey question 3: Estimate 
your level of confidence in the results of your examination? The experimental group’s 
response median was higher than that of the control group, and this is consistent with the 
results of the overall amount of evidence found by the experimental group. 
 
 
Table 5.13   Phi Gamma Survey Q3 Response Distributions 
 








I found less than 20% of the 
evidence 
0 / 0.00% 0 / 0.00% 
I found 20–40% of the evidence 2 / 33.33% 0 / 0.00% 
I found 41–60% of the evidence 1 / 16.67% 2 / 40.00% 
I found 61–80% of the evidence 1 / 16.67% 0 / 0.00% 
I found 81–100% of the evidence 2 / 33.33% 3 / 60.00% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q3 Median Response = 3.5 / 5 




Table 5.14 presents the response distributions for survey question 4: Were you given a 
sufficient amount of time to execute the examination? The experimental group 
unanimously indicated that they had a sufficient amount of time to execute their search, 
while only 50% of the control group indicated that they had a sufficient amount of time to 
execute their search. This response is somewhat unexpected because the control group 
spent slightly less time (on average) than the experimental group during the examination 
session.  
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Table 5.14   Phi Gamma Survey Q4 Response Distributions 
 








I needed a significant amount of additional 
time to execute the examination (> 2 hours)
0 / 0.00% 0 / 0.00% 
I needed additional time to execute the 
examination (1–2 hours) 
1 / 16.67% 0 / 0.00% 
I needed a little bit of additional time to 
execute the examination (30 minutes – 1 
hour) 
2 / 33.33% 0 / 0.00% 
I executed all planned activities and was 
given a sufficient amount of time to execute 
the examination 
3 / 50.00% 5 / 100.00% 
Reference Data: 
Control/Experimental Group Q4 Median Response = 3.5 / 4  
Control/Experimental Group Mean Preparation Time = 58.500 min. / 78.667 min. 
Control/Experimental Group Mean Execution Time = 91.333 min. / 89.167 min.  




5.4 Discussion of Phi Gamma Results and Conclusions 
The results of the Phi Gamma experiment and its relation to the previous Alpha 
Delta/Bravo Charlie experiment trials are presented with respect to two research 
questions:  
1. Does the case domain modeling methodology result in an increased amount of 
evidence found in an examination? 
2. Does the case domain modeling methodology require a significant amount of 
additional effort when compared to a typical approach? 
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Sections 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 discuss the results with respect to research question 1, 
and Section 5.4.3 discusses the results with respect to research question 2. Finally, 
Section 5.4.4 provides conclusions and discusses implications that are relevant to the 
Alpha Delta, Bravo Charlie, and Phi Gamma experiment trials.  
5.4.1 Amount of Evidence 
Unlike the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie experiment trials, the Phi Gamma 
experiment trial yielded significant differences with respect to the amount of evidence 
found between the two groups. The experimental group found more evidence in all 
categories than the control group, and this difference was statistically significant in the 
Frank category and in the overall category. This result provides a strong affirmative 
response to research question 1. However, in order to observe this result, the case domain 
modeling approach was streamlined, a more document-seeded evidence drive was 
prepared, and a vivid case file was provided to the groups. It is assumed that the high 
occurrence of document file items on the disk contributed to the success of the case 
domain modeling method. The rationale behind this assumption involves the subjects’ 
exclusive use of keyword searching methods; this rationale is discussed in Section 5.4.2. 
5.4.2 Keyword Searching 
The experimental group found more evidence than the control group using 
planned keyword searching, unplanned keyword searching, and overall keyword 
searching. These differences were significant in the non-keyword searching and overall 
keyword searching categories. These results provide a strong affirmative response for 
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research question 2. Unlike the subject in the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie 
experiments, the subject in the Phi Gamma experiment reported no evidence files located 
with non-keyword searching techniques.  
Though the case domain modeling method was slightly modified in the Phi 
Gamma trial, the prescribed control group method remained unchanged from the Alpha 
Delta and Bravo Charlie trials. Therefore, the characteristics of the evidence disk, the 
case scenario, and the case scenario materials contributed heavily to the subjects’ reliance 
on planned and unplanned keyword searching methods. The Alpha Delta and Bravo 
Charlie results, like the Phi Gamma results, implied that case domain modeling improved 
the effectiveness of keyword searches. It is likely that this reliance on keyword search 
methods contributed heavily to the experimental group subjects’ ability to locate a 
significantly greater amount of evidence.  
5.4.3 Time and Effort 
The experimental group spent more time in the preparation session than the 
control group, less time in the examination session than the control group, and more 
overall time in the experiment than the control group. Of these three differences, only the 
differences in the preparation session are statistically significant. These results support an 
affirmative response to research question 2, indicating that the case domain modeling 
approach does require an additional amount of time when compared to more ad hoc 
approaches. However, the Phi Gamma experiment yields the first observance of the 
experimental group spending slightly less in any time category than the control group.  
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5.4.4 Overall Conclusions for the Three Practitioner Case Domain Modeling 
Experiments 
The Alpha Delta, Bravo Charlie, and Phi Gamma experiments were planned 
based on the three research questions outlined in the introduction to Section 5.4. Based on 
those research questions, hypotheses were constructed to be evaluated by statistical tests 
for differences between means. These hypotheses include:  
1. The experimental group will find a greater amount of evidence than the 
control group. 
2. The experimental group will spend more time in the preparation session 
than the control group. 
3. The experimental group will spend less time in the examination session 
than the control group. 
4. The experimental group will spend less overall time in the combined 
experiment activities than the control group. 
5. The experimental group will find more evidence using keyword searches 
than the control group. 
6. The experimental group will find more evidence using non-keyword 
searches than the control group. 
Table 5.15 presents a summary of the experiment results that relate to hypothesis 
1. For each experiment trial the following information is presented: the ratio of evidence 
categories where the experiment group found more evidence than the control group, the 
ratio of evidence categories where the experimental group located a significantly greater 
amount of evidence than the control group, and whether or not the experimental group 
located a greater amount of overall evidence than the control group (* indicates a 
statistically significant difference). Hypothesis 1 is supported because the experimental 
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group consistently located a greater overall amount of evidence than the control group, 
and this difference is significant in the Phi Gamma trial. 
 
 

















Alpha Delta 1 / 4 0 / 4 Yes 
Bravo Charlie 2 / 3 0 / 3 Yes 
Phi Gamma 3 / 3 1 / 3 Yes* 




Table 5.16 presents a summary of the experiment results that relate to hypotheses 
2–4. For each experiment trial the following information is provided: whether or not the 
experimental group spent a greater amount of time in the preparation session, whether or 
not the experimental group spent a greater amount of time in the execution session, and 
whether or not the experimental group spent a less overall amount of time in the 
examination. Table entries that contain an asterisk (*) represent a statistically significant 
difference. Hypothesis 2 is strongly supported because all three experiment trials revealed 
that the experimental group spent a significantly greater amount of time planning than the 
control group. This difference was expected because of the more rigorous nature of the 
case domain modeling preparation method. Hypothesis 3 is weakly supported by the fact 
that in the Phi Gamma trial, the experimental group spent slightly less time in the 
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examination than the control group. In contrast, in the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie 
experiment trials, the control group spent a significantly less amount of time in the 
examination session than the experimental group. Likewise, the control group 
consistently spent less overall time in the experiment than the experimental group, and 
these differences were significant in the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials.  
 
 













Alpha Delta Yes* No* No* 
Bravo Charlie Yes* No* No* 
Phi Gamma Yes* Yes No 




Table 5.17 summarizes the experiment results that relate to hypothesis 5 and 
hypothesis 6. For each experiment trial the following information is presented: whether 
or not the experimental group found a greater amount of evidence than the control group 
using unplanned keyword searches, planned keyword searches, all keyword searches, and 
non-keyword searches. Table entries that contain an asterisk (*) represent a statistically 
significant difference.. In all three experiment trials the experimental group found more 
evidence using overall keyword methods than the control group, and these differences 
were significant in the Bravo Charlie and Phi Gamma trials. The consistent trend and the 
significant differences strongly support hypothesis 5. The control group found more 
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evidence using non-keyword searches in the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials, and 
none of these differences were significant. In the Phi Gamma experiment no subjects 
reported any evidence files found using non-keyword searching methods. Though it 
would be ideal for case domain modeling to contribute to more evidence found using 
keyword and non-keyword searching methods, case domain modeling was specifically 
tailored for keyword searching methods. The failure of the experiments to support 
hypothesis 6 is not necessarily a negative outcome when considering the positive 
evidence supporting hypothesis 5. The control group generally found less evidence using 
keyword searches than the experimental group. It follows that the control group would 
find more evidence using non-keyword searches than the experimental group.  
 
 




















Alpha Delta No* Yes No No 
Bravo Charlie Yes Yes* Yes* No 
Phi Gamma Yes Yes* Yes* Equivalent 




With the exception of the Alpha Delta trial, the case domain modeling preparation 
method consistently and significantly increased the effectiveness of keyword searching in 
the experiment trials. The case domain modeling method also consistently yielded more 
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located evidence file items than the ad hoc method. In the Phi Gamma trial this difference 
was significant, and the utility of the case domain modeling approach was likely 
impacted by the characteristics of the evidence disk that contained significantly greater 
document file items than the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials; the Phi Gamma 
evidence disk contained more than 4,000 document file items, while the Alpha Delta and 
Bravo Charlie disks contained fewer than 100 document file items. Thus, when a 
practitioner feels that keyword searching will be heavily used in an examination, then the 
case domain modeling method would be an appropriate tool for deriving search goals and 
keyword search terms.  
The use of the case domain modeling approach requires an investment of 
additional time. In the Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie trials this overall investment of 
time was significantly greater than in the Phi Gamma trial. Though these differences were 
statistically significant, they represent a relatively negligible amount of time due to the 
brief nature of the experiments: a maximum of 3 or 4 hours was allowed in each of the 
experiment sessions. When the amount of document file items and case file information 
was significantly increased, the case domain modeling method contributed to a slightly 
lower examination time than the ad hoc method. This result implies that the case domain 
modeling method may contribute to lower examination times and perhaps a lower overall 
amount of time when a sufficiently large, complex case is encountered.  
5.5  Threats to Validity of the Experiments 
Threats to validity in this section are discussed with respect to three categories: 
internal validity, construct validity, and external validity. Internal validity refers to 
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whether or not there is a causal relationship between the case domain modeling planning 
method and the observed improvements in evidence collection and keyword searching. 
The results of the experiments established a strong relationship between the case domain 
modeling method and an increase in effort. It is possible that this additional effort caused 
the observed improvements in evidence collection and keyword searching. 
Construct validity refers to whether or not the data collected in the experiments 
accurately represents the quality of a computer forensics examination and the 
effectiveness of its search activities. One limitation of the study is that each evidence 
item is weighed equally and the quality of an examination is determined by how many 
evidence items are recovered. Though some items of evidence can be more valuable in a 
presentation, during the examination it is appropriate for the technician to find as much 
relevant evidence as possible. The experiments also do not evaluate qualitative factors 
such as the quality of the examination report or the repeatability of the examination 
procedure.   
External validity refers to whether or not the conclusions of these studies may be 
generalized to other practitioners of computer forensics now and in the future. The 
following factors should be considered before generalizing the results of these 
experiments: the duration of the examination activities, the size of the population, and the 
characteristics of the population. The planning methodology is designed for large-scale 
examinations and investigations that could require weeks or months of effort. Due to time 
constraints and the availability of subjects, the experiments provided a total of eight hours 
for the examination activity. Though the size of the subject population was sufficient to 
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observe statistically significant differences, the population size was not large enough to 
reject outliers in the results. Finally, the subjects were graduate and undergraduate 
computer science and engineering students taking an introductory computer forensics 
course. Though the target users of the methodology would have practical computer 
expertise, they would likely hold college degrees in criminal justice and accounting. 
Thus, the target user group would, at first, be less familiar with the theoretical concepts of 
domain modeling than the experiment subjects.  
Chapter 6 concludes the evaluation of case domain modeling by presenting the 
results of two case studies involving traditional law enforcement investigators. While the 
experiments in Chapter 4 and this chapter evaluated the utility of case domain modeling 
as a forensics examiner’s tool, Chapter 6 will evaluate the utility of case domain 











CASE DOMAIN MODELING APPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT 
INVESTIGATORS: PREPARING FOR AND SOLICITING 
COMPUTER FORENSICS SERVICES 
 
 
Case studies were conducted in order to elicit feedback from law enforcement 
investigators regarding the practicality and applicability of case domain modeling in 
soliciting the services of a forensics technician. The following two case studies 
correspond to the following dissertation research question: Is the case domain modeling 
method useful for typical law enforcement investigators who participate in cases 
involving computer forensics?  
Section 6.1 presents the design and results of Case Study 1, Section 6.2 presents 
the design and results of Case Study 2, Section 6.3 presents conclusions drawn from the 
two law enforcement case studies, and Section 6.4 presents the threats to validity of the 
case studies. 
6.1 Case Study 1: Pilot Study 
This case study involved two law enforcement investigators attending the CF101, 
Computer Forensics Tools and Techniques course at the Mississippi State University 
Computer Forensics Training Center. This case study was designed as a pilot study that 
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was run in order to prepare for the Case Study 2, which involved a larger group of 
subjects. Section 6.1.1 discusses the design of the case study, Section 6.1.2 presents the 
data that was collected from the subjects, and Section 6.1.3 presents a discussion of the 
results of the case study and conclusions. 
6.1.1 Case Study 1: Method 
The general purpose and design philosophy of Case Study 1 and Case Study 2 
were the same. Unlike the practitioner experiments, the subjects in these case studies 
were not distributed between a control group and an experimental group. Instead, all of 
the subjects in each case study were given the same instructional lecture, the same 
activity to complete, and the same post-study evaluation survey. Also, the subjects were 
not using case domain modeling in the same manner as the practitioner subjects used case 
domain modeling: In the Chapter IV & V experiments, the subjects created a case domain 
model and derived keyword search terms, and in these case studies the subjects were 
provided with a forensics service solicitation form supplemented with a generalized case 
domain model. The purpose of the case domain model in these case studies was to 
communicate to the investigator the hypothetical forensic technician’s assumptions 
regarding what information is most important with respect to a general type of case. The 
hypothesis is that communicating these assumptions will help solicit the most relevant 
information from the investigator while also giving them room to challenge these 
assumptions. Though the two case studies were somewhat different, in both instances the 
subjects were given a case scenario and tasked with filling out a forensics service 
solicitation form that featured the case domain model. 
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All subjects voluntarily participated in the experiment after all the planned 
coursework was completed. There was a total of three hours allocated for conducting the 
case study. The first 30–40 minutes was allocated to a training lecture that described the 
case study policies, research goals, and case domain modeling approach. The remaining 
2.5–2.67 hours were allocated to the subjects’ execution of a forensics service solicitation 
task. 
At the beginning of the forensics solicitation task the subjects were given the 
same email death threat case file materials that were provided to the subjects in the Phi 
Gamma practitioner experiment. The subjects were instructed to read the case file 
materials and complete a forensics service solicitation form that was prepared by a 
fictitious digital forensics service provider. They were also given a hard copy of the case 
domain model illustrated in Figure 6.1. The form solicited information as follows:  
1. Based on the Case Domain Model please identify all known attribute values 
by filling out the table below [Table 6.1 provides an excerpt of the table]. If 
attribute values are unknown, then mark “Unknown” in the attribute value 
fields. If you are unsure of attribute values based on your knowledge of the 
case, then mark “Unsure” in the attribute value field. If the attribute value is 
a very long text excerpt, mark “see attachment.” 
2. Are there any Missing Concepts or Attributes in the Case Domain Model? If 
so then list them in the space provided below. Be sure you identify a concept 
name for the missing attribute(s), and be sure to distinguish between concepts 
and attributes when identifying new concepts. 
3. Summarize the goals of your requested forensics service. Each goal statement 
should clearly and concisely state a single goal of the forensics examination. 
If possible, use concept and attribute names in your goal descriptions. If 
additional space is needed, then use the back of the page. 
4. Is there anyone else we should contact regarding the case? Please provide the 
contact information if possible. 




Figure 6.1   Email Death Threat Case Domain Model 
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Table 6.1   Partial Concept Attribute Value Table for Form Step 1 
 
Concept Name Attribute Name Attribute Value 
Suspect Name  
Suspect Phone Numbers  
Suspect Email Addresses  
Suspect Campus Logon ID  
Suspect GPA  
Suspect Classname List  
Suspect Recent Test Grades  
Suspect’s Email 
Account 
Provider Name  
Suspect’s Email 
Account 






Date Established  
Suspect’s Email 
Account 
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When the subjects finished conducting this forensics service solicitation task, the 
time that it took them to perform the task was recorded and they completed a survey that 
solicited information regarding their background and opinions regarding their case study 
experience. The survey contains five multiple choice questions and six discussion/short 
answer questions. Table 6.2 presents the multiple choice questions and Table 6.3 presents 
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Table 6.2   Case Study 1 Multiple Choice Survey Questions 
 
Question 
ID Question Statement and Response Choices 
MQ1 Rate your level of expertise and confidence with respect to computers and 
software technology. 
a. Little to No Computer Experience 
b. Beginner Computer User 
c. Novice Computer User 
d. Advanced Computer User 
e. Expert Computer User 
MQ2 On a 1-5 scale, rate your understanding of the content and purpose of the case 
domain model. 1 indicates the lowest level of understanding and 5 indicates 
the highest level of understanding. (Circle the appropriate number) 
1  2 3 4 5 
MQ3 On a 1-5 scale, do you think that building (from scratch) a case domain 
model or a similar type of model would be a practical tool for use in actual 
investigations and forensics examinations? 1 indicates the lowest level of 
utility/practicality, and 5 indicates the highest level of utility/practicality. 
(Circle the appropriate number) 
1  2 3 4 5 
MQ4 On a 1-5 scale, would requesting forensics services using the method 
outlined in the exercise be helpful to you? 1 indicates the lowest level of 
utility and 5 indicates the highest level of utility. (Circle the appropriate 
number) 
1  2 3 4 5 
MQ5 Did the modeling contribute to a clear and complete understanding of the 
case? 
a. The preparation effort contributed to confusion regarding case 
concepts and case facts 
b. The preparation effort was not helpful for understanding or 
identifying important case concepts 
c. The preparation effort was somewhat helpful for understanding or 
identifying important case concepts. 
d. The preparation effort was helpful in understanding and identifying 
important case concepts 
e. The preparation effort was very helpful in understanding and 
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Table 6.3   Case Study 1 Discussion/Short Answer Survey Questions 
 
Question ID Question Statement 
DQ1 How many years have you been a law enforcement agent? 
DQ2 Approximately how many times have you requested computer forensics 
services? 
DQ3 In the assignment scenario, would you perform any additional 
investigative activities before submitting your request for forensics 
services? If so, did the case domain model and request form help you 
arrive at this conclusion? 
DQ4 Describe the strengths of the case domain model and the service request 
method. 
DQ5 Describe the weaknesses of the case domain model and the service request 
method. 




6.1.2 Case Study 1: Data Collected 
This section reports the time spent by the subjects and their responses to the post-
experiment survey. Table 6.4 presents the time data collected for the two subjects. Time 
is expressed in minutes, and the average time of the two subjects is presented in the last 
row of the table. 
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Table 6.5 reports the subjects’ responses to the multiple choice post-experiment 
survey questions. The letter response values (a–e) for MQ1 and MQ5 were transposed to 
numbers (1–5). The median response values are provided on the last row of the table. 
Table 6.6 reports the subjects’ responses to the discussion/short answer questions. 




Table 6.5   Case Study 1 Multiple Choice Survey Responses 
 
SubjectID/QuestionID MQ1 MQ2 MQ3 MQ4 MQ5 
CS1 3 2 4 4 3 
CS2 2 2 4 4 3 
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Table 6.6   Case Study 1 Discussion/Short Answer Survey Responses 
 
Question ID/SubjectID CS1 CS2 
DQ1  
(yrs. in law enforcement) 
27 6 
DQ2  
(number of digital forensics 
requests) 
0 0 
DQ3 Yes I would like other 
question added – (chat logs) 
The model (domain) did give 
me other ideas (history logs) 
(user names) 
Yes the investigator should 
have checked up on the 
stories he got from Jane, it 
did not match the story of 
Palmer. In general the 
investigator should go more 
in depth. 
DQ4 I think it could help a jury 
understand better if in layman 
terms. 
It would be a good 
guideline for investigators 
to go by during the 
investigation. 
DQ5 Maybe tough to explain to a 
jury 
No Response 
DQ6 Great job. Just not sure I was 





6.1.3 Case Study 1: Discussion of Results and Conclusions 
The two subjects in the experiment had 27 and 6 years of law enforcement 
investigative experience. Both subjects indicated that they had never requested computer 
forensics services. One subject indicated that he/she was a beginner computer user, while 
the other subject indicated that he/she was a novice computer user.  
The responses to the multiple choice survey questions are inconsistent. On MQ2, 
both subjects indicated that they did not clearly understand the purpose of the case 
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domain modeling method; both subjects responded with a 2, where the range of responses 
was 1–5 (5 indicating the highest level of understanding). The subjects also responded 
somewhat moderately to MQ5, as each responded that “the preparation method was 
somewhat helpful in understanding and identifying important case concepts.” However, 
on MQ3 and MQ4 the subjects responded more strongly and favorably to case domain 
modeling; they both responded with a 4 (1 indicates the most negative response and 5 
indicates the most affirmative response) when asked, “Do you think that building (from 
scratch) a case domain model or a similar type of model would be a practical tool for use 
in actual investigations and forensics examinations?,” and “Would requesting forensics 
services using the method outlined in the exercise be helpful to you?” 
The subjects’ comments in MQ3, MQ4, and MQ5 also provide some insight 
regarding the case domain modeling preparation method. Subject CS1 indicated in MQ3 
that the model helped them consider alternative investigative ideas/possibilities. In MQ4 
the subjects indicated the positive aspects of the case domain model by indicating that it 
could be helpful for presenting to a jury and helpful as an investigative guideline. 
However, the same subject indicated that the model may be difficult to explain to a jury.  
Though the subjects provided positive indications that case domain modeling 
would be practical and useful for digital forensics solicitations, subjects also indicated 
that they did not clearly understand the case domain modeling method. It is assumed that 
the training session and the solicitation form may have presented too many theoretical 
concepts that confused the subjects. Based on these responses a revised training session 
and forensics request form was prepared for Case Study 2. 
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6.2 Case Study 2 
This case study involved seven law enforcement investigators attending the 
CF102, Computer Forensics Tools and Techniques course at the Mississippi State 
University Computer Forensics Training Center. This case study was a repeat of Case 
Study 1, but with revised training, activity form, and survey materials. These revisions 
were made based on the results of Case Study 1 and were an attempt to present a less 
theoretical lecture on case domain modeling. Section 6.2.1 discusses the design of the 
case study, Section 6.2.2 presents the data that was collected from the subjects, and 
Section 6.2.3 presents a discussion of the results of the case study and conclusions.  
6.2.1 Case Study 2: Method 
As in Case Study 1, Case Study 2 involved a training session, a case domain 
modeling driven digital forensics service solicitation activity, and a post-case study 
survey. The training presentation was revised/extended to provide more concrete 
examples of case domain modeling. Also, the term, “case domain modeling” was 
replaced with a more user-friendly term, “search scope diagram.” The forensics service 
solicitation form was also revised and extended to more explicitly include the case 
domain modeling and separately solicit case information from defined categories. Figure 
6.2 presents a section of the forensics solicitation form that preceded a query for 












Figure 6.3 presents a portion of the solicitation form fields that preceded the 
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For each suspect involved in the case please fill out the 
following forms.  If you need additional space please use the 
back of the page.  We will use this information to look for 
documents and files that were likely authored by the 
suspect(s). 
------------------------------------Student Suspect 1------------------------------ 
Name:____________________________________________  







Address:   
















Address:   
Street:______________________________  City:_____________  
State:____Zip:_____ 
Other:______ 
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Table 6.7   Case Study 2 Short Answer/Discussion Survey Questions 
 
Question 
ID Question Statement 
DQ1 How many years have you been a law enforcement agent? 
DQ2 Approximately how many times have you requested computer forensics 
services? 
DQ3 Approximately how many times have you performed computer forensics 
services? 
DQ4 Describe the strengths of the search scope model and the service request 
method. 
DQ5 Describe the weaknesses of the search scope model and the service request 
method. 




Most of the multiple choice questions in the Case Study 2 survey were different 
than those in the Case Study 1 survey. Table 6.8 presents the multiple choice questions 
included in the Case Study 2 survey. Note that the term “case domain model” is replaced 
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Table 6.8   Case Study 2 Multiple Choice Survey Questions 
 
Question 
ID Question Statement and Response Choices 
MQ1 Rate your level of expertise and confidence with respect to computers and 
software technology. 
a. Little to No Computer Experience 
b. Beginner Computer User 
c. Novice Computer User 
d. Advanced Computer User 
e. Expert Computer User 
MQ2 On a 1-5 scale, rate your understanding of the content and purpose of the 
search scope diagrams included in the forensics service request form. 1 
indicates the lowest level of understanding and 5 indicates the highest level 
of understanding. (Circle the appropriate number) 
1 2 3 4 5 
MQ3 On a 1-5 scale, rate your ability and potential to learn how to effectively 
build a search scope model from scratch? 1 indicates the lowest level of 
competence, and 5 indicates the highest level of competence. (Circle the 
appropriate number)  
1 2 3 4 5 
MQ4 On a 1-5 scale, would requesting forensics services using the method 
outlined in the exercise be helpful to you? 1 indicates the lowest level of 
utility and 5 indicates the highest level of utility. (Circle the appropriate 
number) 
1 2 3 4 5 
MQ5 Do you feel that reviewing the search scope model (in the training session 
and in the forensics request forms) helped you to realize flaws in the 
investigation that occurred in the scenario? 1 indicates the lowest level of 
usefulness and 5 indicates the highest level of usefulness. (Circle the 
appropriate number) 
1 2 3 4 5 
MQ6 Do you think that the search scope diagrams would be a helpful visual aid 
for presenting computer forensics findings to a jury? 1 indicates the lowest 
level of usefulness and 5 indicates the highest level of usefulness. (Circle the 
appropriate number) 
1 2 3 4 5 
MQ7 If you had a large collection of search scope diagrams that outlined many 
common computer forensics cases, would they helpful reference tools for 
planning your pre-forensics investigation? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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6.2.2 Case Study 2: Data Collected 
Table 6.9 presents the demographic information collected for MQ1, DQ1, DQ2, 
and DQ3. The average response for MQ1 is 3, “Novice Computer User.” The average 
number of years of investigative experience is 24.17, the average number of times the 
subjects requested and performed digital forensics services is 2.8 and 0, respectively. 
Subject CS5 did not respond to any of the survey questions, and subject CS3 did not 




Table 6.9  Case Study 2 Demographic Information 
 
Question CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 Average
MQ1 (Computer 
Expertise 1 – 5) 
3 3 4 3 No 
Response




26 19 53 16 No 
Response
13 18 24.17* 
DQ2 (# of times 
requested 
forensics) 
1 10 Numerous 0 No 
Response
0 3 2.8** 
DQ3 (# of times 
performed 
forensics) 
0 0 Numerous 0 No 
Response
0 0 0** 
*This average excludes CS5 because CS5 did not provide a response 
**This average excludes CS5 and CS3 because CS5 did not provide a response, and CS3 




Table 6.10 presents the results to survey multiple choice questions MQ2–MQ7. 
The median responses for each question are provided in the right-most column. Subject 
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CS5 did not provide responses to any of these questions, so his/her responses are not 
included in the computed medians. 
 
 
Table 6.10   Case Study 2 Multiple Choice Question Responses MQ2–MQ7 
 
Question CS1 CS2 CS3 CS4 CS5 CS6 CS7 Median
MQ2 
(comprehension) 
4 4 3 3 N/A 4 2 *3.5 
MQ3 (potential to 
learn to develop 
models) 
4 3 3 3 N/A 3 3 *3 
MQ4 (utility) 4 2 3 3 N/A 4 3 *3 
MQ5 (realizing 
flaws) 
4 4 3 3 N/A 4 3 *3.5 
MQ6  
(visual aid) 




4 4 2 3 N/A 3 3 *3 




Only one subject provided a response to one of the discussion questions DQ4–
DQ6. Subject CS3 responded to DQ4, which asked the subjects to comment on the 
strengths of the forensics service solicitation method with the search scope diagram: 
“Effective but a lot of lost time due to information and data transfer.”  
6.2.3 Case Study 2: Discussion of Results and Conclusions 
The subjects’ responses to the multiple choice questions MQ2–MQ7 may be 
characterized as moderate: the responses of these questions have a range of 1–5, and the 
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average responses for MQ2–MQ7 were between 3 and 3.5. This moderate 
characterization is also supported by the fact that only one subject responded to any of 
the discussion questions.  
The average response to MQ2 indicate that the subjects had a moderate 
comprehension of the search scope method, and half of the responding subjects indicated 
a high comprehension of the search scope model (indicating 4 out of a possible 5). This is 
an improvement over Case Study 1, when both subjects indicated a low comprehension 
of the search scope method.  
MQ5 asks, “Do you feel that reviewing the search scope model (in the training 
session and in the forensics request forms) helped you to realize flaws in the investigation 
that occurred in the scenario?” The subjects responded more positively to MQ5 (median 
response = 3.5) than to any of the other questions. Fifty percent of the subjects indicated 
4 to MQ5, and the remaining 50% of the subjects indicated 3.  
One subject responded to a discussion question by indicating that the case domain 
modeling service solicitation method was useful but that it duplicated case information 
and took time to transfer information. Other case study subjects indicated similar 
responses in discussions with the principal investigator after the case study. It is likely 
that many investigators do not want to perform any more “paperwork” than is necessary, 
and the subjects seemed to have viewed the activity as paperwork. This seems to imply 
that the subjects would respond more favorably to the case domain modeling method if it 
were supported by a semi-automated tool that reduced the form-filling/paperwork nature 
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of the method. It also was not explained to the subjects that the prescribed method was 
experimental and would involve a technology transfer phase before being adopted. 
6.3 Case Study 1 and Case Study 2: Summary and Conclusions 
These case studies were designed to form a response to the research question that 
states: Is the case domain modeling method useful for typical law enforcement 
investigators who participate in cases involving computer forensics? The purpose of the 
case domain modeling method in these case studies was to solicit important case 
information from the investigators and support communication and knowledge transfer 
between the investigators and the forensics technicians. The conclusions presented in this 
section are based on the subjects’ responses to post-case-study surveys. The following 
two paragraphs will summarize the results of Case Study 1 and Case Study 2. When 
responses to multiple choice questions are discussed, the value of the subjects’ responses 
may be provided to supplement the discussion. These multiple choice questions have a 
range of 1–5, where 1 is the most negative response and 5 is the most positive response.  
In Case Study 1, both subjects indicated that the method was useful when they 
responded with a 4 to two survey questions regarding the utility of the method in 
practical investigations. However, both subjects indicated that they did not have a clear 
understanding of the case domain modeling method: both subjects indicated a 2 to the 
survey question regarding method comprehension. Based on the subjects’ difficulty in 
understanding the method, the training materials and case domain modeling forensics 
solicitation exercise were modified for use in Case Study 2. The desired result of these 
modifications was to increase subjects’ comprehension of the prescribed forensics service 
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solicitation method. Additionally, in the discussion questions one subject indicated that 
the method would be useful for presentation to a jury (but difficult to explain to a jury), 
while the other subject indicated that the method would be a useful guideline for 
investigators to follow during an investigation.   
The modifications to the training materials and case domain modeling forensics 
service solicitation method yielded an increase in subject comprehension. The median 
response to the survey question regarding comprehension was 3.5: three subjects 
indicated a value of 4, two subjects indicated a value of 3, and only one subject indicated 
a value of 2. The overall practitioner response to the case domain modeling method for 
forensics service solicitation may be characterized as moderate; the subjects did not react 
overwhelmingly positively or negatively when queried about the benefits or drawbacks of 
the prescribed method. The subjects indicated the most positive response when asked if 
the method helped them realize flaws in the investigative activities outlined in the case 
file; the median response was 3.5. Subjects indicated in discussion questions and in post-
case-study conversations that the method duplicated paperwork and required excessive 
time for information transfer.  
Based on the results of the case study the law enforcement subjects indicated that 
case domain modeling was most useful for identifying flaws in the investigative effort. 
Their overall response was moderate; they did not provide an overwhelmingly positive or 
negative response to the utility of case domain modeling. They also indicated that case 
domain modeling was somewhat difficult to understand in the exercise. Since the service 
solicitation exercise was primarily a form-filling/information transfer task, many subjects 
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had the impression that case domain modeling meant more paperwork. Subjects would 
likely respond more favorably to the same exercise if a semi-automated software tool 
supported the information transfer. 
6.4 Threats to Validity 
The threats to validity in these case studies are discussed in this section with 
respect to three categories: internal validity, construct validity, and external validity. 
Internal validity refers to whether or not the occurrence of case domain modeling in the 
solicitation activity caused the subjects to indicate that the solicitation method was 
moderately useful. The subjects were taking a free training course, and they may have felt 
obligated to respond positively on the surveys. Though their responses were not 
overwhelmingly positive, the subjects may have been more inclined to react more 
negatively if the study were not conducted in association with a free training course.   
Construct validity refers not only to how accurately the survey solicited 
qualitative factors such as utility, but it also refers to how well the case study activity 
applied case domain modeling. In the studies, the purpose and method of domain 
modeling were discussed, and case domain models were used as visual aids and 
supporting features of the service solicitation task. Since the subjects in the study were 
not required to build domain models their survey responses (see MQ3 in case study 1) 
regarding the utility, building domain models was based on speculation and their ability 
to understand the fundamental theories of domain modeling. Additionally, since the 
survey was relatively brief, it did not include a pool of questions regarding the utility of 
case domain modeling in specific scenarios.  
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External validity refers to whether or not the conclusions of these studies may be 
generalized to other practitioners of computer forensics now and in the future. Since the 
combined population of these studies is nine subjects, it would be inappropriate to apply 
the conclusions of these studies to a large general population of law enforcement 
practitioners involved in computer forensics examinations. Additionally, the population 
of the study was primarily veteran law enforcement investigators with limited 
information technology and computer forensics expertise. The target user group of the 
methodology described in Chapter III has a more extensive information technology 
background and is routinely involved in large-scale and complex computer forensics 
cases. Target users of the methodology are likely to be employed by federal agencies, 
while the subjects in the case studies were employed by state and county law enforcement 
agencies.  
The next chapter, Chapter 7, will conclude this document by summarizing the 
results of all the experiments and case studies, providing responses to the research 










CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 This chapter concludes the dissertation by summarizing the conclusions formed 
that correspond to the three research questions:  
1. Does the case domain modeling methodology result in an increased amount of 
evidence found in an examination? 
2. Does the case domain modeling methodology require a significant amount of 
additional effort when compared to a typical approach? 
3. Is the case domain modeling method useful for typical law enforcement 
investigators who participate in cases involving computer forensics? 
Section 7.1 discusses research question 1, Section 7.2 discusses research question 
2, and Section 7.3 discusses research question 3. Finally, Section 7.4 presents a 
discussion of future research for case domain modeling in computer forensics. 
7.1 Research Question 1: The Amount of Evidence Found in Examination 
As indicated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, examination planning with case domain 
modeling consistently contributed to a greater amount of evidence found by experiment 
subjects. The experimental group used the case domain modeling method and the control 
group used a typical, ad hoc method. The experimental group subjects found a 
significantly greater amount of evidence in the Phi Gamma trial, where relatively vivid 
case details were provided and a relatively abundant amount of document file items were 
present on the evidence drive. These experimental group subjects also found a greater 
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amount of overall evidence, albeit not significantly greater, in two experiment trials 
(Alpha Delta and Bravo Charlie) where only vague case background details were 
provided. Table 7.1 reprises Table 5.15 and presents a summary of the results of the three 
experiments with respect to the amount of evidence found. Experiment 3 yielded the best 
performance by the case domain modeling group: the case domain modeling subjects 
found more evidence than the control group in all three evidence categories, the 
difference in one of these evidence categories was statistically significant, and the 
difference in overall evidence was statistically significant. When compared to other 
experiments, Experiment 3 had a relatively vivid case file/background and the evidence 
drive contained an abundance of document file item types. Based on the comparison of 
the amount of evidence found by the subject groups, the following statement applies to 
Research Question 1: Examination planning with case domain modeling contributes to an  
 
 

















Alpha Delta 1 / 4 0 / 4 Yes 
Bravo Charlie 2 / 3 0 / 3 Yes 
Phi Gamma 3 / 3 1 / 3 Yes* 
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increase in the amount of evidence found, and this improvement is significant when the 
forensics technician is provided with vivid case details and an evidence disk with a 
relatively high occurrence of document file items. 
Data collected from Experiments 1–3 also includes information regarding the 
search methods that subjects used for locating evidence. These methods were categorized 
as planned keyword searches, unplanned keyword searches, overall keyword searches, 
and non-keyword searches. Table 7.2 provides a reprisal of Table 5.17 and a summary of 
the experiment results with respect to the amount of evidence found with search methods. 
With the exception of the Alpha Delta trial, case domain modeling consistently 
contributed to a greater amount of evidence located using unplanned and overall keyword 
searching. Additionally, in the majority of the experiment trials, case domain modeling 
subjects located more evidence using planned keyword searches than the control group  
 
 




















Alpha Delta No* Yes No No 
Bravo Charlie Yes Yes* Yes* No 
Phi Gamma Yes Yes* Yes* Equivalent 
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subjects. Based on the comparison of the amount of evidence found by the subject groups 
using particular search methods, the following statement applies to Research Question 1: 
Examination planning with case domain modeling contributes to more effective keyword 
searches when compared to a typical, ad hoc planning approach. 
7.2 Research Question 2: The Effort Involved in Applying Case Domain Modeling 
As indicated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, case domain modeling contributed to a 
consistent increase in the amount of planning effort and overall effort. Table 7.3 reprises 
Table 5.16 and presents a summary of the differences between the experimental (case 
domain modeling) and control (ad hoc) groups in Experiments 1–3. In all of the 
experiment trials the case domain modeling method contributed to a significant increase 
in preparation time. This difference was expected, and it was hypothesized that an up-
front investment of case domain modeling effort would contribute to a lower examination 
time. The results of the experiments do not support that hypothesis, as in all but one trial 
(Phi Gamma), the experimental groups’ examination times were significantly greater than 
the control groups’ examination times. Based on these observations, the following 
statement applies to Research Question 2: Generally, the case domain modeling method 
requires a significant increase in planning and examination time. However, in its most 
successful trial, case domain modeling contributed to a lower examination mean time. It 
is also important to note that the experiment sessions were limited to four hours each, 
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Alpha Delta Yes* No* No* 
Bravo Charlie Yes* No* No* 
Phi Gamma Yes* Yes No 




7.3 Research Question 3: Utility for Traditional Investigators  
In Case Study 1, both subjects indicated that the method was useful when they 
responded positively to two survey questions regarding the utility of the method in 
practical investigations. However, both subjects indicated that they did not have a clear 
understanding of the case domain modeling method. Based on the subjects’ difficulty in 
understanding the method, the training materials and case domain modeling forensics 
solicitation exercise were modified for use in Case Study 2. The desired result of these 
modifications was to increase subject comprehension of the prescribed forensics service 
solicitation method. Additionally, in the discussion questions one subject indicated that 
the method would be useful for presentation to a jury (but difficult to explain to a jury), 
while the other subject indicated that the method would be a useful guideline for 
investigators to follow during an investigation.   
The modifications to the training materials and case domain modeling forensics 
service solicitation method produced an increase in subject comprehension. The average 
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response to the survey question regarding comprehension increased from 2 to 3.33 (out of 
a possible 5). The overall practitioner response to the case domain modeling method for 
forensics service solicitation may be characterized as moderate; the subjects did not react 
overwhelmingly positively or negatively when queried about the benefits or drawbacks of 
the prescribed method. The subjects indicated the most positive response when asked if 
the method helped them realize flaws in the investigative activities outlined in the case 
file; the average response was 3.5 out of 5. Additionally, subjects indicated in discussion 
questions and in post-case-study conversations that the method duplicated paperwork and 
required excessive time for information transfer.  
Since the service solicitation exercise was primarily a form-filling/information 
transfer task, many subjects had the impression that case domain modeling meant more 
paperwork. Subjects would likely respond more favorably to the same exercise if a semi-
automated software tool supported the information transfer. Based on the results of the 
case studies, the following statement applies to Research Question 3: Law enforcement 
investigators indicated that case domain modeling was moderately effective for soliciting 
computer forensics services. Additionally, the subjects indicated in conversation that the 
method would be more useful if supported by a semi-automated software tool.  
7.4 Future Work 
This dissertation represents the first known research concerning the application of 
domain modeling to planning and executing computer forensics examinations. Thus, the 
adoption of case domain modeling is not likely to occur until further research has been 
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conducted, ready-to-use methodologies are refined, and semi-automated tools are 
implemented (i.e. technology transfer).  
The results of this dissertation research suggest that case domain modeling would 
be more appropriate for cases involving vivid details with an abundance of document 
items on the evidence drive. Future experiments could more definitively evaluate this 
observation by further characterizing the attributes of an evidence disk and its underlying 
case scenario. Additionally, it would be beneficial to evaluate the performance of case 
domain modeling against other typical or ad hoc approaches. For example, the control 
group could be given a detailed lesson on Forensic Toolkit and instructed to begin the 
examination without a preparation session. Such variations would provide more 
definitive answers regarding the effectiveness of case domain modeling and other 
approaches to digital forensics examinations.  
Finally, future research work should include case studies where investigators use 
case domain modeling as an analytical tool instead of an information transfer and fact 
checking tool. If possible, future research work should include experiments (similar to the 
student experiments in this dissertation) that involve law enforcement investigators and 
forensics practitioners. Criminal justice students could provide another alternative 
population of experiment subjects. 
Based on the results of future research, a ready-to-use case domain modeling 
methodology could be defined and adopted by practicing organizations. Though the 
definition of the methodology may be fundamentally similar to the definition of case 
domain modeling in software engineering, the methodology should be tailored to a 
  210 
 
diverse audience of forensics practitioners and law enforcement officers; it should be 
written such that law enforcement organizations could include it in their standard 
operating procedure documentation.  
Finally, when a case domain modeling methodology is well defined, software 
tools may be designed and implemented to support the methodology. Such tools should 
be supportive of the end-to-end practice of computer forensics planning, execution, and 
documentation. Such tools should also include support for other widely adopted digital 
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